Strident criticism is continually directed at The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That criticism is often directed at the failure of the alliance to adjust to the Russian threat that continues to unfold in the wake of Vladimir’s Putin’s efforts to ensure that Russia is relevant again. Critics have lambasted the alliance response to Moscow’s intervention in Georgia and the Ukraine. At another level, there is another form of disparagement that is directed at the alliance. This time the subject is NATO counterterrorism policies. The level of criticism reached its zenith during the 2016 U.S. presidential election and continued during the open period of the administration of President Donald Trump. This post provides details of the criticism and then examines NATO’s response and post-September 11 counterterrorism policies.
NATO Counterterrorism: A Record of Criticism
The criticism prior to and during the opening days after the Al Qaeda attack in September 11 was unabated and unchallenged by NATO officials. One analyst after another focused attention on President George W. Bush’s decision not to permit the alliance to have a say in military decision making in what would be administration’s response to the first attack on the homeland of the United States since Pearl Harbor.
NATO did invoke Article 5 which required that all member states come to the defense of the United States. That did not occur. At that time, rather than an anticipated coalition response in Afghanistan instead devolved into a largely unilateral action American action.
Military scholar Phillip Gordan provides an important analysis of the situation: “The Americans decided not to ask for a NATO operation for both military and political reasons—only the United States had the right sort of equipment to project military forces halfway around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 allies in the campaign. In light of these decisions, some observers have begun to wonder whether NATO has any enduring role at all”[1] in dealing with transnational terrorism.
In the wake of the emergence of the Islamic State and the subsequent creation of their caliphate, critics again launched a series of disparaging comments directed at the alliance for their failure to prevent a series of attacks on soft targets that unfolded in France, Britain, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Another round of criticism ensued after domestic law enforcement agencies were negligent in implementing rudimentary counterterrorism techniques. The open border decisions, immigration policies, manpower shortages, the failure to track suspected extremists, the failure to deal with sleeper cells, and logic personnel are all variables that came to fore as areas that required substantial improvement to prevent future attacks.
American Presidential candidate Donald Trump incessantly stated, “NATO was obsolete.” Asked why during his interview with Reuters on January 15, 2017, the Trump stated, “It’s obsolete because it wasn’t taking care of terror.” In recognition that the candidates’ comments played well to the domestic American audience, Trump repeated his criticism of NATO’s problematic counterterrorism after most of the attacks in NATO countries.
At another level, after much criticism about their response to terrorism, NATO officials boasted about what they argue is one of their signature counterterrorism programs—partnership policy This program is designed to permit NATO to train local forces in counterterrorism to defeat terrorist groups. While the program can boast of successes, there are salient problems.
Critics charge “the lack of resources means not only that NATO cannot deliver as many services as partner nations need, but also that NATO is in a constant cycle of over-promising and under-delivering, which leads to a loss of credibility with its partners.”[2]
Evidence of this dilemma is found in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where “NATO needs to make itself more attractive and cannot afford a more tarnished reputation. Maintaining productive partnerships is hard and resource-intensive work.”[3] To address this problem NATO needs to accept reality “and prioritize the necessary funding.”[4]
NATO’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Examining The Response
The criticism of NATO’s post-9/11 role in responding to terrorism overshadows the reality the alliance did assist the United States in the wake Al Qaeda’s attack. In October of 2001 members of the alliance participated in Operation Eagle Assist. During this operation NATO Airborne Warning and Controls System aircraft (AWACS) flew missions to patrol the continental United States to prevent a subsequent Al Qaeda attack.[5]
During Operation Enduring Freedom, which commenced on October 7, 2001, the mission to confront Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, several NATO countries joined American forces to end the transnational terror enclave in the country and later additional alliance forces participated in stability operations during the post-Taliban era.
Marianne Van Leeuwen argues that while “the Bush administration quickly made it clear that, while it appreciated collective NATO support, it did not want collective decision-making in warfighting against terrorism. It wanted to be in the lead. Yet, ever since President Bush proclaimed the ‘War on Terror’, varying European allies of the United States … participated in fighting at high levels of force in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, both within and outside the NATO framework.[6]
There is additional evidence of NATO counterterrorism efforts. In 2012, NATO updated its policy guidelines to approve their ancient counterterrorism framework. The new framework is based on three pillars which include awareness, capabilities and engagement This new framework is designed to increase NATO capacity and ensure a coordinated and robust response.
NATO subsequently created the Terrorism Intelligence Cell at NATO Headquarters and thereafter established the position of “coordinator” [which] “oversees NATO’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.”[7]
NATO SOFs, aircraft, and other units engaged the Islamic State as part of anti-ISIS coalition during Operation Inherent Resolve. Though evidence of direct NATO involvement, critics charged the alliance should have deployed more forces to deal with the threat.[8]
In February of 2017, what some argue is a direct response to President Trump’s statement that NATO is obsolete. The alliance established a “regional Hub for the South, based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples helps the Alliance anticipate and respond to crises arising in its southern neighborhood.”[9]
NATO’s Partnership Policy represents one of the long-standing and ever-changing components of the counterterrorism efforts of the alliance. The capacity building involving NATO partners remains central component to its counterterrorism mission despite criticism from several critics. Speaking historically, “since the end of the Cold War, NATO has built a network of 41 partners across the globe.”[10]
Over last five-plus years, “partnership initiatives [have been created] that aim to strengthen regional partners through institutional and military capacity building and security sector reform.”[11] There is a partnership mission in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere around the world.
