The word strategy is a critical word in understanding the global war on terrorism. Edward Meade Earle defines strategy as the utilization of “the resources of a nation—or coalition of nations—including its armed forces” to preserve the vital interests against one’s enemies.[1] The problem with nearly all of the definitions associated with strategy is the original intent of the definition was created as an instrument or plan of action by leaders of one nation-state to defeat another nation-state. In an era of transnational terrorist networks, states have struggled to create a workable strategy to confront and eventually defeat violent extremist groups whether in the form of Al Qaeda, The Islamic State or a host of other transnational organizations.

This essay will examine three U.S. presidents—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—and how these leaders have avoided fleshing out a formal definition of the word strategy. Instead, these presidents (and senior officials within their administrations) have utilized speeches or statements as a means to unveil their disparate strategies to confront the propagation of terrorism regionally and globally.

During the administration of President Bill Clinton, Al Qaeda incessantly targeted U.S. interests around the world. A few examples are instructive. Osama Bin Laden dispatched what came to be known as The Cell[2] to New York. After extensive surveillance, a member of the violent extremist cell used a rental van to detonate a 500-pound bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. In the aftermath of the attack, six Americans were killed and over one thousand others were wounded.

Later in the year, unknown to the U.S. intelligence community, Bin Laden dispatched his military commander Mohammed Atef to arm and train elements of Somali Warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s militia on how to shoot down American Black Hawk Helicopters. In the aftermath of the battle of Mogadishu, on October 3-4, 1993, 18 American military personnel were killed and 73 others were wounded during the attack.

On October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda suicide extremists filled a motorized rubber raft with explosives and then rammed the U.S. Destroyer, the USS Cole. The attack resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors, and 38 others were wounded.

After considerable criticism of the president’s lack of a response to Al Qaeda, particularly after the coordination bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of 1998, following a series of national security meetings the Clinton administration finally unveiled their strategy. In a speech on August 22, 1998, President Clinton asserted the war on terrorism would be “a battle of good versus evil.” Additionally, the president warned “this is not just America’s fight: it’s a universal one.”[3]

In another illustration of administration efforts to establish a strategy, in a statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 4, 1999, Secretary of State Madeline Albright warned the United States must be “vigilant” in dealing with what she described as “a terrorist triple threat.” The first threat came in the form of state sponsored terrorism. The second threat “by long-active terrorist organizations.” But it was the third threat, one characterized by “loosely affiliated extremists”[4] such Al Qaeda, that she believed posed the greatest threat to the security of the United States. Additionally, Albright asserted “law-abiding peoples” around the world will have to “close ranks to deter, detect, and punish” violent extremist groups.[5]

In another action, President Clinton authorized a diplomatic initiative in April of 2000 aimed at forcing the Taliban to sever their relationship with Bin Laden. In reality, the administration had hoped the Taliban would terminate their relationship with Al Qaeda. The initiative had another objective: to force the Taliban to close Al Qaeda’s sanctuaries that existed in a host of areas within Afghanistan. In the end, the initiative failed.

During the latter years of his presidency, Clinton signed a number of “findings” that authorized the CIA to target mid-level and senior members (to conclude Bin Laden) of Al Qaeda. The findings represented the beginning of Clinton’s covert efforts to target senior members of Al Qaeda. Of great significance, working with local allies in Afghanistan, U.S. special forces had an extraordinary opportunity capture or kill Bin Laden while the terrorist leader was hold-up in his Kandahar compound. Fearing civilian and U.S. casualties, President Clinton refused to authorize the final phase of the mission. This and other Clinton covert efforts against Al Qaeda are recounted in the study titled Ghost Wars.

In the end, Clinton’s war on terrorism failed for a host of reasons. The encompassing Monica Lewinsky Scandal prevented Clinton from securing domestic support. Second, the president could never secure international support, and finally, the Clinton administration never developed a “force component”[6] in which it was prepared to use military power against Al Qaeda. Thus neither U.S. allies nor Bin Laden took President Clinton’s rhetoric to use force seriously.

Following the heinous Al Qaeda coordinated attacks on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush, who previously did not view Bin Laden’s transnational organization as a high priority, thereafter made the violent extremist network emerged as the dominant concern in the administration’s foreign policy agenda.

