The battle for Raqqa is the subject of great controversy. Many counterterrorism experts complained about President Barack Obama’s strategy and the failure to intensify the air strikes while others have argued the former American leader should have increased local and US combat firepower to retake the operational headquarters of the Islamic State months ago. Most recently, other scholars have questioned President Donald Trump’s “plan for soundly and quickly defeating ISIS.”[1] This post addresses the long-overdue anti-ISIS coalition battle to retake Raqqa. Additionally, this post explores the next frontier: the battle over the future of Deir al-Zour.
Background
It has been mistakenly reported by the media that the battle for Raqqa has finally commenced. The reality is the battle for Raqqa, which is defended by some 3,000-4,000 ISIS Islamists, has been underway for over six months. In fact, three phases of the battle for Raqqa have already concluded. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a 30, 000-strong force that is armed, advised, and trained by US Special Forces, initiated the opening phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath on November 6, 2016.[2] The objective of this phase called for the liberation of territory in Northern Raqqa.[3] During Phase Two of Operation Euphrates Wrath the SDF captured significant territory in Western Raqqa. Phase Two concluded on December 10, 2016.[4]
The third phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath concluded on February 4, 2017. During this phase, SDF forces captured several villages in Eastern Raqqa. Taken collectively, the aim of SDF forces called for using the phases to isolate “the ISIS radical group in its de facto capital Raqqa.”[5] By the end of phase of three phases “more than 200 villages, hamlets, hills and other localities that span over 7, 400 square kilometers (2, 900 square miles) were captured.”[6] There is another critical component associated with this phase that has not received enough attention. Specifically, SDF forces engaged in separate engagements in “Tabqa while the other half was ready to isolate Raqqa from Deir al-Zour”[7] where ISIS fighters have substantial areas of control.
The SDF General Command which implemented the fourth phase and issued this important statement: “We now announce the beginning of the fourth phase to clear the remaining Northern countryside and the valley of Jalab from the terrorists and to remove the last obstacles in front of us, to prepare for the liberation of the city of Al-Raqqa and the completion of the siege with encirclement of the terrorists.”[8]
The fourth phase, the formal battle to retake the Islamic States’ operational hub, is well underway. Having now surrounded the city, the objective of the plan is to annihilate ISIS and prevent its fighters from fleeing to other areas in Syria and returning to their original countries of origin.
Inside The Battle For Raqqa
The battle for Raqqa will have political and strategic consequences for states in the region and outside the region and for the Islamic State. In supporting the SDF as “the local force” to retake Raqqa, the Trump administration made a political decision that could have consequences for US-Turkey relations.
The consequences of the Trump administration decision are viewed this way: “The US administration appears to have concluded that the benefits of driving ISIS from Raqqa as soon as possible justify the potential costs of further damaging Washington’s strategic alliance with Ankara and the risks associated with attempting to seize an overwhelmingly Arab city of some 200,000 with a Kurdish-dominated force.”[9]
Another regional perspective involves ISIS near Jordan. ISIS “is now effectively surrounded on three sides by regional powers with international support. Jordan sits along [ISIS’s] southern outskirts. Though vast desert leaves [ISIS] with few gains to be made, it has not stopped [ISIS] … from trying to expand its sphere of influence over its southern border. While [ISIS] has been losing territory for over a year, most of that territory was not strategically important. Now, [ISIS] faces existential threats to its power, but a final blow can’t be struck without a cohesive plan of attack and a strategy for maintaining the territory”[10] after the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa. In short, the postwar period in Raqqa is essential in maintaining stability and from preventing the return of the Islamic State. At issue, what role will Jordan perform in the post-Raqqa period?
There is still another major issue that must be addressed following the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa. That is, “Many regional and international actors have conflicting goals in Syria. The Turkish imperative is to halt the threat from the Islamic State while suppressing the Kurds. The Turks also are trying to limit their direct exposure to the conflict by supporting the Sunni Arab-dominated Free Syrian Army (FSA) to take the lead in advancing on the city. The United States has backed the SDF throughout most of the conflict, but the group is beginning to outlive its utility in the face of the Turks, who are currently fighting to push the Kurds back to the eastern side of the Euphrates. This takes the Kurds out of the lead for the assault on Raqqa. Russia has brought both air power and ground troops into Syria to support the Bashar al-Assad regime, but those troops lack the military capability to lead the charge. Russia’s forces in Syria were meant to prop up the Assad regime and were successful in doing so. But those forces are not significant enough to be decisive against” the Islamic State.”[11]
The Next Front: The Conflict in Deir al-Zour and its Political-Strategic Consequences
While SDF forces, backed by US special forces, have made advances in Tabqa, al-Mishlab and al-Sabahia areas of the city, one should anticipate a months-long struggle to retake Raqqa that is not likely to conclude until the fall of 2017. Another strategic ISIS-held territory will have strategic consequences in Syria and beyond. That area is Deir al-Zour.
For senior US officials in the Trump administration, “Deir al-Zour presents dilemmas commensurate with its importance. Even if asserting control over Raqqa proves easier than expected, attempting to capture Deir al-Zour by relying primarily on the [SDF] would be extremely dangerous: the aforementioned overstretch risks and demographic challenges are much greater there. ISIS certainly will attempt to exploit the SDF’s reputation as a Kurd-dominated force, and may succeed to rally otherwise critical locals to its side against the shared threat of a perceived invader. A successful defense could allow the group to rebound, boosting its efforts to appear as a defender of Sunni Arabs who see themselves at the losing end in both Syria and Iraq. And even if the offensive succeeded, governing the area would require managing complex tribal and local dynamics in a society far removed from the Kurdish communities in which the [SDF] has proven most successful, while addressing the potential challenges of asymmetrical insurgency and persisting regime presence. The situation contains all the ingredients of a treacherous morass.”[12]
The struggle inside Deir al-Zour will create an extended period of danger for the United States. That is, conflict in the area could involve an indirect struggle between Russia and its proxies which include Iran, Hezbollah and Syrian government forces for control of this strategic region of the country.
