In recent discussions with former students many have inquired about some of the signature issues or debates during the period of contemporary counterterrorism. This post addresses several issues. What accounts for why counterterrorism is conducted differently during the period of international terrorism than in the current era which is dominated more by transnationalism terrorism? How do we distinguish between two rudimentary (anti-terrorism and counterterrorism) concepts which continue to sow much confusion? How, seventeen years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that the confusion about these concepts still exists? Finally, this post explores other critical corollary concepts (special forces and counterterrorism, intelligence and counterterrorism, conventional air strikes and the use of drones, and counterterrorism and the use of force in international law) that are prevalent during the era of contemporary counterterrorism.
Background
International terrorism[1] is often, but not exclusively, a term which equates to methods of terrorism that occurred through much of the Cold War. It is important to direct attention to the reality that during the period of international terrorism the governmental or state counterterrorism response is significantly different than in the epoch of contemporary counterterrorism.
What is international terrorism? Brian M. Jenkins defines international terrorism as “acts of violence or campaigns of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war. Breaking the rules may include attacking diplomats and other internationally protected persons, attacking international travel and commerce, or exporting violence by various means to nations that normally would not, under the traditional rules, be considered participants in the local conflict.”[2]
There are many “terrorism characteristics” that were prevalent during the era of international terrorism. During this period, “state-sponsored terrorism” was a prevalent feature of the conduct of many state actors. Second, terrorist groups made extensive use of hijacking of aircraft. Third, terrorists, particularly those from several splinter groups of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), incessantly launched terrorist attacks against airline ticket counters inside airports. Fourth, airplane hijackings and hostage taking is one notable example which were conducted by terror groups that occupied sanctuaries in countries in the Middle East. Fifth, the use of truck bombings, particularly those aimed at American interests occurred in the same region. The Marine Barracks bombing and the destruction of the US embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 are salient illustrations of this trend. Finally, taken collectively, the locus of terrorist activity and precedents is often, though not exclusively, centered in the Middle East.
In terms of the counterterrorism response, states made use of air strikes as the central military response to terrorist activities during the era of international terrorism. The use of special operators represented another counterterrorism response. However, in the United States special operators were little-used as a counterterrorism option until the creation of the Delta Force during the administration of Jimmy Carter. Of note, the global response is limited to the passage of United Nations and regional organizational resolutions (European Union (EU)) which condemned actions of various terrorist groups, but the military responses where often conducted by states impacted by the specific terrorist attack.
The Anti-Terrorism and Counterterrorism Divide
In the post-September 11 world rudimentary terms have themselves caused confusion. For example, too often there are those that confuse anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. Anti-terrorism requires the synergy of several components. That is, it involves “the practice of using intelligence, political, social, psychological, [and] criminal … analysis to predict where an attack is likely to happen and then using that anticipation to apply measure[s] to harden against the possibility of the terrorism attack. Basically, an effort to reduce the likelihood of the attack by making a target too difficult to attack” are all aspects of counterterrorism.[3]
Counterterrorism typically involves offensive actions, particularly those involving the military. Thus, “typical counterterrorism efforts are focused on identifying and capturing terrorists and/or actively defending a target from attack. Unlike anti-terrorism efforts, however, counterterrorism efforts are seldom strategic but rather focused on specific groups and targets.”[4]
One thing is certain, the terms have been clouded since 9/11. That is, civilian organizations at the state level, the NYPD is the best example, conduct both anti-terrorism and counterterrorism activities. These are characteristics usually associated with executive branch entities such as the CIA, FBI, NSA, or a host of entities within the American military.
Because of the prevalence of local law enforcement and the fact that they are conducting both anti-terrorism and counterterrorism operations, many experts assert that this only adds to the confusion between the concepts. At another level, the creation and expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces[5] or JTTFs after September 11, and the fact this entity conducts anti-terrorism and counterterrorism functions which are conducted by local and federal officials within a state, has also increased the confusion. In the end, these dilemmas are a by-product of the contemporary counterterrorism era.
