President Donald Trump’s decision on December 19, 2018 to withdraw American forces from Syria unleashed a tsunami of piquant criticism. Much of that criticism is described below. At issue, how does the president’s decision inform us about his leadership in the area of counterterrorism?
Criticism of Trump’s Withdrawal Decision From Syria
As one can imagine, the criticism of President Trump’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria was swift. An article in The Atlantic described the president’s decision as “self-evidently reckless” and a “borderline-illegitimate course.”[1] The decision had another quality. It “confounded top advisers and by the end of the day left Washington in chaos and confusion.”[2]
Many of president’s political allies expressed shock and dismay. Senator Lindsey Graham asserted the president’s decision “rattled the world.”[3] Republican Senator Marco Rubio offered this statement via twitter: “If it isn’t [the decision] reversed, it will haunt this administration & America for years to come.”[4]
Many decried the decision and its impact on the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), American-backed allies in the struggle with the Islamic State. Dana Stroul, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stated, “I’m not sure the SDF continues to exist as an organized entity.”[5] She spoke of another dilemma that is likely to occur in the wake of the president’s decision: “The pressure is probably taken off ISIS, and the campaign doesn’t get completed in a way that would be satisfactory to America.”[6]
In response to the criticism, the president returned to twitter. This time Trump issued a video message to explain his decision. In the statement Trump argued, “We have won against ISIS…. We’ve taken back the land and now it’s time for our troops to come back home.”[7]
Day’s after the decision, on January 15, 2019 four Americans were killed in suicide attack launched by a member of the Islamic State. In an unfortunate declaration, which hours after the terrorist attack against the Americans, Vice President Mike Pence in a speech before the Global Chiefs of Mission Conference at the State Department “declared ISIS is defeated.”[8]
Revisiting The Core Components of Counterterrorism
There are four variables that connect leadership and counterterrorism, according to Lieutenant Commander Craig Haynes of the United States Navy. Those variables include (1) Commitment, (2) Diplomacy, (3) Action, and (4) Vision. These four variables have been refashioned to explore the connection between Trump, leadership, counterterrorism, and the decision to withdraw from Syria.
Trump’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria required that I reevaluate the president’s counterterrorism leadership. Why? Syria represents a significant case study by which one can explore the connection between leadership and counterterrorism.
Commitment is a reference to preserving US national security interests, and it calls upon the leader of a country to make major political decisions, to have staying power, and when called up to make decisions impacting the deployment or redeployment of US forces into and out of a war zone.
Many observers questioned the president’s commitment to the mission in Syria. The essence of the mission called for the defeat of the Islamic State. If the mission was the removal of its caliphate and the recapture of land under their control, then they have been defeated. If the mission is the defeat of the terror entity in its entirety, the fact that it has morphed into an insurgency and its resurging in Syria (and Iraq), then it is clear the network is far from defeated.
Diplomacy is another political component that connects leadership to counterterrorism. Diplomacy requires the participation of local, regional, and whenever appropriate, a coalition to defeat the terrorist entity.
On the diplomatic front it is personal diplomacy in the form of an extended conversation with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey that set the stage for the withdrawal of US forces. In the immediate hours and days after the decision to withdraw, the State Department and ambassadors around the world scrambled to present the best picture available to ensure shocked allies that the Trump administration is “still in the fight” against the Islamic State. There have been subsequent rounds of diplomacy aimed at settling on a state or states to step in to replace US forces and work with US-backed Kurdish fighters to continue the fight against the Islamic State.
Action is a requirement that calls upon the use of military force to defeat a transnational terrorist entity. In the case of the Islamic State and the battles that resulted in the collapse of the caliphate, action, whether in the form of air power (manned or unmanned), artillery, Special Operation Forces (SOFs), infantry, naval power, a local force (the SDF) or the combined use of coalition power, are all instruments utilized in Syria.
There several actions available to US military commanders during the anticipated lengthy withdrawal of American forces in Syria. A few examples are instructive. Air power (both from Air Force and Navy) will remain a tactical option open to President Trump. In addition, there are over 5,000 US military forces stationed in Iraq. Surely, if necessary some of those forces can be redeployed to Syria to protect the Kurds or to confront ISIS, or if need be the Turkish military.
Vision is the final variable. An American leader must have sense of the termination of hostilities with a transnational entity. The decision to shift focus, to leave a war zone or battle with a terrorist entity must be made in concert with commanders on the ground.
This variable is the most troubling. The reason is that President Trump previously spoke about withdrawing US forces from Syria. The president’s senior advisers were able to convince the president to delay any thought of withdrawal unless conditions on the ground indicated that it is safe to “move on.” Without the traditional formal notification (via the White House or from the Pentagon) no one can point to a vision, a way forward or a justification for the decision. Similarly, at the time of the decision, the president’s tweet does not a vision make.
Analysis
Taken collectively, the four components are critical to understanding President Trump’s decision to withdraw American forces from Syria. At issue, in light of the four variables can they be used to evaluate the president’s decision?
Previously, I made the following statement about Trump, leadership, and counterterrorism: “This early assessment indicates that Trump has succeeded in three of the four categories outlined earlier. The fourth component is problematic (one that haunted the Bush administration). [The absence of a vision] is the failure to provide a sense of when the war on terrorism concludes.”[9]
The decision and subsequent “vision-thing” in Syria provides an opportunity to reassess the president’s leadership in the area of counterterrorism. The analysis below provides a sense of the problems the four variables expose in Trump’s leadership in the area of counterterrorism. Conversely, the reader will note the same variables provide a positive perspective to the president’s decision and its long-term implications.