On this point, Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria make a significant statement: “For Iran, securing a land route across the Syria-Iraq border to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, is a key motivation. The United States, which lists Hezbollah as a terrorist organization because of its attacks on Israel, would oppose such a conduit.”[13]
The battle in Deir al-Zour will have consequences of the Trump administrations’ strategy. Consider this validating comment: “For the United States, control of Deir al-Zour would be a boost to President Trump’s calls to blunt Tehran’s influence in the region. It also would provide US-backed forces with an important bargaining chip to use in the event of a final peace settlement for Syria. Although the United States has shown willingness to back its force of Arab fighters with defensive airstrikes, there are few signs that the rebels are strong enough militarily to move northeast to Deir al-Zour.”[14]
As one observer noted, Deir al-Zour is shaping up to be a twenty-first century “great game.”[15] In the final analysis, “most everyone else in Syria’s multifaceted war are looking ahead to an even more decisive battle in the south.”[16] Thus, “a complex confrontation is unfolding, with far more geopolitical import and risk. The Islamic State is expected to make its last stand not in Raqqa but in an area that encompasses the borders with Iraq and Jordan and much of Syria’s modest oil reserves, making it important in stabilizing Syria and influencing its neighboring countries.”[17]
Given the stakes of this proxy war, “the United States, Iran and Russia are all scrambling for advantage. They are building up their forces and proxy fighters and, increasingly, engaging in inflammatory clashes that threaten to escalate into a larger conflict…. The contested area also includes desert regions farther south that include several border crossings, including the critical highway connecting Damascus and Baghdad—coveted by Iran as a land route to Lebanon and its ally, the Shiite militia Hezbollah. But what is really at stake are even larger issues. Will the Syrian government reestablish control of the country all the way to its eastern borders? Will the desert straddling the Syrian-Iraqi border remain a no man’s land ripe for militant control? If not, who will dominate there—forces aligned with Iran, Russia or the United States? Which Syrian factions will wield the most influence? The Americans want to prevent the establishment of a “Shiite Crescent” of influence from Iran to Lebanon, Kamel Wazne said, and to maintain “a piece of what is taking place in Syria.” Similarly, according to Wazne, “They will not allow the Iranians and those they support to have a victory at the expense of the Americans in the whole region.”[18]
Analysis
The claim that Raqqa is the last stand for the Islamic State is also false. The battle for the province of Deir al-Zour will likely represent the last stand. There are multiple reasons to indicate why this is the case. US intelligence has suggested that senior ISIS leadership and a large contingent of its most experienced fights have shifted to Deir al-Zour. Second, the area will constitute a major battle for the control of the region between US and Russian proxies to establish or to prevent a “Shiite Crescent.”
The Trump administration will at some point in the not too distant future declare victory in Raqqa. The administration however will face several critical questions. Will it support Arab troops from Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to patrol Raqqa or trust that the SDF, a group comprised largely of Kurds, will be able to administer an area dominated by Sunnis? Is the Trump administration prepared to substantially increase the US troop presence to secure Deir al-Zour? Is the administration prepared to deal with the Islamic States insurgency in Syria and prevent a resurgence of the transnational terrorist organization in the country? The answers to these queries will indicate whether the American victory is short lived or whether the US presence in Syria will be one of long duration?
Endnotes
[1] Read Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump’s Remarks at a Military Forum Transcript, Time.com, September 7, 2016. http://time.com/4483355/commander-chief-forum-clinton-trump-intrepid/.
[2] Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Syrian Democratic Forces Launch Fourth Phase of Anti-ISIS Raqqa Campaign,” Aranews.net, April 14, 2017. http://aranews.net/2017/04/syrian-democratic-forces-launch-fourth-phase-of-anti-isis-raqqa-campaign/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Josko Baric, “US-Backed Syrian Forces Closing in on ISIS Stronghold of Raqqa,” Conflict News, May 23, 2017. http://www.conflict-news.com/articles/us-backed-syrian-forces-closing-in-on-isis-stronghold-of-raqqa.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Wilgenburg, “Syrian Democratic Forces Launch Fourth Phase of Anti-ISIS Raqqa Campaign.”
[9] “Fighting ISIS: The Road to and Beyond Raqqa,” International Crisis Group, April 28, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/b053-fighting-isis-road-and-beyond-raqqa.
[10] George Friedman, “Taking Raqqa from the Islamic State,” Geopolitical Futures, March 20, 2017. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/…to-pdf…/big-surprise-battle-raqqa.pdf.
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Fighting ISIS: The Road to and Beyond Raqqa.”
[13] Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria, “US-Backed Forces Battle ISIS Around the Edges of Raqqa’s Old City,” Washington Post, June 13, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-syria-fronts-us-backed-forces-probe-raqqa-defenses-as-iran-allied-fighters-gain-key-foothold/20 17/06/13/dc9f7cdc-4fa1-11e7-b74e-0d2785d3083dstory.html?utmterm=.0eea88d39425.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Tim Lister, “Battle for Raqqa: Seven Things You Need to Know,” CNN, June 6, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/middleeast/raqqa-great-battle-begins-tim-lister/index.html.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Anne Barnard, “Beyond Raqqa, An Even Bigger Battle to Defeat ISIS and Control Syria Looms,” New York Times, June 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/world/middle east/syria-raqqa-islamic-state-isis-deir-al-zour-iran-russia-united-states.html?mcubz=2&_r=0.
