Following the recapture of Mosul, the second largest city in the country, the government of Iraq issued a proclamation extolling the defeat of The Islamic State. Not long thereafter, the administration of President Donald Trump, following the collapse of the operational headquarters in Raqqa, Syria and in their strong-hold Deir Al-Zour, proclaimed the pillars that formed the Islamic State’s proto-state existed no more.
Within months of proclaiming victory senior officials in the government of Iraq and within the intelligence community warned a stealthy insurgency is well underway in the small towns, the countryside, and the mountainous regions in Iraq and Syria. In short, the Islamic States’ resurrection is unfolding in ungovernable and under governed areas in Iraq and Syria.
This post examines two issues. The first issue explores the size and scope of the insurgency. In addition, it explores the extent to which the Islamic State is using new tactics and how it is exploiting the failed governance in Iraq and Syria to fuel their resurrection. Second, this post explores the U.S. and coalition response to the ever-evolving threat.
Background
Talk of the Islamic States’ revival or resurrection is not new. A host of scholars warned the Islamic State’s demise is greatly exaggerated. A few examples are instructive. In one example, Benjamin Bahney and Patrick B. Johnston assert “ISIS Could Rise Again.” In the article, the authors warned, “Most ominously, ISIS has a tried-and true playbook for bringing itself back from near death. Just a few years ago, it managed to resurrect itself after apparent defeat. And history of that resurrection should serve as a warning”[1] about what is unfolding in Iraq and Syria.
In a subsequent example, Fareed Yasseen, the Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, argued “ISIS’s proto-state no longer exists. Their flag doesn’t fly over Iraqi Territory. But that doesn’t mean they’ve disappeared. They are reverting to old tactics used by al Qaeda before 2014.”[2] What has emerged during this period of resurrection is “ISIS 2.0”
The Islamic States’ Revival
There are a host of indicators that provide evidence of the revival of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Those indicators illustrate the revival is occurring at a level and speed that is causing concern within the coalition and no doubt in the government of Iraq, and most certainly within the Trump administration.
One of the significant indicators is that there is evidence that despite the coalition air strikes that pounded Islamic State-held territories, while the terror group has been displaced in those areas, the number of fighters still operating remains at a staggering high level. Two reports—one from the Pentagon and second from the United Nations—indicate that not only is the insurgency in full-swing but thousands of fighters survived the air and ground onslaughts and have stealthy worked to resurrect the terror group in Iraq and Syria.
The methodology of counting insurgents is always problematic and uncertain. Previously, the U.S. intelligence community estimated the Islamic State may have as many as 6,000 fighters. That figure has recently been contradicted.
The Pentagon report, issued by the Inspector General, provides disturbing evidence of not just a resurgence but the potential of failed intelligence collection. The report acknowledges that “fourteen thousand fighters—not just members—in Syria, with up to seventeen thousand in Iraq.”[3] The UN asserts that there may be as many as 30, 000 Islamic fighters in Iraq and Syria.
These figures are inconsistent with previous intelligence information concerning the presence of the threat in Iraq and Syria. What is clear is that the U.S. intelligence community has been imprecise on gathering data on the survival of ISIS fighters in the wake of the coalition air onslaught that unfolded in Iraq and Syria.
Factors Indicating Islamic States’ Revival in Iraq
The government of Iraq has provided detailed evidence of the reemergence of a threat that previously undermined the security of the state. The Mowaffak al-Rubaie, who previously served as the national security adviser asserts, “There are a lot of indicators that there is going to be an imminent resurgence of IS [Islamic State]. You can see it in the records and the intelligence reports.”[4]
Second, Geneive Abdo, a researcher, articulates that “remote Sunni areas of Iraq, where fighters remained after the group was routed from its urban strongholds”[5] have assisted in the sustainability of the network. Most importantly, Abdo asserts, “Other factors boosting extremism include a lack of state authority, government corruption that curtails public services and the weakness of Iraqi security forces. Demonstrations in southern Iraqi cities over issues like unemployment and a lack of electricity are intensifying, offering [the] Islamic State further opportunities to exploit public grievances.”[6]
Third, a major indicator is the significant shift in the Islamic Sates’ strategy which has permitted the revival and sustainability of the terror entity which is worrisome to the government of Iraq and the coalition. Al-Rubaie refers to the Islamic States “four triangles of death strategy”[7] which makes use of “sparsely populated areas once controlled by the group, where militants can hide even without the support of the local population.”[8]
The components of the strategy include the following: “In the first triangle [emphasis provided by the author of the blog post], IS [ISIS] uses the Hamrin mountains as a base for ambushes and attacks on the Iraqi state security barracks. This area for the most part is under IS control. In the second triangle, which includes Samarra, IS has not been able to coopt the local population, but militants use the area as a fallback position when attacked. The third triangle, located between Baghdad and Damascus, is where IS is carrying out kidnapping and bombings, disrupting trade and stealing commercial goods. The fourth triangle is in the vast desert on the border with Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.”[9]
The Islamic States’ new strategy has shifted from holding large cities to controlling small enclaves in towns and in the countryside. It is in these areas that Iraqi governance is weak both in terms of government services and security forces.
