For two-plus generations the United Nations (UN) is committed to confronting the threat posed by international and transnational terrorism. This post addresses the early efforts of the UN and subsequent organizations and offices that have endeavored to engage in actions and activities consistent with counterterrorism. This post examines recent United Nations’ counterterrorism  efforts. The post concludes with an analysis of the progress and problems that have developed in the wake of the UN’s efforts to confront terrorism?

Background

On international terrorism the UN Security Council has passed a host of resolutions seeking to condemn and respond to state sponsored terrorism and those terrorist groups that have committed acts of violence consistent with this form of terror.

This post however is limited to recent actions taken by the United Nations to deal with transnational terrorism in the form of Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and other major organizations of this type.

The United Nations General Assembly in September 2006 adopted a Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288). This plan of action created “a unique instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counterterrorism.”[1] In short, the plan action marked the first time that member states of UN “agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism.”[2]

The framework created a rudimentary UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy. The UN counterterrorism strategy consists of four pillars: (1) designed to “address the conditions responsible for the spread of terrorism”; (2) to work to prevent and combat terrorism; (3) build the capacity of states “to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthen the UN system’s role in this regard”; and (4) ensure “the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”[3] The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy central function is to develop an international center that would enhance the fight against terrorism.

There are other organs within the United Nations that maintained responsibilities for the dealing with the counterterrorism. In September 2011 the United Nations Counterterrorism Center (UNCCT) was established to “to promote international counterterrorism cooperation and support Member States in the implementation of the Global Counterterrorism Strategy.”[4]

On November 18, 2011, the General Assembly established the UNCCT “within the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office  of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the UN Secretariat and encouraged Member States to collaborate with the Center (A/RES/66/10).”[5]

The most recent and certainly one of the most significant aspects of the UN’s machinery charged with the dealing with threat of transnational terrorism is The United Nations Office of Counterterrorism which was created following the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 71/291 on June 15, 2017. On June 21, 2017 Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov was appointed the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counterterrorism.

The Office of Counterterrorism is tasked with carrying out multiple functions. The first function of the office is to “provide leadership on the General Assembly counterterrorism mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General from across the United Nations system.”[6] Second, the office is charged with enhancing “coordination and coherence across the 38 Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact (former CTITF).”[7]

Third, the office worked to “strengthen the delivery of United Nations counterterrorism capacity-building assistance to Member States.”[8] Fourth, the office endeavors to “improve visibility, advocacy and resource mobilization for United Nations counterterrorism efforts”; and fifth, office is given the function of ensuring “that due priority is given to counterterrorism across the United Nations system and that the important work on preventing violent extremism is firmly rooted in the Strategy.”[9]

In another important aspect of the office are the evolving “relationships with the Security Council and Member States.”[10] The office’s expertise is enhanced by these relationships. In addition, experts in the office are interested in developing other “partnerships through regular travel and attendance at counterterrorism-related meetings.”[11]

For many, the UN machinery appeared to be moving the international community in the right direction—confronting the specter of terrorism in ways the supra-international organization, led by the Security Council, failed to accomplish. 

Analysis

There are several positives associated with the UN counterterrorism efforts. Despite statements by the US-led anti-ISIS Global Coalition concerning the decline of the Islamic State in the wake of the collapse of the caliphate, the office of counterterrorism issued a detailed report the international community that the threat posed by ISIS is still significant.[12]

In addition, the office provided data on the numbers of fighters that remain associated with the Islamic States insurgency both in Iraq and Syria. This data contradicted the information provide the Department of Defense which initially issued estimates of ISIS’s insurgency at numbers far lower that of the UN. 

The work of the Office of Counterterrorism is a major, indeed comprehensive effort to construct a common framework … [that places] special emphasis on the Security Council’s Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Secretariat’s Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).”[13]

The UN has increased cooperation among regional organizations and member states in sharing critical data on terrorist organizations and those that comprise their memberships. There is an increasing focus on the need to not address terrorism but work to eradicate what is a threat to regional and international security.