In the wake of the attacks, President Bush struggled to find his footing. However, beginning with the address before a Joint Session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush outlined the administration’s four-pronged strategy to deal with Bin Laden’s minions. In the words of Bush, “We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.”[7] In short, the four components of the Bush’s strategy involved diplomatic cooperation with U.S. allies around the world, global cooperation in the realm of law enforcement, unleashing CIA covert operations against Al Qaeda, and the use of force against the terror network all over the globe.

There were a number of corollary components to Bush’s strategy. U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOFs) were dispatched around the world to confront Al Qaeda foot soldiers in a host of disparate sanctuaries, and the elite members of American armed forces trained allied military forces on how to deal with Bin Laden’s forces in their midst’s. During the twilight of Bush’s tenure in the White House, the American president introduced unmanned aerial vehicles or drones as a new counterterrorism instrument to target senior members of Al Qaeda.

In a further illustration of the complexity and expansiveness of President Bush’s corollary strategy components, consider the administration created a military command—United States Northern Command—to protect the homeland against future external attacks. In Africa, the Bush administration created two coalition regional arrangements, The Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).[8] In time, following the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM), the CJTF-HOA and the TSCTI would become components of the latest U.S. Combatant command which was designed to confront local terrorist groups allied with Al Qaeda and (semi) independent violent extremist networks, and to monitor Al Qaeda members that fled Afghanistan and The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan.

On October 7, 2001 President Bush announced that US forces were engaged in strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Referred to as Operation Enduring Freedom, the military campaign represented the start of what was viewed as a “multifaceted phased campaign” against Al Qaeda.

In the most controversial phase of the global war on terrorism, on March 20, 2003, President Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom which quickly unseated the regime of Saddam Hussein. Dubbed the war of choice by Bush’s domestic political opponents, the military operation lacked international legitimacy, split the NATO alliance, and around the world many forever questioned “the moral authority” of the United States to lead the global war on terrorism.

In the Post-Saddam Hussein period, the U.S. and coalition forces confronted multiple insurgencies: A Sunni insurgency led by Baathists, a Shiite insurgency in the South which received coordination from Iran, and another far more violent insurgency led by Al Qaeda in Iraq. After the defeat of the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies, and the vanquishing of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the occupation did achieve a measure of stability.

Another important and certainly controversial aspect of the global war on terrorism occurred when the Bush administration supported the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December of 2006. The Bush administration was very much concerned about the presence of an Al Qaeda supported organization known as The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which established a large and increasing sanctuary in Southern Somalia to counter the fledgling influence of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Following the collapse of The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), a U.S. supported “collection of secular warlords”, it was at this time the Bush administration enlisted the support of the Ethiopian military to engage and eventually end the ICU’s domination of the southern part of the country.[9]

Despite direct U.S. military engagement against the remnants of the ICU in the southern Somalia, the U.S. intelligence community all but missed the rapid rise and the opportunity to defeat Al Shabaab which eventually replaced the Islamic Courts Union. Though there is evidence of the presence of U.S. special forces during the conflict, the Bush administration, given the expanding insurgency in Iraq during this period, and other reasons, was unwilling to insert American conventional ground forces to stabilize the situation in Somalia.

After the political and financial costs of their occupation, the Ethiopian Government withdrew their forces. After Al Shabaab filled the power vacuum, there was now the need for an outside force to stabilize the country. Enter the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).[10] Following its creation by African Union’s Peace and Security Council, and subsequently approved by the United Nations Security Council, AMISOM’s peacekeeping and later peace enforcement mission in Somalia formally commenced in January 19, 2007.[11] Thereafter, the Bush, and later the Obama administration, depended upon this entity to deal with the seminal terrorist entity in East Africa.

The global war on terrorism dramatically changed following the election of President Barack Obama. There were two salient modifications in US strategy and the conflict. In a major shift away from the Bush administration, President Obama refused to use the phrase “war on terrorism.” Instead, all U.S. missions connected to confronting transnational terrorism would be referred to as Overseas Contingency Operations. In another alteration of Bush’s strategy, Obama relied less on conventional forces. In order to accomplish the shift in strategy, Obama implemented his campaign promise to end U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

President Obama did not shelve all components of President Bush’s strategy. Indeed, the vast majority of Bush’s strategy (particularly the corollary components) remain intact. Of equal import, the Obama administration has had to deal with the reauthorization of the controversial PATRIOT Act and the legacy of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) data mining operations inside the United States.