Factors Indicating Islamic States’ Revival in Syria
This U.S.-led coalition warned the major presence of Islamic State fighters exists on the “western side” of the Middle Euphrates River Valley or MERV. According to U.S. government officials, this area is controlled not by the coalition but pro-regime Syrian forces with support from Russian troops stationed in the area.[10] The implication is that pro-regime forces have not done enough to eliminate the threat in the area. The presence of up to fourteen thousand fighters scattered across Syria is salient evidence that the coalition has to “finish the job”—defeat the Islamic State in the country.
On the eastern side of the MERV, the coalition has had great success in dealing with the Islamic State. Though the threat is contained, however, the Islamic State has not been defeated in the area. In the words of Army Colonel Ryan Dillon, a spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve, “There has been absolutely zero land reclaimed by ISIS on the east side of the Euphrates River,” he said. “We have put obstacles in place … to contain ISIS in two areas … Al Dashisha, along the Iraq-Syria border, and north of Abu Kamal on the eastern side of the river, in a town called Hajin.”[11]
Following an extended “operational pause”[12] Syrian Democratic Forces are completing what the Pentagon hopes is the final phase of Operation Roundup.
The objective of Operation Roundup is rudimentary. Beginning in early September of 2018, Central Command asserts, “The ground offensive, supported by Coalition cross-border air and artillery strikes, will clear ISIS remnants from northeastern Syria, along the Middle Euphrates River Valley toward the Syria-Iraq border.”[13] After the conclusion of Operation Roundup, does this signal the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria? This is a critical question that as of now remains unanswered.
Analysis
There are a several dilemmas confronting the U.S.-led coalition in dealing with the revival of the Islamic State. In particular, there are twin dilemmas that the coalition will have to contend with in their efforts to rollback and ultimately defeat the Islamic States’ revival in Iraq.
On the first dilemma, the “majority of remaining IS fighters are Iraqis, not foreigners. This makes it nearly impossible to provide incentives for them to leave the country.”[14] Second, Iran’s influence and the involvement of the Shia militias (the Popular Mobilization Forces or PMFs) remains a “key factor in Islamic State’s resurrection [and] … its ability to tap into public dissatisfaction.”[15]
The Trump administration, much like all other coalition members, celebrated the collapse of the caliphates twin pillars, Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. President Trump promised a swift victory and the defeat of the Islamic State. Now the president and senior foreign policy officials are coming to grips with the resurrection of the Islamic State but now they must develop a new or corollary strategy. The initial strategy was dominated by tactics that rejected the Islamic State from major cities. Now alternative tactics must be introduced to reject the terror entity from towns and in the rural and mountainous areas.
The tactics will have dissimilar utilities given the size and location of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The administration has made it clear that they intend to respond to the twin threats. Thus far, the United States air assets have conducted numerous air strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq and selected strikes in Syria.
Of equal significance, the Trump administration has asserted that the “final phase” of the U.S.-led coalition response against the Islamic State has yet to take place. The Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, Brett McGurk, issued the following statement on the pending final phase: “The focus is the enduring defeat of ISIS. We still have not launched the final phase to defeat the physical caliphate. That is actually being prepared now, and that will come at a time of our choosing, but it is coming.”[16] Administration sources have conveyed to the author that the final phase has still not been implemented. The sources have argued the phase will involve a comprehensive effort to wipe out the Islamic fighters in both Iraq and Syria.
