The unfolding counterterrorism activities inside Africa’s most populist country remains both a fascinating story and one which continues to be grossly underreported. A wealthy state in many ways, Nigeria continues to struggle with its single greatest security challenge—the specter of subnational terrorism. The specific form of terrorism has confounded Nigeria’s leaders for years is the twin threats posed by Boko Haram. The first threat is that a vicious transnational terrorist entity has caused instability in the Nigeria itself and in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition, a splinter faction of the terror group has pledged their loyalty to the Islamic State. What counterterrorism measures have the government of Nigeria implemented in response to the threats posed by Boko Haram?  

Background

Boko Haram’s rise to a regional transnational terrorist threat overshadows an important fact. The terrorist entities violent insurgent campaign “is a direct result of chronic poor governance by Nigeria’s federal and state governments, the political marginalization of northeastern Nigeria, and the region’s accelerating impoverishment.”[1]

Boko Haram has used these internal political issues to fuel its recruitment and sharpen their message. Beginning in 2009, Boko Haram unleashed a wave of “attacks on schools, the burning of villages, and hundreds of abductions, is a response to longstanding religious tensions, political corruption, and widening economic disparity in Nigeria.”[2] Notably, it is the “government’s heavy-handed police and counterterrorism tactics [that have added] … fuel for the group’s flame.”[3]

Beginning in 2012 and again in 2016, the Nigerian government had to confront dissimilar fragmentations of Boko Haram: “one in 2012 when a branch split off, forming the militant group Ansaru, and the other in 2016 when Abu Musab al-Barnawi declared himself to be the true leader of the Islamic State (or ISIS) in Nigeria.”[4]

Inside The Nigerian Government’s Counterterrorism Efforts

At issue, what are the components of the government of Nigeria’s counterterrorism response to Boko Haram’s violence across the Northeastern portion of the country? Why did the government’s response routinely fail, and why did the counterterror insurgent campaigns often fuel Boko Haram’s insurgency?

It can be argued that covering the period 2009-2013 Nigerian security forces failed to implement coherent and effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in response to Boko Haram’s evolving campaign of violence.

In the absence of countervailing force to reverse their siege of territories in the Northern part of the country, Boko Haram met their objective of dominated that part of the state and subsequently dominated the region. A coherent strategy was not implemented until late 2013 following a “state of emergency” that covered the Borno, Yobe and Adamawa areas of the country.[5]

In late November of 2014, the deputy governor of Borno State warned that if Boko Haram’s campaign is not halted, the “three northeastern states will no longer be in existence.”[6] Oddly, it took “a multinational force including Chadian and Nigerian troops to support Nigerian troops in Borno [that] broke Boko Haram’s momentum in the run-up to Nigeria’s presidential elections in February 2015.”[7]

In the aftermath of the success of the multinational effort, which included the use of American intelligence, “since then, Boko Haram has lost the majority of its territory, though not its operational capacity.”[8]

The government of Nigeria boasted in 2013 that their counterterrorism campaign had drastically reduced the threat posed by Boko Haram. The data raised “doubts about the government’s progress toward containing the group. In particular, brazen operations, the group claimed a bombing of an Abuja bus station that killed nearly one hundred people on April 14, 2014, the same day it abducted more than two hundred schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok. The latter attack prompted an international outcry and evoked harsh criticism among many Nigerians of the [Goodluck] Jonathan administration’s slow response.”[9]

President Muhammadu Buhari promised to end Boko Haram’s insurgency and their insidious violence. Buhari instituted a counterterrorism campaigned that was coednamed “Operation Safe Corridor.” According to President Buhari, the counterterrorism strategy consisted of “a multi-sectorial approach involving related government agencies to address the socio-economic and political damages, while the armed forces of Nigeria assist civil authority to provide security and maintain law and order.”[10] In addition, the strategy called for a campaign to “deradicalize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate willingly surrendered Boko Haram members into the larger society.”[11]

A critical issue that concerned human rights organizations around the world is President Buhari is willingness to address some of the salient abuses by the Nigerian military against captured fighters of Boko Haram and against innocent civilians in recaptured territory formally under the control of the terror group.  