Corollary Concepts in Contemporary Counterterrorism
In the post-September 11 world, the practice of counterterrorism has been radically transformed. The focus of states and international organizations (mainly the United Nations) after the heinous Al Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001, shifted to transnational terrorist threats rather than those that were conducted internationally. The concept of transnational terrorism is hotly debated. That said, there are some accepted characteristics of transnational terrorism. Transnational terrorist entities are violent non-state groups which tend to operate within states and between borders of states which have led to the creation of numerous terrorist sanctuaries. Within these sanctuaries terrorist organizations recruit and train terrorists, and these sanctuaries are too often the original location where terrorist conspiracies are created.
During the epoch of transnational terrorism, states impacted by the terrorist acts have conducted reprisal responses and there have been a host of coalitional responses that are usually led by the United States. Individual reprisal acts have been conducted by small states (United Kingdom, France, and Israel) and large states (Russia and the United States). Then there are the coalitional responses. The U.S. post 9/11 coalition emerged in the wake of the Al Qaeda terrorist attack. Following the creation of the Islamic State caliphate, and the regional and international instability that resulted from this terrorist entity, the United States created the anti-ISIS global coalition.
Several corollary concepts assumed prominence during the period of contemporary counterterrorism. Many of these concepts existed during the period of international terrorism while a new counterterrorism emerged as a critical response to terrorism. Those that existed previously include special forces, intelligence, and the expanded use of force and its impact on international law. That said, with the expansion of transnational terrorist entities these concepts became far more prevalent as methods of counterterrorism response during the period of contemporary counterterrorism. Others like drones indicate the extent to which this form of technology forever changed the state response to non-state transnational terrorist attacks.
What are characteristics of an affective counterterrorism strategy? An effective “U.S. counterterrorism strategy … [requires] a range of military, intelligence, financial, law enforcement, diplomatic, and other tools from across the U.S. government. The U.S. State Department, intelligence community, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and other U.S. federal, state, and local agencies”[6] are all critical components to both an effective strategy and response. Most recently, the term “whole of government” is now the phrase used to describe the best practice in the conduct of counterterrorism by the American government.
Special Operation Forces remain a critical tool in counterterrorism response. The American government relies heavily on Special Operation Forces (SOFs). SOFs serve multiple counterterrorism functions. During coalition operations against terrorist organizations, SOFs work to build partner capacity. On this point Seth Jones argues, “Special operations forces are trained to work “by, with, and through” partner forces, which generally makes them the provider of choice for building partner capacity. They are also trained to understand local culture, society, language, economy, history, and politics. For counterterrorism purposes, building partner capacity can involve deploying U.S. Army Special Forces and other units to train, advise, and assist local security forces and build the capacity of local governments to provide services, secure their populations, and deal with the causes of terrorism in their countries.”[7]
SOFs serve other counterterrorism functions to include intelligence gathering, capture of high value terrorist targets, denial of sanctuary wherever possible, and killing as many terrorists on the battlefield as possible. As Al Qaeda in Iraq ramped of the use of car bombs that resulted in the death of untold Shia civilians, Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) created what came to be known as “industrial counterterrorism.”[8]
In this evolved concept of counterterrorism, “JSOC would assemble intelligence packages which would be used to mount raids on suspected terrorist cells. During these missions more intelligence would then be gathered and used to mount further raids. As JSOC commander General Stanley McChrystal put it, these were ‘intelligence-driven operations [with] very precise targeting … so you can hit the network as many times as the intelligence will support.”[9] The outcome resulted in mounting deaths of Al Qaeda in Iraq members, decline in cells, and increased stability in Iraq, particularly in Sunni dominated areas.
The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval aviators collectively represent contemporary instruments of counterterrorism. The evolution of “precision air strikes” permits the American government to conduct an air campaign against terrorists and their facilities like at no time in recent memory. As a result, it is not a question of whether the U.S. military can conduct an effect air campaign against a terrorist entity, but whether there is presidential will.
From Ronald Reagan to the current occupant of the White House Donald Trump, American presidents have relied on airstrikes from conventional aircraft to mount counterterrorism air campaigns against terrorist groups. That said, sceptics continue to question the effectiveness of such strikes. Many questioned the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State for its inability to extinguish the threat quickly.[10] President Barack Obama had to deal with this criticism throughout much his struggle with the Islamic State. During the Trump presidency, following the release of video of the devastation of the city of Raqqa because of the success of the U.S.-led air campaign, criticism of the counterterrorism strikes declined considerably.
