The African Union (AU) has been engaged in a continental struggle against terrorism since its creation. Recently, the regional organization has come under increasing scrutiny in its response to major transnational actors, its record in ensuring that member states are equipped with rudimentary counterterrorism equipment, and its failed to ensure that member states enact fundamental anti-terrorism laws. At issue, are these criticisms valid? Is evidence available to indicate that the AU has performed admirably in working with local governments to deal with subnational and transnational terrorism? This post addresses these and other issues that concern the most engaged and successful regional organizational response to a wide array of terrorist threats.
Background
The African continent has had to wrestle with many different forms of terrorism and terrorist actors, to include Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army. As a consequence, the African Union which consists of 55 member states and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) “have been actively engaged in continental efforts to prevent and combat terrorism for over four decades.”[1]
The African Union’s struggle with regional terrorism predates the current organization. For an understanding of the arduous task before the regional entity, it is important to return to its precursor, the Organization of African Unity. During its tenure, the OAU reached agreement on a Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States and The Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations.
Following a gathering of members in Dakar, Senegal in 1992, the participants agreed on the initial resolution (On the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States) which call for a pledge “to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.”[2]
In the wake of the conference, and in a subsequent meeting, this time in Tunis, Tunisia, in June 1994, another milestone in regional counterterrorism cooperation was reached following the approval of Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. This time members agreed to reject “all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. [In addition], the declaration also condemned, as criminal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices, and expressed its resolve to enhance cooperation to combat such acts.”[3]
The 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which was held in Algiers, Algeria further codified regional efforts. In this gathering States agreed to “criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws as defined in the Convention.”[4]
These precedent setting agreements represent the foundations of OAUs effort to align regional states to deal with the rapid spread of terrorism on the continent. There is another significant feature of the regional entity: “The OAU was premised on a principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its Member States.”[5] This represents one of the critical distinctive features between the OAU and AU. By contrast, one should be aware of the AU’s “increased mandate to be more interventionist on matters of continental concern, which include terrorism and international crimes.”[6]
The African Union assumed the mantle of dealing with the threat of terrorism following its creation. Not long after its founding, the AU created several mechanisms which quickly distinguished it from its predecessor the OAU. For example, “The AU has a well-developed normative framework to combat terrorism with The 1999 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its 2004 Protocol which gives responsibility to The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to ‘coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects.’”[7]
Also, in 2004, the AU formally established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The objective of the ACSRT is “to centralize information and research on terrorism and to develop counterterrorism capacity building programs.”[8] Additionally, The ACSRT provided “a forum for interaction and cooperation among Member States and Regional Mechanisms.”[9]
In October 2010, the AU created the position of The Special Representative for Counterterrorism. Within a year, the AU further expanded their counterterrorism efforts following the adoption of the African Model Law on Counterterrorism which assisted “states in harmonizing legislation on terrorism.”[10] The Model Law had another purpose: it assisted member states “in implementing the various continental and international counterterrorism instruments.”[11]
The AU benefited significantly from other organizations within and outside the region. In a notable example, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been lauded as a “pioneering counterterrorism cooperation in the sub-region.”[12] In an illustration of its effectiveness, IGAD provides a “proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime in East Africa and the Horn.”[13] It is undisputed that “The IGAD’s role [remains the] … forerunner in [counterterrorism] cooperation is similarly presented … in comparison with other sub-regional organizations.”[14] Noted scholar, Jolyon Ford asserts, “through its Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), IGAD has led the way among sub-regional organizations on counterterrorism strategy.”[15] Thus, the AU benefited from the efforts of the IGAD.