Only months into the campaign and his presidency, in December of 2015 Buhari asserted the military campaign defeated the insurgent Boko Haram movement. Few doubted the swift campaign had recaptured vast territory from the terror group, but the “declaration of victory” was dismissed by critics at the home and abroad.[12]

There is substantial evidence that undermined the declaration. On the one hand, Boko Haram continued their attacks on Nigerian security forces and second the terror entity continued “low-level terror attacks in the country’s northeast.”[13]

In 2017 Buhari announced that Boko Haram was “technically defeated.”[14] However, “Boko Haram terror activities have continued throughout 2017 and into 2018. Most attacks have consisted of suicide bombings at busy marketplaces around the terror group’s dwindling stronghold in northeast Nigeria.”[15] Once again Buhari’s credibility was called into question. 

There are several enduring issues that continue to overshadow the highly successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts implemented by Nigeria’s security forces from 2015 to the present. The issue of significance is the enduring legacy of human rights abuses. After a fact-finding mission, Vanda Felbab-Brown makes the following argument concerning the observation of twin human rights abuses: “the Nigerian government’s and [and the actions of the] militias’ have led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people. In major cities and towns, including Maiduguri, there is widespread belief that Boko Haram informants are everywhere. This belief is exacerbated by previous incidents of Boko Haram donning police or military uniforms and then killing those who volunteered information on the group.”[16]

At another level, Felbab-Brown argues that “The Nigerian military and police have been partnering with local militias, such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and relying on them and paid informants to find out who is a Boko Haram member. CJTF claims are often the dominant, if not sole, basis for raids and arrests, yet such intelligence is often completely unreliable, unverified, and random, motivated merely by desire for further financial payments or as a means of revenge for previous perceived grievances against local rivals.”[17] In the final analysis, the human rights abuses within the security forces and in the civilian CJTF are still ongoing.

The United States and Counterterrorism in Nigeria

Nigeria has struggled to obtain U.S., U.N. and other external support for its counterterrorism operations. Things have changed. At the close of the Obama administration and now under the administration of President Donald Trump, the government of Nigeria achieved substantial support from the government of the United States.

The significance of the American support is characterized this way: “President Buhari had received a phone call in London from President Donald Trump who commended Nigeria for her giant counterterrorism strides…. Last year there was also an unprecedented endorsement from former U.S. President Barack Obama who openly praised President Buhari and the gallant Nigerian military for defeating Boko Haram. “It is worthy of note that these endorsements of Nigeria’s successful counterterrorism strategy by two successive bipartisan political dispensations in the U.S. in a space of three months is perhaps Nigeria’s greatest achievement now. It is our greatest feat as a nation of hope and promise against threats to our national unity, security, stability and prosperity.”[18] 

The U.S. government, to include the Obama and Trump administrations, has made use of an expansive toolbox to assist Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram. Nigeria continues to receive counterterrorism assistance through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, both administered by the Department of State. In addition, the Nigerian government “receives counterterrorism, anticorruption, and maritime security assistance through the State Department’s West Africa Regional Security Initiative (WARSI).[19]

The Department of Defense also provides security assistance funding and training. In an example of the defense assistance, The Trump administration asserted it will release 12 Super Tucano A-29 Fighter Jets that advance Nigeria’s counterterrorism capacity.[20] In an illustration of jointly administered State and Defense funded programs, “Nigeria, along with neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, will also benefit from counterterrorism and border security assistance under the new $40 million, 3-year Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) program focused on countering Boko Haram.”[21]

Taken collectively, the U.S. government, as asserted by Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, recognizes “Nigeria … is a critical U.S. partner that faces a number of threats. Nigeria leads the regional fight against Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and other terrorist groups that continue to fuel one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.… We consider it in our national interest to support Nigeria and its neighbors in this fight.”[22]

Analysis

Several significant questions remain unanswered. First and foremost, why did the government of Nigeria wait until 2013 to declare a state of emergency to confront Boko Haram? For many counterterrorism experts, this represents a clear failure of political leadership. By the same token, the absence of leadership points to the breath of the corruption on the civilian side of government, but it also underscores the rampant corruption that remains pervasive in the Nigerian military.

