Understanding The Terrorism And Non-Terrorist Threat Landscape
Syria is a state that represents the most dangerous terrorism/non-terrorism threat landscape in the world. Amazingly, there is scant discussion on how and in what ways the twin variables associated with Syria have complicated U.S. counterterrorism operations in that country. This post examines a host of critical issues that will ultimately determine the success or failure of the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria. What are the issues? For example, what is meant by “the terrorism threat landscape,” and why is this concept critical to understanding the success or failure of the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria? Second, what are the state and non-state issues that impact the terrorism landscape in Syria? Third, how do the “ungoverned spaces” and the violent non-state extremist actors use of these sanctuaries impact the terrorism landscape in Syria. Finally, does the administration of Joe Biden have a plan for not only safeguarding U.S. forces but does it have plan for completing the counterterrorism mission in Syria during a period of the ever-expanding terrorism/non-terrorism threat landscape?
The concept of the terrorism threat landscape lacks a precise definition. One issue that counterterrorism scholars and officials inside the United States and abroad agree on “is the threat landscape has expanded considerably, and international terrorism remains a serious threat.”[1]
The terrorism threat landscape represents a reference to the types of terrorism threats that exist within an area (sanctuary), a state, a region, or those that can metastasize internationally like Al Qaeda which developed into a global phenomenon and implemented the most brazen terrorist attack in United States on September 11, 2001.
Thus, the initial and certainly the critical components of the terrorism threat landscape are the existence and expansion of a terrorist entity. Additionally, the types and numbers of attacks planned and implemented, organizational membership, the presence of multiple splinter groups that emerged from a given violent extremist group assist in understanding the terrorism threat landscape.
It is for these reasons that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State represent two of the most dangerous terrorist groups and whose operations, attendant violence, and ability to operate and impact a state, a region, or have threatened the U.S. globally that assists in understanding the potential regional and U.S. national security implications of a given terrorism threat landscape.
The terrorism threat landscape includes a host of additional variables that further identify why the struggle against violent extremists in Syria will be long and arduous. As stated above, the terrorist groups themselves represent the most conspicuous aspect of the terrorist threat landscape in Syria. Some of the additional variables include the increasing use of cyberterrorism by terrorist organizations, their increasing use of drones, the stark reality that a state (Afghanistan) is governed by a terror entity (The Taliban) and this entity has access to an expansive array of American conventional military weapons[2] both to preserve their hold on power in Afghanistan and to confront a host of antigovernmental threats to include ISIS-Khorasan.
Vital Cog: State and Non-State Variables In The Threat Landscape In Syria
The state components of the terrorism landscape in Syria consists of a host of actors each of significantly impact the U.S. counterterrorism mission in that country. The Pentagon has recognized this continuing thorny issue. The American military presence in the Northeastern portion of country in support of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and when appropriate to launch separate counterterrorism missions to confront the reemerging Islamic State forces “risks bringing the United States into direct military confrontation with pro-Assad forces, including Iran and potentially Russia.”[3]
Russia’s presence significantly complicates the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria. As described by Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s counterterrorism typically focused on brutal repression and murder.” As to the perceived reasons associated with Russia’s counterterrorism objectives in Syria, is that “Thousands from Russia and the former Soviet Union joined ISIS in Syria, and Russia had to intervene to prevent terrorist attacks inside Russia.”[4]
At another level, Russian air assets launched hundreds of what it viewed as counterterrorism airstrikes against “antigovernment” extremists that were determined to end the Bashar al-Assad regime. Many of the missions have been associated with Russian war crimes in the country which many believe litter the landscape in Syria.[5] Additionally, the Russian government launched numerous indiscriminate air strikes destroyed what Moscow and the Syrian leader Bashar viewed were sanctuaries across the country under the control of antigovernment forces.[6]
In an illustration of the violence and destruction, wholesale blocks formerly teaming with people and buildings have been reduced to rubble. Worse, Russia targeted countless hospitals across the country which killed thousands of innocent civilians. Collectively, these tactics have been viewed as war crimes.
In the case of Iran, the administration of Donald Trump increased U.S. military activities against Iranian-back militia groups that have become increasingly active in Syria and those that directly threatened American forces.
In a recent example of the threat posed by Iranian-backed militias against U.S. forces, in January of 2022 these forces “conducted a suicide drone attack on U.S. forces at Al-Tanf and an attack on U.S. and partner forces in northeast Syria.”[7]
The U.S.-Russian And Israeli-Russian Deconfliction Agreements In Syria
In the case of the U.S. government and its reasons for an agreement on deconfliction in Syria, there are a host of vital points that validate the necessity of cooperation with Russia in order to safeguard U.S. counterterrorism operations in Syria and to prevent potential conflict between Washington and Moscow. For starters, there is need for cooperation to defeat the Islamic State. Second, there is the requirement to avoid direct and unnecessary engagements between Russian and U.S. forces, whether during ground or air operations in Syria.