In the contemporary era, Drones or unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) represent a major counterterrorism platform both in terms of air strikes and intelligence. Drones have assisted in the targeting and killing of the senior leadership cadre within Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and other terrorist entities around the world. Additionally, drones have caused untold destruction inside terrorist sanctuaries. Raqqa, the operational headquarters of the Islamic State, was eliminated thanks in part to drones.
Drones permit JSOC to monitor high value terrorists within their sanctuaries. This intelligence permits the US military leaders to determine when to use drones to conduct strikes to destroy them or send in SOFs to capture them. The capture of terrorists has led to additional raids that have resulted in more terrorists eliminated on the battlefield. In short, drones “have been invaluable in gathering several types of intelligence from the air, such as SIGINT and image intelligence.”[11]
The national security state, one formerly designated to deal with threats from states, shifted and included the response to non-state or transnational threats. As a result, intelligence surveillance itself underwent transformation. The CIA was not the only source of counterterrorism intelligence surveillance. Domestically, the National Security Agency (NSA), through data mining and other means monitored terrorist threats at home and abroad with an eye to “monitoring chatter” to ensure there were no future September 11-styled attacks. The FBI’s counterterrorism division expanded their investigations to confront several threats ranging from “sleeper cells”, lone wolf threats, and the explosion of cyberterrorism used by transnational terrorist entities to exploit weaknesses of states to recruit and to inspire soft target attacks.
Counterterrorism and use of force and international law assumed prominence in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Under international law a set of criteria must be met to undertake a counterterrorism reprisal against a terrorist group.
Many scholars assert that the post-Cold War security environment which includes the increasing “involvement of non-state actors, such as armed bands, insurgents and terrorist groups, in situations of armed conflict; cross-border terrorist violence; and the hostile presence of terrorist groups in foreign territory without full control.”[12]
Michael Schmitt argues that “future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operations”[13] must meet rigorous criteria. According to Schmitt, “Such operations must be necessary; specifically, there must be a sound basis for believing that further terrorist attacks will be mounted and that the use of force is needed to counter them. They must also be proportional, that is, limited in nature, targets, level of violence and location to that required to defeat an on-going attack or prevent any reasonably foreseeable ones. If conducted in advance of a terrorist strike, counterterrorist operations can only be mounted when the potential victim must act immediately to defend itself and the potential aggressor is irrevocably committed to attack. However, once a terrorist campaign is underway, acts of self-defense are permissible throughout its course and need not be in response to specific terrorist actions. Finally, the central purpose of the counterterrorist operation must be self-defense, not punishment or retribution.”[14]
There is a subsequent criterion that President George W. Bush and President Obama followed in the disparate counterterrorism campaigns: both used diplomacy at the United Nations to ensure international support.[15]
Issues regarding the use of force shifted to address the loss of civilian life, particularly in Pakistan, following the Obama administration’s decision to increase drones strikes which targeted senior members of the Taliban (and the Pakistani Taliban [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)] that maintain a sanctuary in the country.[16] The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism addressed this legal issue and another one of equal significance: did the Obama administration violate Pakistani sovereignty when it launched drone strikes?[17] These and a host of other related issues regarding the use of force assumed prominence during the contemporary counterterrorism.[18]
Analysis
As the era of contemporary counterterrorism continues to unfold, there are several warning signs that governments and experts must confront. There are obvious trends that must be addressed. There are several trends among transnational terrorist groups that counterterrorism professionals will have to confront. Specifically, there is a remarkable and dangerous trend afoot—the iteration of terrorist groups is becoming more pronounced and the activities and actions more violent.
In the case of Al Qaeda, words like mass destruction and mass disruption associated with a transnational terrorist entity entered the verbiage of counterterrorism professionals. Equally troubling, Al Qaeda established sanctuaries in sixty-plus states around the world. That not being problematic enough, a litany of Al Qaeda affiliates emerged all over the world.
Regarding iterations, the world watched as the creation of a far more dangerous Al Qaeda splinter group known as the Islamic State took hold as the once promising Arab Spring fizzled. In time, the Islamic State filled power vacuums across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In an important illustration the Islamic State succeeded where Al Qaeda failed—they created a caliphate. Like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State established several sanctuaries around the world.