In the case of Syria, with the use of the four categories the evidence indicates that much of the criticism directed toward President Trump following his decision to withdraw US forces from that country is justified. However, there are other developments that indicate that while the decision is flawed but taken in conjunction with events in the wake of the December 19, 2018 tweet, the president’s action, while not justified, is one that can be sustained to complete the mission—the defeat of ISIS in Syria.
One of the critical events is connected to the president’s secret trip to visit the heroic members of American armed forces serving in the Al-Asad Air Base in Iraq. As part of the trip, President Trump met with senior military leaders. It is during this meeting that Trump presumably decided to slowdown the withdrawal of US personnel from Syria.
Second, senior civilian leaders no doubt pressed the president to slow the withdrawal. This could be expressed in the verbiage that was used by the president and other administration officials. Instead of an “immediate withdrawal” words such as “condition-based” were subsequently used by the administration officials. Because of the administration’s policy of not discussing troop deployments for security reasons, it is unknown how many troops have been withdrawn and when the final troops will depart Syria.
Third, there is the diplomatic component. The president met with senior military leaders about “the decision” and he subsequently met with national security advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and others. Pompeo and Bolton were tasked with communicating with allies and working to secure allied involvement prior to or in the wake of the American troop effort.
Fourth, with respect to action, on December 26, 2018, Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders acknowledged, “The generals and President Trump came up with a powerful plan that will allow us to continue our path to total victory. People will see results in a short period time.”[10] This is a problematic statement in that the decision to depart Syria was made with the Islamic States’ resurrection well underway in the country. Additionally, it is unclear how the Trump administration defines “total victory.”[11]
In the wake of this statement, US aircraft have launched numerous air strikes against ISIS-held towns in and around Hajin, Syria formerly the last major Islamic State strong-hold in the eastern part of the country. In addition, US troops near the Iraq-Syria border have unleashed several major artillery barrages directed at ISIS fighters. And the US-backed SDF launched major raids to target ISIS fighters coalescing within towns in the area.
Fifth, vision is another troubling aspect associated with the withdrawal decision. The central issue concerns the rollout. That is, the decision was released via twitter. The president noted that the decision is based on “the defeat of ISIS in Syria.”[12] This, said Trump, is “my only reason for being there.”[13] On the decision, Robert Ford, US ambassador to Syria under the Obama administration stated, “Looking out from a high distance, it’s the right decision.”[14] Ambassador Ford made this additional comment: “The overall thrust of the policy decision was correct.”[15] Ford did express displeasure with the haphazard way the decision was announced by the president.
There is a question that the president, military leaders, and diplomats are continuing to process: What’s next? As stated by former Army General Donald C. Bolduc, the head of Special Operations with Africa Command, “It is time … for diplomats, senior civilian advisors, and generals to move smartly to the follow-on question of ‘what now.’”[16] Put another way, “we need to figure out how we are going to support our allies and partners.”[17]
There is little doubt there will be a continued resurgence of ISIS in parts of Syria. The key is to prevent them from obtaining and subsequently holding territory going forward. This will require the president to create “a new vision and a new strategy” that will deal with the Islamic State’s insurgency in the absence of the presence of major American ground troops in Syria.
What remains unclear is whether the “wrong decision” at the improper time will assist President Trump in making better and more productive decisions regarding the war on terrorism in the future. In the interim, the president should thank the military and senior civilian leaders in the administration for rescuing him. Dealing with the future of the US-backed Kurds, the resurgent Islamic State, Turkey, Iran and Hezbollah are all variables that will be used in subsequent assessments of Trump, leadership, and counterterrorism.
[1] Conor Friedersdorf, “How the Press Sustains the Forever War,” TheAtlantic.com, December 21, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/forever-war/578800/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Russell Berman, “Much Ado About 2,200 Troops in Syria,” TheAtlantic.com, December 21, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archinve/2018/12/trumps-surprising-decision-withdraw-syria/57855/.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Lara Seligman, “The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria,” Foreign Policy, January 28, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/28/ unintended-consequences-trump-decision-withdraw-syria/.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Kevin Liptak, “In Syria Withdrawal, Trump Discards Advice from Allies and Officials,” CNN, December 20, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/politics/trump-syria-advisers-congress/ index.html.
[8] Carol Morello, “Pence Declares ‘ISIS is Defeated’ Hours After Attack Kills Americas in Syria,” Washington Post, January 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nat ional-security/pence-declares-isis-is-defeated-hours-after-attack-kills-us-troops/2019/01/1 16 ecc8d1e6-7967-4446-8ed0-afc282e0318 story.htm.
[9] For more on these four variables, see my previous post, John Davis, “Leadership and Counterterrorism,” March 14, 2018. https://www.editor-in-chieftheglobalwaronterrorism com /leadership-and-counterterrorism/.
[10] “The Latest: Trump Greets US Troops in Germany,” USNews.com. December 26, 2018. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-12-26/the-latest-trump-defends-with drawal-of-troops-from-syria.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Krishnadev Calamur, “Trump Wanted Out of Syria. It’s Finally Happening,” TheAtlantic.com, December 19, 2018. https://www.atlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/ trump-signals-us-troops-will-withdraw-syria/578569/.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Berman, “Much Ado About 2,200 Troops in Syria.”
[15] Ibid.
[16] Donald C. Bolduc, “The Decision to Depart and the Defeat of Violent Extremist Organizations,” Small Wars Journal. January 3, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal. com/jrnl/art/decision-depart-and-defeat-violent-extemist-organizations.
[17] Ibid.