These points are critical when one considers the multiple times U.S and Russian forces (or Russian private military contractors) were in direct contact or there were near misses. For example, there is the incident where Russian military contractors engaged U.S. Army Special Forces and Marines in an American military outpost in Kasham, Syria.
In what was dubbed the Battle of Kasham, the Wagner Group, which are Russian mercenaries, battled U.S. forces for nearly four hours. The mercenaries, which were supported by Syrian forces that possessed T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers (the combined force was believed to be 400 troops), were participants in the engagement against U.S. forces.
The Secretary of Defense James Mattis spoke to his Russian counterpart in an attempt to prevent any unnecessary military engagements. The Russian government relayed the message that those were not their forces and were not under their command. Given the intense shelling of the base, the Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) made the decision to call in air support. Following the massive display of American air power, the result of the Battle of Kasham ended this way: “The remnants of the attacking force fled the field. In their wake lay between 200 and 300 dead fighters [Russian mercenary and Syria troops].”[8]
As a result of this incident, and another instance where Russian mercenaries attacked U.S. forces in Syria, U.S.-Russian deconfliction “shed light on how political leaders and military professionals on both sides were able to maintain productive lines of communication and avoid dangerous situations.”[9]
The Israeli and Russian governments decided to engage in military-to-military cooperation to avoid potential engagements in Syria. Commencing in 2015, the Israeli government moved swiftly to create an Israeli-Russia deconfliction agreement “to prevent them clashing inadvertently during Israeli strikes against Iranian deployments and arms transfers in the neighboring Arab state.”[10]
In the case of the United States and their military, and with respect of Israeli forces that operated in Syria, both recognized that cooperation in that country could assist in counterterrorism operations and avoid potential disaster and negate extended and unnecessary conflict in that country.
Terrorist Groups Operating in Syria And The Non-State Terrorism Threat Landscape[11]
Since the start of the Syrian Civil War, a host of terrorist groups have operated in the country. Some but certainly not all of the terrorist groups operating in Syria include but are not limited to the following examples, The Islamic State, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Jabhat Fatah al Sham/Al Nusrah Front), National Liberation Front, Hurras al-Din (an HTS offshoot), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Failaq al-Rahman, Jaish al-Islam, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, and Hezbollah.
As the aforementioned details illustrate, a host of terrorist groups exist across Syria. Many of these violent terrorist organizations pose a direct threat to the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria. From another perspective, the U.S. government, given the small footprint of military forces in Syria, recognizes it cannot confront most and certainly not all of the above violent extremist groups. Thus, the Pentagon will likely only confront those terror groups that threaten U.S. forces or their SDF allies.
The above not being sufficient there is another critical component of the terrorism threat landscape—State sponsors of terrorism. The state sponsors of terrorism include the governments of Syria, Russia, and Iran. In all cases these states kill indiscriminately to wipe out or destroy “perceived or designated antigovernment organizations whose objective is to eliminate the anti-Bashar al-Assad forces determined [undermine] his authoritarian government.”[12] Russia tactics in Chechnya is another illustration of state sponsored terrorism. In a notable example of state sponsorship of terrorism, the government of Syria used nerve gas against their own people, prompting intervention from the administration of Donald Trump which launched several air strikes to target the bases that target the Syrian civilian population.
The Non-Terrorist Threat Landscape Variables In Syria
The threat landscape includes other (non-state) variables which comprise non-terrorist entities which include variables such as ungoverned spaces, and other non-terrorist threats such as “external states” (Russia, Iran, and Turkey that operate in Syria) whose military operations, intelligence, and financial support have increasingly impacted the terrorism landscape in Syria.[13]
An ungoverned space is considered an important variable that assists in understanding the terror landscape in Syria and beyond. Two noted scholars, Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas offer this perspective: “The ungoverned spaces are viewed as social, political, and economic arenas where states do not exercise “effective sovereignty” or where state control is absent, weak, or contested.”[14]
American Presidents to include Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and most recently Joe Biden have each asserted that to defeat terrorism the United States must be prepared to destroy the untold number of sanctuaries that exist within the ungoverned spaces around the world, most notably in Africa.
Each of the aforementioned presidents understood that ungoverned spaces represent the critical node in defeating terrorism. As argued previously, in Africa the failure to destroy these sanctuaries, or ungoverned spaces, represents a major U.S. counterterrorism failure in dealing with violent extremism across Africa.[15]
The Terrorism Landscape in Syria: U.S. Counterterrorism Implications
Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of House Sub-Committee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade previously warned, “You have a multitude of actors all seeking their own self-interest in Syria.”[16] Poe’s statement represents an ominous warning for the U.S. counterterrorism operations in Syria in that pro-and anti-Assad forces and state and non-state actors will certainly benefit from a failed U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria.