Counterterrorism officials in NATO argue if member states can train local partners in a host of antiterrorism programs, then the alliance will not have to intervene with large troop contingents. Put another way, “the strengthening of partners is thus already seen in NATO HQ as an important tool to stabilize along NATO’s borders with a reduced operational footprint.”[12]
The President of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) Fabrizio W. Luciolli provided a clear statement for the necessity for improved alliance counterterrorism efforts in the ever-evolving threat environment. In the words Luciolli, “No country can face the new terrorist threat alone. It is necessary [that] a new counterterrorism strategy combining three levels of security: international cooperation, a resolute action by national governments and a new security culture for citizens”[13] should be established.
In addition, Luciolli, observed, “The fight against terrorism must become the priority of a common security agenda for NATO and [European Union] EU member states, and for the countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East.”[14] Time will tell if NATO and EU members will move beyond rhetoric to action.
Analysis
One of the major flaws that significantly impacts NATO counterterrorism activities is that during postwar stability operations, many member states deploy their troops in hotspots such as Afghanistan. However, because of the “political restrictions” placed on these countries their troops do not patrol or engage the enemy “outside the wire.”
In Afghanistan, the failure of many NATO members to participate due to these restrictions is causing friction in the alliance. U.S. military personnel, which assumes the “significant force and mission burden” during these operations, are unhappy that those forces are not willing to engage the enemy.
In Afghanistan, the utilization of humor is the most conspicuous way to convey a message. The humor is conveyed this way: “among U.S. troop the acronym ISAF in fact stood for “I Saw Americans Fight.”[15]
With respect to the use of special operations forces, this represents another challenge for the alliance. Given the extraordinary fighting capabilities among member forces, an ongoing schism exists because too few members are willing to send their SOFs to hot spots like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Syria.
For the United States, whose SOFs are engaged in missions around the world, a major burden is placed on its forces. This is true to a degree of British and French SOFs. In the end, the political restrictions are a hindrance and this issue must be resolved if the alliance is to emerge as full partner in the war on terrorism.
The issue of politics rears its head in another way. As pointed out by, Hanjnalka Vincze, who wrote about NATO’s counterterrorism efforts, asserted, “multiple disagreements between NATO allies both on the analysis of threats and on how to respond to them. Within the Alliance, views differ markedly on the respective roles of the police versus the military, the application of certain counterterrorism measures, data protection and the use of force.”[16] Until these issues are resolved, it is certain that questions concerning the viability of NATO counterterrorism will persist.
At another level, an ongoing challenge within NATO counterterrorism is in intelligence sharing. Among the 28-member alliance this represents a genuine threat to “real counterterrorism.” As acknowledge by British Secretary of Defense Michael Fallon, “there is quite a way to go”[17] in intelligence sharing among members.
On the question of the alliance response to terrorism, President Trump no longer views NATO as obsolete. Still, major improvements are still necessary if the alliance is to quit their critics.
Endnotes
[1] Phillip P. Gordon, “NATO and the War on Terrorism: A Changing Alliance,” Brookings.edu, June 1, 2002. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nato-and-the-war-on-terrorism-a-changing-alliance/.
[2] Kristian Soby Kristensen and Laura Schouseboe, “How to Step Up NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism,” War on the Rocks.com, September 12, 2017. https://warontherocks .com/2017/09 /how-to-step-up-natos-fight-against-terrorism/.
[3] Kristensen and Schouseboe, “How to Step Up NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism.”
[4] Ibid
[5] “NATO: Assessing the Alliance’s Counterterrorism Efforts,” Real ClearDefense.com, April 24, 2017. www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/04/24/natoassessing_allian ces_counterterrorism_efforts_111231.html.
[6] Marianne van Leeuwen, “NATO and the War on Terror,” https://www.atlcom.nl/ap _archive/pdf/AP%202017%20nr.%203/Van%20Leeuwen.pdf.
[7] “NATO-Topic: Counterterrorism.” https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_77646. htm.
[8] Matthew Levitt, “NATO’s Role in Fighting Post-Caliphate ISIS Looms Large,” The Hill, August 2, 2017. https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/344965-natos-role-fighting-post-caliphate-isis-looms-large.
[9] “NATO-Topic: Counterterrorism.”
[10] Kristensen and Schouseboe, “How to Step Up NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism.”
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] NATO: Three Security Levels for Counterterrorism,” Atlantic Treaty Association, November 14, 2015. http://www.atahq.org/ata-policy-focus/nato-three-security-levels-for-counter-terrorism/.
[14] Ibid
[15] Hanjnalka Vincze, “NATO: Assessing the Alliance’s Counterterrorism Efforts,” RealClear Defense.com, April 24, 2017. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/ 2017/04/24/natoassessingthe_alliances_counterterrorism_efforts_111231.html.
[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid
