Covering the period of President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump a host of significant trends in counterterrorism have developed. This post addresses two issues: to briefly list some of the most significant trends in terrorism and those in counterterrorism (or those that impact counterterrorism practices). Second, this post concludes with an analysis of the linkage between trends developed by terrorist entities and the counterterrorism responses of the United States and its allies around the world.
Background
Since the commencement of the war on terrorism there have been several trends in counterterrorism. Post 9/11 the United Nations and regional organizations implemented a series of important resolutions in response to terrorism, most notably from Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda central and its affiliates around the world.
At another level, the administration of President George Bush relied on a host of counterterrorism instruments to counter the threats posed by Al Qaeda. Examples include the use of Special Operations Forces, unleashing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assist in countering the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s global network.
Assisted by the “Authorization to Use Force,” legislation approved by the US Congress, the Bush administration dramatically increased the use of military force to target Al Qaeda. The legislation is critical to understanding the tactical use of a several controversial “new forms of counterterrorism.”[1]
Ersun N. Kurtulus argues this “new counterterrorism is based on normalization of extra-judicial means in the fight against terrorism. This has happened at three levels: by creation of overt and covert extra-jurisdictional domains—or legal black holes—outside of the human rights regimes of democratic states.”[2] In addition, the Bush administration created an expansive counterterrorism infrastructure that include drones and a host of other instruments.[3]
The Bush administration, the Obama administration, and now the Trump administration is utilizing drones as part of the counterterrorism toolbox to respond to terrorist threats in a variety of threat environments. Still, despite these proactive efforts to address terrorist threats, the long war continues and the likelihood of a cycle of new terrorist trends will unfold.
Terrorist Trends: The Path to New Counterterrorism
Below is a sketch of some of the most significant trends introduced by terrorist groups. It should be noted that the terrorist trends listed below, for the most part, there is a striking commonality or association to Al Qaeda Central, their affiliates, and even the Islamic State.
Ungoverned Spaces
As previously discussed in another post, terrorist networks and terrorist groups, continue to make use of ungoverned spaces. While the West, most specifically the United States and its coalition allies, can claim major victories over several terrorist entities, one of the ongoing trends is the specter of ungoverned spaces.
It is important to note that in a major illustration of “a string of victories”, the United States, after the collapse of the caliphate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, can claim that it eliminated a major swath of territory. That said, it must be understood the Islamic State expanded and claimed territory elsewhere, thus expanding their control over ungoverned spaces around the world. Put another way, this means the Islamic State’s sanctuaries continue to expand which illustrates the trends in ungoverned spaces remains problematic.
Violent Extremism
Beginning with the arrival and subsequent maturity of the Islamic State following the emergence and collapse of their caliphate, violent extremism developed into an ever-evolving threat to the United States and allies around the world.
On the significance of the threat, Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute asserts, “threats from violent extremist groups have both multiplied and become more complex, particularly with the tectonic political and security shifts in the Middle East, the media and Internet landscapes, communications technology, and domestic public security threats.”[4]
To illustrate the threat to American security, consider since early 2014 through the Trump presidency the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched countless counter extremist investigations. As a result of these investigations, there have been arrests in all 50 states of US citizens prepared to either join the Islamic State (or other terrorist entities) or launch attacks inside the homeland. The Department of Justice is dealing with a back log of the cases that is threatening to overwhelm the American judicial system.
The United Nations Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) Trends
In January of 2019 The United Nations Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) issued a document detailing trends and key challenges that are “likely to emerge”[5] in the near term. CTED noted that there are four thematic trends. They include: (1) “key regional trends; (2) technology-driven trends in terrorism and counterterrorism; (3) the potential release of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and the broader issue of the rehabilitation of reintegration of convicted terrorist offenders; and (4) other potential trends …[sectarian violence, right-wing terrorist attacks unleashed in parts of Europe, and suicide attacks conducted by women].”[6]
The CTED trends are significant. However, due to the absence of space, I will briefly discuss some of the critical points associated with these trends. The regional trends are ominous. The document makes this significant point: “the risk that fragile States, political instability, and ongoing or unresolved conflicts would continue to create conditions conducive to terrorism”[7] which will extend the trend and increase stability in the region.
The issues described above are acute to the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In addition, the researchers express a grave concern about the expansion of instability in the Sahel. The researchers note the “continued fighting and the targeting of security forces and civilians by terrorist groups”[8]
The need to deal with the FTFs is a major issue. The threat associate with this issue should be viewed through this lens: as the release of the FTFs continues, governments where these individuals originated refuse to accept the return of their citizens. This is true in United States and many European states. The reality is FTFs are often released and return to the battlefield. Others remain in limbo (remain) incarcerated, increasing the costs for holding them.
Those that returned to the battlefield could strike again and therefore could inflict violence and deaths in new waves of terror. Those that remain imprisoned could produce a next generation threat. As is already known, many former members of Al Qaeda in Iraq were captured and in time met in prison and laid the foundations for what would become the Islamic State. Are we destined for history to repeat itself (perhaps on a smaller scale?).