Following an AU commissioned Heads of State-level Peace and Security Council gathering in Nairobi, Kenya on September 2, 2014, the organization agreed to the following objectives[16]: (1) “establishing a Counterterrorism Fund and convening an annual AU Coordination Forum to coordinate efforts in counterterrorism, (2) “establishment of specialized joint counterterrorism units at the sub-regional level within the framework of The African Standby Force (ASF),” and, (3) “pending the achievement of the ASF, The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).”[17]
The AU’s Counterterrorism Shortcomings
There are those that insist that the AU should rethink its counterterrorism role. In a notable example, Jide Okeke asserts the AU should continue to support counterterrorism operations. That said, it is argued “the deployment of peace support operations is not an appropriate tool for achieving such a strategic goal.”[18] Instead, Okeke argues for the “repositioning of the AU’s role through providing political, policy, technical and limited financial support if possible, and should be what the continental body aspires to.”[19] Put another way, there is an increasing argument for “clarity on what the continental body can and cannot or should not do.”[20]
Additionally, Okeke articulates “successful counterterrorism operations require specialized capabilities. There is currently a mismatch between equipment and other capabilities deployed for counterterrorism operations.”[21] Finally, he asserts success in counterterrorism requires “Swift capabilities … such as intelligence, a quick reaction force, combat helicopters, and secure and effective real-time communication. These resources are difficult to negotiate.”[22] The sad reality is the AU is lacking in all of these areas.
Another shortcoming is in the area of funding. It is currently projected that the current AU Peace Fund of “US$400 million” is significantly below the average cost of a single counterterrorism operation.[23] Member of states of the AU are unable to off-set the shortfall in needed counterterrorism obligations. As a result, the AU welcomes and receives support from the UN and EU. At another level, the United States assists select states individually or through counterterrorism coalitions in the region. In the end, however, “The AU should use its international credibility and legitimacy to help its member states deliver more effective counterterrorism operations.”[24]
There are additional shortcomings. For decades the AU prodded member states to expand counterterrorism capabilities. A reality still remains: few states have the means and political will to expand local counterterrorism capabilities. Assistance is available in the form of ACSRT. The organization remains a structural resource that assists in combating terrorism in the region.[25]
Unfortunately, too few states take advantage of this resource. As a result, many “member security forces” continue to lack “the most rudimentary skills in counterterrorism.”[26] It should also be noted “the AU itself can do more to uphold its end of the bargain. The ACSRT … has the potential to be a vital resource, but it remains chronically underfunded and under-staffed.”[27]
At another level, unlike NATO, the AU does not have a standing army.[28] Thus, the Peace and Security Council, which provides a critical mechanism to provide member states with a forum for debate and response to terrorist threats. But the Council cannot introduce a force to eradicate a threat in a state or within a region of the continent.
Effective counterterrorism requires effective implementation. It is in the area of implementation where one may find additional shortcomings in counterterrorism. Simon Allison, writing in a brief for Institute for Strategic Studies, articulates, “It took more than a decade for the Algiers Protocol to come into force, and even today only fifteen-member states have ratified it. Among those who have not ratified are key actors in the fight against terrorism, including Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia. Meanwhile, only a third have passed specific counterterrorism laws as recommended by the AU (for which the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law is the template).”[29]
Allison further argues the disinclination of key players in the region “to embrace the AU’s counterterrorism policy is fatal to the success of that policy. There can be no coordinated response to terrorism if the main players refuse the AU’s attempts to coordinate it (and there is no comparable body offering a better alternative).”[30]
Allison made this additional significant statement: “Any policy is only as good as its implementation, and currently the AU’s counterterrorism policy is not being implemented effectively.”[31]
As noted, the dilemmas associated with AU counterterrorism efforts are alarming. But in many ways, the deficiencies in the AU counterterrorism are rudimentary. Outgoing chairperson of the PSC, Ambassador Alian Aim’e Nyamitwe from Burundi, provides this sobering statement: “There is a difficulty in defining terrorism and not all African countries have counterterrorism laws, which makes collaboration difficult at times.”[32]
Analysis
Irrespective of the conspicuous shortcomings, the AU remains an extraordinary instrument in the fight to combat terrorism. Other than the AU, no regional organization comes close in confronting the diverse set of threats, subnational, transnational, and international terrorism. Additionally, given the substantial threats, through partnership with the UN, EU, and IGAD, thus operating in a crowded structural environment, or working alone, the AU still shines is responsible for numerous victories against terrorism.
