The April 21, 2019 Easter terrorist bombings unleashed violence on a religious Christian holiday. This post addresses three distinct issues. It opens with a discussion of the terrorist attack. Second, the post examines Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism practices. Third, the post provides an autopsy of the counterterrorism failures and lessons learned. 

Background

The Sri Lankan government successfully defeated a major indigenous terrorist group, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In the generational struggle with the LTTE, which concluded in 2009, the government of Sri Lanka relied on a sweeping counterterrorism strategy that consisted of three components. Those components consisted of the following: (1) intelligence sharing between Sri Lanka and those allied countries engaged in the struggle against terrorism, (2) improvement of intelligence collection and cooperation among Sri Lanka’s armed forces, and (3) “continuous intelligence data gathering to counter efforts to various organizations to revive terrorist activities in Sri Lanka.”[1] This strategy remains largely in place today. At issue, how did two local groups, with assistance from the Islamic State, conduct a coordinated multi-faceted “revenge attack” that resulted in the death of over 250 and injured 500-plus civilians? 

A new threat took center stage in the wake of coordinated attacks on Easter Sunday. In the attacks, at least seven suicide bombers detonated backpacks that were filled with explosives. The evidence thus far indicates the denotations occurred within minutes of each another. The post-attack analysis indicated three hotels and three Christian Churches were attacked by previously unknown terror groups that were supported by an outside transnational entity.

The Grand Intelligence and Counterterrorism Failure

Long before the multiple terrorist attacks that were initially suspected of being conducted by two local extremist terrorist groups—National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ)  and Jammiyahthul Millathu Inbrahim—that received assistance from The Islamic State, the Sri Lankan counterterrorism professionals (those at federal level and those among law enforcement at the local level) made two critical mistakes.

The first mistake is connected with a psychology that likely engulfed much of the federal bureaucracy and local law enforcement. There was triumphalist attitude that existed for years following the defeat of LTTE. This attitude assumed that no threat on the level of the LTTE existed and thus these officials relaxed ignoring salient signs of a changing security environment within the country.

This new environment indicated that there is evidence of local threats and the presence of an outside or exogenous threat in the form of The Islamic State that received insufficient attention from the government. One could what explains Sri Lanka’s government defeat of LTTE and how it appears the leadership of the country appeared so unprepared to confront the existence of nascent local threats and underestimate the threat posed by the Islamic State?

The reality is the current threats were not given much attention. Rather, evidence indicates that “government intelligence, security, and law enforcement officers were likely focused on monitoring the country’s Tamil population and preventing a resurgence”[2] of LTTE. In the absence of this attention-gap, “the inattention” to “a small Muslim community” … provided “the opportunity for a local group[s]—perhaps with external encouragement or support—to emerge from obscurity and perpetrate such horrifically lethal attacks.”[3]

The second issue is a connected to politics and internal strife between leaders and the political factions seeking to govern the country. That is, the government functioned as a sharply divided entity. Leadership was divided. Maithripala Sirisena served as the president and defense minister and Ranil Wickremesinghe occupied the prime minister position.[4]

As Lydia Khalil, counterterrorism analyst with the New York Police Department (NYPD), acknowledges, the situation is even more problematic when one considers “the government … [is] bitterly divided, with the president and prime minister at war with each other.”[5] Thus, in the face of this discord, counterterrorism officials either knew about the plot but refused to act out of fear that action could have further exacerbated the constitutional crisis and the loss of prestige and one’s job (maybe even one’s life).