Second, does the government of Nigeria have the political will to continue the fight against Boko Haram? As is well-known, the insurgency continues. As John Campbell and Asch Harwood articulate, “Boko Haram’s territorial control is now limited to some small villages and pockets of countryside, a shift in tactics has helped the group stay a threat to millions. It has turned to suicide bombings, which accounted for almost a third of all casualties in the first half of 2018.”[23]

The point is whether the Nigerian government is willing to appropriate the necessary funds, and can it count on continued funding from the United States (at the current level) and support from other countries over an extended period?

The Nigerian government by itself may be able to defeat Boko Haram through hard power but are other options available? Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, the American military leader in charge of Flintlock 2017, a regional military exercise, asserted, “The [Nigerian] military can’t do it by itself.”[24] Additionally, Bolduc argued it is important to “Regionalize all the efforts, work closely together in an effective military construct … and then bring in the police, the civil administration, religious leaders and include anybody working to bring the stability necessary to the local villages.”[25] That regional or coalition effort is critical to ensuring the defeat and the prevention of the resurrection of Boko Haram.

Third, “the seeds that created Boko Haram” still exist. Is the government of Nigeria prepared to make the political reforms (at the national and state levels) that will preclude the reemergence of Boko Haram? If not, there is little doubt that a long slog, a sustained insurgency could exist for the foreseeable future.

What about “the elephant in the room”—Nigerian security forces and human rights abuses? While Buhari made substantial progress in removing many corrupt and abusive elements in the senior ranks of the Nigerian military, human rights challenges still persist. Resolving he human rights dilemma will strengthen short term and long term efforts to improve the Nigerian military and increase the domestic, regional, and international support for the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign.

Endnotes

[1] John Campbell, “U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko HaramU.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014. https://www.cfr.org/report/us-policy-counter-nigerias-boko-haram.

[2] Claire Felter, “Nigeria’s Battle with Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 8, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram, How Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counterinsurgency Strategy Fuels Insecurity,” Foreign Affairs, March 30, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troubling-counterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram.

[5] J. D. Leach, “Boko Haram: Diverging Approaches to Fighting Insurgency,” Journal of Politics and Democratization, Volume 1-2 (September 2016), p. 5.

[6] Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri, “Chapter 4: The Rise and Risks of Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force: Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeastern Nigeria” in “Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency,” Jacob Zenn, Editor, Combating Counterterrorism Center, May 2018, p. 74.

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Remarks by President Trump and President Buhari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Joint Press Conference, April 30, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-buhari-federal-republic-nigeria-joint-press-conference/.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Buhari and other members of the government made other “victory” or statements of decline of Boko Haram. For example, “Nevertheless, Buhari had to couch his December 2015 victory announcement by specifying that Boko Haram could no longer launch “conventional” attacks. As of 2016, Chief Defense Staff Olonisakin argued that the movement could no longer launch coordinated attacks. Attorney General and Minister of Justice Malami declared that Boko Haram was no longer able to hold territory.” As quoted in J. D. Leach, “Boko Haram: Diverging Approaches to Fighting Insurgency,” Journal of Politics and Democratization, Volume 1-2 (September 2016), p. 8.

[13] “Nigeria: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” February 17, 2017. https://www.counte reterrorism.com/countries/nigeria.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram, How Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counterinsurgency Strategy Fuels Insecurity.”

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sunday Okibi, “Nigeria: U.S. Endorsement of Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Boost to Our War Against Boko Haram,’” AllAfrica.com, April 5, 2017. http://allafrica.com/stories/201 704050809.html.

[19] Lauren Ploch Blanchard and Tomas F. Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, March 11, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row /RL33964.pdf.

[20] Isiaka Wakili, “Trump to Buhari: We’ll Release Fighter Jets to Nigeria Soon,” Daily Trust, May 1, 2018. https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/trump-to-buhari-we-ll-release-fighter-jets-to-nigeria-soon.html.

[21] Wakili, “Trump to Buhari: We’ll Release Fighter Jets to Nigeria Soon.”

[22] Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan Remarks on CT in Africa Before House Foreign Affairs Committee December 7, 2017. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ FA/FA00/20171207/1 06703/ HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-SullivanJ-20171207.pdf.

[23] John Campbell and Asch Harwood, “Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 20, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact.

[24] Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, “Amid Aid Uncertainty, U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation Continues in Africa,” NPR, April 17, 2017.

[25] Ibid.