Despite what some view is the AU’s omnipresent involvement in combating regional terrorism, there are those that argue the AU needs to increase its counterterrorism activity. One recommendation calls for the creation of a sub-committee on counterterrorism that would be placed within the PSC. The purpose of the sub-committee would be to serve as “a mechanism” that would enhance efforts “to enable monitoring of progress and ensuring compliance with PSC decisions.”[33]
In January of 2018, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres made this important statement: “The African Union is a vital partner in confronting the global challenge posed by terrorist groups.”[34] The secretary general spoke of the need for more cooperation. Guterres stressed, “I believe this work can be strengthened even further with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) setting out a road map for future collaboration and capacity-building support on countering terrorism.”[35] In effort to further the necessity of cooperation between the UN and AU, Guterres observed, “We face a serious challenge–but I believe it is one that we can meet with solidarity, common action and a shared resolve.”[36]
The intentions by the secretary general are well founded, but collaboration in the absence of specific plan of action will not elevate the AU in meeting the threat of terrorism in the region. Leadership within the body, and from the states that comprise the organization, must work to provide the details for a future plan of action. Time is of the essence. One instructive reality illustrates the point. Terrorist organizations will not wait for the AU to improve. Instead, they will continue to exploit the weaknesses of the AU and those of member states.
[1] “Module 5: Regional Counterterrorism Approaches: Africa Region,” UNODC.org. https://www. unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/african-region.html.
[2] “African Union Counterterrorism Framework,” African Union Peace and Security, November 23, 2015. http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Module 5: Regional Counterterrorism Approaches: Africa Region,” UNODC.org. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/african-region.html.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAC),” UNOAU.UNMissions.org. https://un oau.unmissions.org/counter-terrorism.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] “The African Union Counterterrorism Framework.” www.peaceau.org, November 2015. http://www.peaceau.org/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct1q.
[12] Dawit Yohannes, “Counterterrorism Partnership in a Crowded Field: A Case Study of the EU, AU, and IGAD,” Paper submitted to the workshop on “African Security and Unbridled Militarization? New Approaches to African Peace and Security Governance Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, November 22 and 23, 2017.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Other than those listed above, a host of AU-led instruments were created to include the Sahel Fusion Liaison Unit (UFL), the Nouakchott Process, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), and the establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), which deals with the ever-present need for cooperation to address transnational crime as well as anti-terrorism.
[17] United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAC),” unoau.unmissions.org. https://unoau.unmissions.org/counterterrorism.
[18] Jide Okeke, “Repositioning the AU’s role in Counterterrorism Ooperations, Policy Brief, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2019. file:///C:/Users/PublicIT-PC/Downloads/Repositioning _the_AUs_role_in_counter_terrorism%20(1)pdf.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Jide Okeke, “Repositioning the AU’s Role in Countering Terror,” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), May 2019. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/repositioning-the-aus-role-in-countering-terror.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] See John Davis, Editor, Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror (Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland: 2010), p. 289.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Simon Allison, “26th AU Summit: Why Isn’t the AU’s Counterterrorism Strategy Working?” January 29, 2016, Institute for Security Studies (ISS). https://issafrica.org/iss-today/26th-au-summit-why-isnt-the-aus-counter-terrorism-strategy-working.
[28] Davis, Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror, p. 289.
[29] Allison, “26th AU Summit: Why Isn’t the AU’s Counterterrorism Strategy Working?”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “African Union Should Lead the Continent’s Response to Terrorism,” Institute for Strategic Studies, ISSAfrica.org. https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/african-union-should-lead-the-continents-response-to-terrorism.
[33] Ibid.
[34] “At African Union Summit, Guterres Outlines UN-AU Approach to Combatting Terrorism,” AU Summit 2018. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/african-union-summit-guterres-outlines-un-au-approach-combatting-terrorism.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