Equally alarming, terrorist-related violence is what scares governments and counterterrorist professionals the world over. There are advances associated with the Islamic State. The use of social media has been used to recruit followers to their organization, many of which were willing to fight on behalf of the terrorist group. Second, through videos and an online magazine (Dabiq and later Rumiyah), the Islamic State inspired their followers to conduct an unprecedented number of attacks inside states that opposed their radical vision of Islam. Third, another concern is the Islamic State developed and used drones against Iraqi and coalition forces. There is an increasing fear that the weaponization of their drones could lead to far more dangerous attacks in the future or they may be used to conduct attacks inside states. Fourth, another fear is that as the footprint of the Islamic State’s caliphate recedes, a question begs, what is the next terrorist entity on the horizon? This question and what emerges is what is hotly debated within the halls of governments and among counterterrorist practitioners.
[1] International terrorism remains in existence today. However, it is conducted by far few terror groups, states associated with state sponsored terrorism have declined considerably, and the types of terrorist actions or attacks are different in the post-9/11 world than was the case during the Cold War. For example, Al Qaeda hijacked aircraft and then flew them into monuments inside the United States sparking an ever-evolving U.S.-led international response. During the period of heightened international terrorism, PLO groups incessantly hijacked aircraft, but then subsequently used the incidents and the hostage taking (and hostage killing) as “an event” that provided an audience for their causes.
[2] Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare,” Rand, 1974. https:// www .rand.org/pubs/papers/P5261.html.
[3] “Defining the differences between Anti-terrorism and Counterterrorism?” ShadowspearSpecialOperators, September 14, 2011. https://www.shadow spear.com/vb/threads/defining-the-differences-between-anti-terrorism-and-counterterrorism.11623/.
[4] “Anti-terrorism vs. Counterterrorism,” The Tactical Edge, Summer, 2011, pp. 68-70. Field Command. January 10, 2015. http://fieldcommandllc.com/anti-terrorism-vs-counter-terrorism-tactical-edge-summer-2011-pp-68-70/.
[5] The initial JTTF was created in New York in 1980. JTTFs are often staffed with representatives of the FBI and many other federal agencies, the NYPD, and may include other local civilian actors.
[6] Seth Jones, “Counterterrorism and the Role of Special Operations Forces,” RAND Corporation, April 8, 2014. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT 400/CT408/RAND _CT408.pdf.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Jon Moran, “Time to Move Out of Shadows: Special Operation Forces and Accountability in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations,” UNSW Law Journal, (2016) Volume 39(3). https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/38798/2/MORAN%20UN SWLJ.pdf/.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Missy Ryan and Loveday Morris, “When Air Power Works, and When It Doesn’t: A Snapshot of U.S. Operations against the Islamic State,” Washington Post, December 20, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/20/when-air-power-works-and-when-it-does nt/?utm_term=.a845249d89fc.
[11] Mark Pomerleau, “How Technology Has Changed Intelligence Collection,” Defense Systems, April 22, 2015. https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/04/22/technology-has-chan ged-intelligence-gathering.aspx.
[12] Dominika SVARC, “Military Response to Terrorism and the Jus Ad Bellum,” Defense Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 29-48. http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume1/03-Military_Response_to _Terrorism_and _the%20JusadBellum.pdf.
[13] Michael N. Schmitt, “Counterterrorism and the Use of Force in International Law,” The Marshall Center Papers, No. 5, November 2005. http://www.marshallce nter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_5-en.pdf.
[14] Ibid.
[15] President Bush made the case for the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. President Obama made the case for the use of force in opposition to the Islamic State.
[16] Kate Martin, “Are U.S. Drone Strikes Legal? A Guide to the Relevant Legal Questions,” Center For American Progress, April 1, 2016. https://www.american progress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/04/01/134494/are-u-s-drone-strikes-legal/.
[17] [No Author] “U.N.: U.S. Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty,” USA Today, March 13, 2013. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/15/…drones-pakistan/1990825/.
[18] The UN not only addressed alleged US violations but those of terrorist groups. The United Nations is concerned about trends, particularly those involving terrorists. Genocide conducted by the Islamic State against the Yazidi’s in Iraq, mistreatment of women, mistreatment of prisons of war are examples of some of the trends.