In an illustration of one the threats, the terror threat environment in Syria and the attendant instability associated with the U.S. counterterrorism mission in that country is the impacted by a potential second invasion by Turkish military forces. In the initial Turkish invasion that commenced in October 2019 in “SDF-controlled territory in northern Syria saw a restive population of imprisoned ISIS fighters and detainees respond to regional instability with riots and escape attempts.”[17]
In the aftermath of the invasion, many SDF fighters were deployed away from the ISIS prisoner camps to confront advancing Turkish forces. This reality is amplified when one considers the “continued threat posed by ISIS prisoners was more recently highlighted by the January 2022 al-Sina prison uprising and attack, which saw a 10-day long battle with SDF fighters and prison guards.”[18]
There is little doubt the Turkish government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is “exploiting geopolitical instability”[19] in Syria to fill power vacuums and of equal import to attack a critical U.S. ally, the SDF, in the country. In response to Erdogan’s threat to launch another invasion of Syria, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Erdogan the Biden administration will not accept a second Turkish invasion of Syria or an attack the SDF.
Given the presence of small U.S. forces, the Pentagon has “almost fully shifted objectives towards supporting and advising the SDF on counterterrorism operations.”[20] To be clear the administration has launched several significant raids aimed at targeting ISIS leaders across Syria. That said, the ISIS threat remains and the American effort to confront the Islamic State continues to be complicated by the terrorist/non-terrorist landscape that exists in Syria.
One of the critical counterterrorism lessons not learned since the evolution the Syria civil war is “the United States performed poorly on one key counterterrorism task: building up local allies.”[21] The issue which transcends the Obama, Trump, and now the Biden administration is this: “The United States relied on Syrian Kurds and otherwise supported forces that could fight but could not govern with broad popular support.”[22]
The overreliance on the SDF, which has their own interests and objectives that are often at odds with those of the United States, means that in any Turkish advance into their enclaves, or those by Syrian government forces, the U.S. preferred mission on fighting the Islamic States all-too-often takes a backseat.
This issue becomes more problematic when recognizes the American government is not committed to enlarging their presence in Syria. Worse, other than the SDF, the U.S., other than the contingent of allied special forces in the country, its options are minimal. More disturbing is the U.S., like in Afghanistan, has yet to define victory in Syria.
In an area of the world replete with a complex terrorist/non-terrorist landscape it is understandable but no less acceptable that no one in the Biden White House, State Department or Pentagon can define victory in Syria. What is interesting is across the American foreign policy bureaucracy each of the critical bureaucratic entities can describe the chaos that will result if there is a U.S. withdrawal from Syria but have been unable to craft a strategy for victory.
The United States, consistent with events in Iraq, must continually deal with the threat posed by Iranian-back militias in Syria. In spite of successful operations against the threat, the Biden administration is dealing with a problematic reality: “The cycle of strikes and counter-strikes against U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq, however, suggest that U.S. military actions to date have not adequately deterred Iranian-backed forces.”[23]
Some three-years since Trump declared the end of the ISIS caliphate and the defeat of the Islamic State, consistent with the terrorism landscape, the Biden administration has “inherited a complex and shifting battlefield in Syria.”[24]
In the ever-fluctuating terror environment in Syria the Biden administration has failed define a way forward and a strategy to define what constitutes victory. This issue resulted in the failure of four U.S. presidential strategies in Afghanistan. What will it mean for U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Syria? At present the administration “continues to conduct counterterrorism operations in Syria with no clear objective beyond securing the “enduring defeat” of the Islamic State.[25]
The administration has however weighed in on the terror landscape, not in Syria but its impact on the homeland. In an illustration of the point, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas issued an important statement about this critical concept and its implications.
Secretary Mayorkas asserted, “The threat landscape has evolved considerably over the last 20 years.”[26] The point said Mayorkas is the threat has evolved from one of the foreign extremist threats to the homeland to one from multiple domestic terrorist threats that threaten American democracy.[27]
Critics charged the Biden administration has overemphasized the domestic aspects of the terror threat landscape and not enough on the myriad of threats that have complicated the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Syria. Some critics have argued the administration is misusing the terror threat landscape for domestic political purposes. The dilemma is the absence of a coherent strategy and how the administration intends to deal with the myriad of threats in Syria.
There are several issues that remain quietly on the minds of counterterrorism professionals inside the Beltway and around the world. For starters, will Biden declare his own victory in Syria and then announce a “future withdrawal deadline” for American troops? Second, given the legacy of Afghanistan, will the administration continue a conditions-based deployment of U.S. forces in the Syria to deal with the Islamic State? Third, has the administration considered the impact of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and the future of the SDF and how this issue could impact the future movements of Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces in Syria?