Technology-driven terrorism continues to evolve. Terrorist entities continue to use the internet to recruit and create polished video messages. These and other activities are aided through platforms such as “WhatsApp, SnapChat, Instagram and YouTube.”[9]
At another level, counterterrorism officials are adapting to another phenomenon—terrorist use of drones. The Islamic State sporadically used drones. It can be best be described as an evolving program, a program that emerged in 2014 and developed into a real threat in late 2015.[10]
Islamic State forces initially used drones for surveillance purposes. In the Levant, the Islamic States’ threat was less about attacking American forces, but rather ISIS drones were used against Iraqi security forces. In particular, Islamic State forces utilized weaponized drones loaded with grenades that were unleashed against Iraqi forces during the battle for Mosul.[11]
In a disturbing trend other terrorist groups are using drones. For example, Boko Haram is using drones in Nigeria and elsewhere. Hezbollah’s use of drones is threat to Israel. The Taliban is deploying drones in Afghanistan against coalition forces.[12] Houthi rebels have made use of drones against Saudi Arabia’s allies in Yemen. The use of drones is a dangerous trend that is causing nightmares for counterterrorism officials around the world.[13]
START Trends
START is a Global Terrorism Data platform which is designed as a major resource for understanding trends in terrorism and counterterrorism. As a result of START, there are a host of important trends that counterterrorist officials worldwide are dealing with.
A few examples illustrate the usefulness of the START which tracks “Global Trends in Terrorist Incidents and Casualties.” Covering the period 2000-2017 the data indicates there is “the steep rise after 2004 [which] is driven largely by Islamist extremism, and as well as ethnic and sectarian fighting within largely Islamic countries.[14]
With respect to trends by region, MENA remains the focus of terrorist incidents. The regions of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia[15] are areas which are impacted by the rise in incidents of terrorism and terrorist related violence.
At another level, a most interesting trend exists. Trends in Sunni-led violent extremism assists in the comprehension of sectarian anger and extremism do drive terrorism in many of the main centers of terrorism.”[16]
Analysis
One of the most fascinating points is that there is much literature on how terrorist groups adapt to counterterrorism tactics of the United States and its coalition allies. There is a need for more research into the multiple terrorist trends and the counterterrorist response by states around the world.
In an illustration of trends and response, terrorist rely heavily on the use of cell phones to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq at the zenith of the insurgency against American forces. In response the US military introduced new heavily armored vehicles designed to improve the protection of military personnel. Additionally, the National Security Agency (NSA) and US military forces designed counterterror techniques that helped jam cells phones. This tactic prevented the detonation of IEDs and paved the wave for intelligence that helped to launch raids to track, detain and in some cases led to the death of terrorists.
The Islamic States’ caliphate represented an important trend for transnational terrorist organization. In response, the United States devised multiple terrorist strategies that involved two presidential administrations (Obama and Trump) and coalition to eliminate the terrorist enclave.
In response to the Islamic States ingenuity in the creation of multiple funding sources, the US-led coalition introduced a series of tactics designed to eliminate ISIS’s financial resources which assisted in the disruption of their control over the territories in Iraq and Syria.[17]
Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups utilized cyberspace as a method of radicalization and recruitment of new fighters; some of these converts launched lone wolf attacks. In response to this trend, “U.S. counterterrorism experts [view countering violent extremism or CVE] as a key part of the toolkit necessary to preempt terrorist activity in the first place and to help handle the many cases of extremism that will fall below the legal threshold for investigation.”[18]
CTEDs trends discussed above have unleashed what this United Nations entity believes represents a new round of global counterterrorist responses aimed at dealing with terrorist-related violence. Global North states react quickly to countering these trends, but states in Global South will require money, training, and time to adjust to the new counterterrorism landscape.
Counterterrorism officials worldwide are confronting a disturbing reality: new trends unleashed by terrorist groups are leading to the unveiling of new counterterrorism tactics. Counterterrorist officials must ponder this significant query: how do counterterrorism professionals break the cycle?
[1] Ersun N. Kurtulus, “The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the United States and Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 35, 2012, Issue 1. https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.631456.
[2] Ibid.
[3] For more on President Bush’s counterterrorism landscape, see John Davis, “Obama, Trump, and Bush’s Counterterrorism Infrastructure,” January 23, 2017. https://www.editor-in-chieftheglobalwaronterrorism.com/obama-trump-bushs-counterter rorism-infrastructure/.
[4] Matthew Levitt, “Recent Trends in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: National Practices in Countering Violent Extremism,” The Washington Institute, November 16, 2017. https://www .un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/8-Statement-as-delivered-by-Mr.-Matthew-Levitt-The-Washington-Institute.pdf.
[5] “CTED Research Digest: Terrorism and Counterterrorism Trends in 2019,” January 2019. http://us2.campaign-archive.com/?u=8343c3b932a7be398ceb413c9&id=13afc5ab 5e/?u=8343c3 b932a7be398ceb413c9&id=13afc5ab5e&awesome=no&e=#technology.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point United States Military Academy July 2018.
[11] “The Islamic State is Using Drones to Attack Iraqi Army in Mosul,” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/2049180/Islamic-state-using-drones-attack-iraqi-army-mosul.
[12] “IntelBrief: Terrorist Use of Drones and Other Emerging Technologies,” The Soufan Center, October 3, 2018. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-terrorists-use-of-drones-and-other-emerging-technologies/.
[13] Zak Doffman, “Forget Gatwick, Why the Deadliest Terrorist Threat from Drones is Not at Our Airports,” Forbes, December 27, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdo ffman/2018/12/27/forget-gatwick-why-the-deadliest-terrorist-threat-from-drones-is-not-at-our-airports/.
[14] Anthony Cordesman, “Terrorism: U.S. Strategy and the Trends in Its Wars on Terrorism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-prod.s3.am azonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180808_Terrorism_START_Survey.Transmittal.pdf?g8Yu9.p9DmHWXXhJn6WuIFinxbMblDpo.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] “AML Professionals and Addressing the Challenges of Combatting Terrorist Financing,” ACAMs.https://www.acams.org/ami-resources/combatting-terrorist-financin g/.
[18] Levitt, “Recent Trends in Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”