In Syria, the likely final phase of military activity will be a joint American and SDF mission. In this joint mission, “The goal is for the Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by U.S. airpower, to liberate about four hundred square miles in northeast Syria along the Iraqi border.”[17]
One of the interesting paradoxes is that many commentators on the Obama administration’s failed strategy in Syria complained that there is too much reliance on SDF forces to confront and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in that country. The Trump administration is now confronting the reality that without a major dispatch of American troops to that country, there is no other choice at this point but to wait and prepare the SDF for the “final assault.”
In Iraq, the administration continues to work through the advise and assist, a process that calls for continued training of Iraqi security forces. Coalition air strikes continue to strike targets in the country. There are private discussions well underway about direct U.S. participation in upcoming raids in Iraq. However, until the government of Iraq is willing to extend its political and military authority to under governed areas in the country and implement badly needed government services, and reduce and ultimately eliminate Iran’s influence, the Islamic State will have a host of ready-made issues by which to use to expand their influence.
At another level, the Trump administration will have to accelerate administration efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate Iran’s influence in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the administration is taking a low key, more diplomatic approach to containing Iranian influence. In Syria, the administration reaffirms that it will continue to reduce Iranian influence in Syria.[18] This is being done without a direct U.S. confrontation with Iranian regular or paramilitary forces. How is the administration working to reduce Iranian influence? Back in in April of 2018, “General Joseph Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that the U.S. military continued to use “indirect” means to push back against Iranian influence in Syria. These [measures] included interdicting weapons shipments, supporting local forces, and bolstering the defenses of regional allies.”[19]
The declarations of victory by the Trump administration, the government of Iraq, and other coalition partners is clearly premature. It is clear there are decisive confrontations with the Islamic State still on the horizon.
Endnotes
[1] Benjamin Bahney and Patrick B. Johnston assert “ISIS could Rise Again.” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/12/isis-could-rise-gain.html.
[2] Rhys Dubin, “ISIS 2.0 Is Really Just the Original ISIS,” Foreign Policy.com, April 3, 2018. https:/foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/isis-2-0-is-really-just-the-original-isis/.
[3] Robin Wright, “ISIS Makes a Comeback—as Trump Opts to Stay in Syria,” The New Yorker, August 30, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-makes-a-comebackas-trump-opts-to-stay-in-syria?mbid=nl_Daily%20083118&CNDID=39170107& utm_source=Silverpop&utmmedium=email&utmcampaign=Daily%20083118&utmcontent=&spMailingID=14168160& spUserID=MTgyNTIwMTQzOTg2S0&spJobID=1462770963&spReportId=MTQ2Mjc3MDk2MwS2.
[4] Geneive Abdo, “Commentary: The Reality of Islamic State in Iraq,” Reuters, July 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-abdo-islamicstate-commentary/commentary-the-reality-of-islamic-state-in-iraq-idUSKBN1K92D9.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Kyle Rempker, “US-led Coalition: ISIS May be Resurgent on Russia’s Turf, But Not Ours,” Military Times, April 24, 2018. https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/ 04/24/us-led-coalition-isis-may-be-resurgent-on-russias-turf-but-not-ours/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The pause has been described this way by Kyle Rempker, a reporter for The Military Times, “Earlier this year, SDF fighters went north to fight Turkish forces attempting to take Afrin, Syria, from Kurdish militia, an ethnic group which makes up a large part of the SDF. Around that time, the coalition announced an “operational pause,” while still urging the SDF to remain focused and return to the anti-ISIS offensive.” Cited from Rempker, “US-led Coalition: ISIS May be Resurgent on Russia’s Turf, But Not Ours.” That pause appears to be nearing an end, as SDF partners are spotted returning to the MERV.
[13] CJTF-OIR PAO, “Ground Offensive Begins for Operation Roundup, Phase Three,” Inherentresolve.mil/, September 11, 2018. http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/News-Releases /Article/626665/ ground-offensive-begins-for-operation-roundup-phase-three/.
[14] Abdo, “Commentary: The Reality of Islamic State in Iraq.”
[15] Ibid.
[16] Wright, “ISIS Makes a Comeback—as Trump Opts to Stay in Syria.”
[17] Ibid.
[18] Office of Inspector General, Lead Inspector General Report, Contingency Operations Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, Report to Congress August 1, 2018. https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/other-reports/quarterly_oir_0630 18.pdf.
[19] Ibid.