A memo provided substantial evidence of the looming conspiracy. As reported in the New York Times, “Dated April 9 and labeled “Top Secret, (Eyes Only),” the chief of national intelligence warned the country’s police chief that “Sri Lanka based Zahran Hashmi of National Thowheeth Jama’ath and his associates are planning to carry out a suicide terrorist attack in Sri Lanka shortly.” The bombings came 12 days later.”[6]

How could so much vital intelligence be ignored? The answer points back to the discord at the federal level. In the end, civilians, domestic and foreign nationals, lost their lives because of the discord within government that had sufficient information to prevent the attack. What ensued is an extended period of a “blame game.”[7]

The internal political discord prevented a collective and professional response to early warning signals that could and should have prevented the coordinated attacks. For example, the autopsy thus far indicates the United States and Indian intelligence communities warned their counterparts in Sri Lanka of the “potential plot against churches and tourist sites in the country.”[8] Additionally, internationally, the government’s own Defense Ministry informed the Inspector general of the plot and replete “with a list of names and addresses of potential suspects” that actually participated in the conspiracy, and the information was ignored.[9]

Lessons Learned

Irrespective of internal political discord, when the security of the state and lives are at risk, leaders must act. Given the multiple levels of intelligence information about the plot, one would hope (though it is unlikely) that a commission is set up to address several issues. To ensure that counterterrorism failures on the magnitude associated with the conspiracy are not repeated. Second, the commission must address if charges should be brought against those in know that failed to act. Third, a comprehensive review and upgrading of Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism strategy must take place.

There are other lessons. Receiving intelligence about a threat requires decision makers to act on that information. This means that cooperation and communication must occur among leaders and bureaucratic entities to defeat a threat. The very fact the president of the country excluded the prime minister from critical meetings of the national security council is indicative of the failure of cooperation and communication.

Thus far, the post-attack response by government and local forces has been appropriate. Once the blame came between the prime minister and the president subsided, leadership and decision making at the executive level, along with cooperation at the local level, ensured a coordinated response. No doubt critics will ask: why did the government not perform in this way to prevent the multi-pronged and coordinated attack?

The coordinated attack will serve as an important case study in counterterrorism. It will provide vivid details of the consequences when government fails to act. Second, the available information thus far indicates the post-attack response could serve as a clearinghouse on how leaders should deal with those associated with the local extremist groups and those associated with the external terror group (The Islamic State in this case).

Another critical lesson learned is a detailed analysis of the actions taken by government security forces and law enforcement to evaluate the extent to which human rights may have been impaired. In cases involving domestic terrorism, there are untold cases where the government security forces, and at times law enforcement personnel, often engage in unlawful practices. Additionally, thinking long-term, one must examine the extent to which terrorists were detained and ultimately prosecuted. An analysis in these areas is critical to evaluate the effectiveness of post-attack counterterrorism and justice system in the Sri Lanka.

In the post-attack analysis, a major issue remains outstanding; what did the president of the country know? The president repeatedly states he was unaware of the intelligence connected to the attack. What occurs if the evidence proves otherwise? Is another constitutional crisis set to unfold in the not too distant future? Is a potential civil war likely? If a civil war occurs then the terrorists win. Still, the role of president, and whether he did know about the numerous warnings, is somethings the victims of this tragedy must know. Of equal importance, it is something the people of Sri Lanka must know.

Endnotes

[1] See Amparo PamelaH. Fabe, “Countering Terrorism in Sri Lanka,” The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy, June 29, 2017, 635-648.

[2] Bruce Hoffman, “Sri Lanka Bombings What We Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/article/sri-lanka-bombings-what-we-know.

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Lydia Khalil, “Sri Lanka’s Perfect Failure,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2019. htttps://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/23/sri-lankas-perfect-storm-of-failure-bombings-government-mistakes-terrorism/.

[6] Jeffrey Gettleman and Dharisha Bastians, “Sri Lanka Authorities Were Warned, in Detail, 12 Days Before Attack,” New York Times, April 29, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/world/asia/sri-lanka-attack-warning.html.

[7] “The Blame Game Begins After Sri Lanka Bombings,” The Economist, April 22, 2019. https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/04/22/the-blame-game-begins-after-sri-lanka-bombings.  

[8] Khalil, “Sri Lanka’s Perfect Failure,”

[9] Ibid