These questions are all prompted by the terrorism (and the impact of the non-terrorism) threat landscape in Syria. There is this additional issue. How will U.S. leadership of the war on terrorism suffer should Biden shift to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria? This issue and those mentioned above and administration answers to them will loom large on the future trajectory of the war on terrorism.
[1] “FBI-What We Investigate,” https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism.
[2] Tanya Mehra, Méryl Demuynck, and Matthew Wentworth, “Weapons in Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Spoils of War,” International Centre for Counterterrorism, Policy Brief, February 2022. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2022/02/The-Spoils-of-War-final.pdf.
[3] Tess Bridgeman and Brianna Rosen, “Still At War: The United States in Syria,” Just Security, April 29, 2022. https://www.justsecurity.org/81313/still-at-war-the-united-states-in-syria/.
[4] Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, and Aaron Stein, editors, Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Lessons Learned (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020), p. 17. https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/russias-war-in-syria.pdf.
[5] Julian Borger, “Russia Committed War Crimes in Syria, Finds UN Report,” TheGuardian.com, March 2, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report.
[6] Nick Cummings-Bruce, “U.N. Panel Says Russia Bombed Syrian Civilian Targets, a War Crime,” New York Times, March 2, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/world/middleeast/united-nations-syria-idlib-russia.html.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Mac Caltrider, “That Time U.S. Forces Tore Hundreds of Russian Wagner Group Mercenaries to Pieces in Syria.” Coffee or Die Magazine, March 22, 2022.https://www.coffeeordie.com /wagner-group-syria-khasham.
[9] Andrew Weiss and Lisa Ng, “Collision Avoidance: The Lessons of U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 20, 2019. https://carnegie endowment.org/2019/03/20/collision-avoidance-lessons-of-u.s.-and-russian-operations-in-syria-pub-78571.
[10] Dan Williams, “Russia Sees Military Coordination with Israel on Syria Continuing,” Reuters.com, February 26, 2002.https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/russia-sees-military-coordination-with-israel-syria-continuing-2022-02-26/.
[11] The terrorist threat landscape is further complicated by what group is designated as a terrorist group that operates in Syria. Two examples are instructive. The government of Turkey designated a major Kurdish adversary, The People’s Protection Units (YPG), a splinter group of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as “an internationally designated terrorist group.” For more on Turkey’s designation of Kurdish terrorist groups operating in Syria, see “Syria: Extremism and Terrorism,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/syria-extremism-and-terrorism. In a second example, the Syrian government, along with their allies Russia and Iran, designated a host of groups as ant-government extremists. Examples include Ahrah al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Liwa al-Tawhid, are just a few examples. It should not come as a surprise the antigovernment groups outnumber the global or international designated terrorist groups. For more on this topic see, “Antigovernment Government Armed Groups,” European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), September 2020. https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria/13-anti-government-armed-groups.
[12] Zachary Laub, “Syria’s Civil War: Descent into Horror,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war.
[13] Of note there are other conspicuous non-terrorist entities that operate within Syria. The most conspicuous of these non-terror entities are the U.S. and coalition special and conventional, air and intelligence assets that operate in Syria to confront the Islamic State fighters that operate in the country.
[14] Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority, And Softened Sovereignty,” https://www.degruyter.com /document/doi/10.1515/9780804774499-003/pdf.
[15] For more on this point, see John Davis, “Ungoverned Spaces and The Failure of Counterterrorism in Africa,” October 30, 2016. https://www.editor-in-chieftheglobalwaronterrorism.com/2016/10/ 30/ungoverned-spaces-failure-counterterrorism-africa/.
[16] Defeating Terrorism in Syria a New Way Forward: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, February 17, 2017, Washington, DC. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24241/html/CHRG-115hhrg24241.htm
[17] Martijn Vugteveen and Joshua Farrell-Molloy, “Turkish Military Offensive in Syria: Consequences for Counterterrorism Operations,” June 22, 2022. https://icct.nl/publication/turkish-military-offensive-in-syria-consequences-for-counter-terrorism-operations/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Daniel Byman, “6 Counterterrorism Lessons from the Syrian Civil War,” Brookings.edu. February 27, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/6-counterterrorism-lessons-from-the-syrian-civil-war/.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Bridgeman and Rosen, “Still At War: The United States in Syria,” Just Security, April 29, 2022.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Zach Schonfeld, “DHS Secretary: ‘Threat Landscape Has Evolved Considerably’ Since 9/11,” The Hill, September 11, 2022. https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3638093-dhs-secretary-threat-landscape-has-evolved-considerably-since-9-11/.
[27] Ibid.