There is a long list of problems associated with UN Counterterrorism efforts. For example, the counterterrorism sanctions regime proved cumbersome and extremely time consuming. The following excerpt illustrates the point:

The counterterrorism sanctioning regime has now been modified by various resolutions. Resolutions 1333, 1390, 1455, 1526 and 1617 require all states to impose a travel ban and arms embargo on, and freeze the assets of, individuals and entities listed as being “associated with” the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda or their affiliates (henceforth referred to as the 1267 regime). The 1267 Committee is now mandated to maintain an updated list of individuals and entities who are associated with these groups and whose assets are therefore to be frozen. 17 States are to submit reports to the 1267 Committee on the implementation of the measures contained in the resolutions. Resolution 1526 established a Monitoring Team to report on how the sanctions are being implemented and to recommend new measures to improve them.[14]

The committee’s listing and delisting procedures are equally cumbersome and problematic. There is another issue—the 1267 regime. It is problematic in that “the 1267 regime is restrained by the core right to a fair hearing as reflected injus cogens and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The sanctioning regime breaches this right in particular by providing no effective mechanism of review for listed individuals.”[15] What can be done to resolve this dilemma? In a word, reform. Reform in that “the 1267 regime would strengthen it by adding credibility and encouraging better cooperation from states.”[16]

During a review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in June of 2018 a major issue surfaced—the failure to deal with human rights abuses. There is an attendant problem associated with this issue. As expressed by Hanny Megally, a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, who forcefully argued the UN failed “to adequately address the human rights abuses being committed, and the increasing erosion of international humanitarian law in the name of combatting terrorism.”[17]

An ongoing dilemma that continues to impact the UN counterterrorism effort is the failure to achieve a consensus on approaches “to violent extremism, the identification of the conditions and drivers to radicalization, the important role of civil society in ensuring an effective global strategy, and even on the attention being paid to gender.”[18]

Human rights organizations weighed in on the abuses and the expansion of the use of force under the aegis of counterterrorism. These NGOs have expressed outraged over “the failure to adequately address human rights abuses and the increased militarization of counterterrorism approaches. We are also concerned about member states’ failure to provide an enabling environment for civil society entities.”[19]

There is little doubt the United Nation’s counterterrorism efforts have proven comprehensive, increased attention on transnational terrorism and their leaders, increased the capacity of regional and member states to confront the threat of terrorism, and continues the global effort to implement a framework of continuing cooperation and coalition building to eliminate the threat.

There are questions about the abdication of the Security Council and the maintenance of international peace. These questions, critics argued often undermine the excellent efforts of the many aspects of the UN to confront terrorism.

What are the questions? Did the United Nations Security Council abandon its responsibility to deal with the threats to peace and international security to multiple bureaucratic entities which it has little control over? Did the Security Council surrender its authority to an evolving and committed entity that had too much on its plate? Will the Security Council attempt to wrestle some of bodies old counterterrorism functions away from the Office of Counterterrorism? Speaking of the Office of Counterterrorism, is it prepared to protect its turf? These are just a sample of the menu of issues that must be resolved before the next phase of effective UN counterterrorism is to take place.

Endnotes

[1] “Implementing the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy in Central Asia Concept Paper,” https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/concept_note_eng_0p dfheirnationalefforts.

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] “Background: The Office of Counterterrorism.” https://www.un.org/counterterrorism /ctitf/en uncct.

[5] Ibid

[6] See “United Nations Office of Counterterrorism.” The United Nations. https:// www .un.org/en/counterterrorism/.

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] “ISIS Terrorists Remain “Global Threat’ as ‘Covert Network, Says UN Report,” Homeland Security Today, February 12, 2019. https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/iss-terrorists-remain-global-threat-as-covert-network-says-un-report/

[13] Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy 42nd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade, Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation, June 8-13, 2007. https://stanelyfoundation.org.

[14] Andrew Hudson, “Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counterterrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, Volume 25, Issue 2, 2007, https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1339& context=bjil

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Hanny Megally, “The UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy Review: Raised Expectations, Missed Opportunities,” From the June 2018,” Review New York University, Center on International Cooperation. August 15, 2018. https://cic.nyu.edu/publications /UN-Global-Counter-Terrorism-Strategy-Review.

[18] Ibid

[19] “Global Group of NGOs Deplore Lack of Attention to Human Rights in Latest Review of UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy by UN Member States,” November 11, 2017. https://www. fidh.org/en/global-group-of-ngos-deplore-lack-of-attention-to-human-rights-in.