Drones were previously introduced as a counterterrorism instrument at the close of the Bush administration. President Obama accelerated the use of Drone Strikes. The view within the Obama administration is that drones served the purpose of targeting central terrorist figures, and therefore reduced the necessity of risking the lives of U.S. ground forces. The drone strikes were used primarily in Pakistan and Yemen (with other major strikes occurring in Somalia and Libya and elsewhere).

Several controversies developed following the use of the drone strikes. The central problem is that civilian casualties accompanied many U.S.-led drone strikes. Virulent anti-American protests occurred in Pakistan and Yemen following the mounting civilian casualties. Another controversy surrounding the use of Drones concerned the question of whether the strikes violated the international law.[12]

Referring to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (or ISIL) as a “JV Team”, following considerable criticism of the statement, and the absence of an administration response to what was perceived as perhaps the greatest terrorist threat in history, President Obama was forced to come to grips with the need for a strategy to confront an organization that was eventually constructed a Caliphate that consisted of territory from Syria and Iraq. Thereafter, Obama informed the Government of Iraq that his administration would assist an ally in their fight against The Islamic State. However, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that President Obama would not reintroduce any U.S. combat forces into another conflict in Iraq.

Following months of criticism of failed leadership and the inability to design and implement a strategy to the deal with the Islamic State, President Obama finally began deliberations with senior national security advisers in early 2014. In the wake of the long and arduous meetings in July through August, the Obama administration promised that a strategy would be forthcoming.

On September 10, 2014, President Barack Obama unveiled the anti-ISIL (or anti-ISIS) strategy. The leader of the United States finally had a plan of action to deal with the Islamic State. What are the components of Obama’s strategy? The administration’s plan of action is comprised of four components. The strategy called for the use of air strikes against ISIL. Second, the Obama administration publicly committed to training Iraq’s Security Forces (ISF). Third, the president informed the American people that his administration would “draw upon our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks.” And finally, Obama promised to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi minorities displaced by the advances made by the Islamic State.[13]

A year-plus in plus into the strategy, the coalition has rolled back ISIL territorial gains in Iraq and Syria. At issue, will the U.S.-led strategy lead to “the defeat” and “the destruction” of the Islamic State”? It is this query that critics of President Obama’s strategy all of over the world continue to ponder and express doubt.

After three disparate U.S. presidential strategies, the global war on terrorism continues apace. Despite statements by President Obama that Al Qaeda’s leadership has been decimated, the terrorist network continues to expand around the world. There are a host of organizations—Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), The Al Nusra Front, Ansar Al Sharia in Libya, to name a few—that continue to operate with impunity. It is for this and a host of other reasons why scholars, politicians, and citizens around the world continue to question the success and the necessity of the global war on terrorism.

What Are Some Of The Takeaways Associated with the U.S.-Led Global War On Terrorism?
Amazingly, covering three U.S. presidents, the American Government has yet to completely understand the complexities associated with the disparate violent extremist groups that operate around the world. Clinton’s failed to create a coherent strategy, and he failed to establish domestic and international support to deal with the increasing threat posed by Al Qaeda. Second, while the Bush administration erected the most comprehensive strategy, the problematic decision making that led to invasion of Iraq, and the resultant instability, thereafter impacted the global war on terrorism. Third, no coherent U.S. strategy is currently in place to formally contain and eventually defeat the plethora of transnational terrorist threats around the world. Viewed collectively, the aforesaid reasons provide a sample of some of the problems associated with the strategies created by American presidents.

Endnotes
[1] As quoted in William C. Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for An Effective American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 51.
[2] See John C. Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hachette Book Group).
[3] As quoted in John Davis, The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response, ed. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), p. 68.
[4] Ibid., p. 69.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., p. 73.
[7] President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation, Washington, DC. Washington Post, September 20, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials /attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.
[8] TSCTI was later renamed to The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
[9] Bill Roggio, “The Rise & Fall of Somalia’s Islamic Courts: An Online History,” The Long War Journal, January 4, 2007. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_rise_fall_of_ som.php.
[10] It is important to note that AMISOM replaced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (or IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (or IGASOM).
[11] For more on the peacekeeping mission, see Lieutenant Donatien Nduwimana, “AMISOM A Ray of Hope?” An Occasional Paper, Series 4, Number 4, IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department, 2013. http://www.ipstc.org/media/documents/occasional_paper_4-4.pdf.
[12] For more on this issue, see Rose Brooks, “Drones and the International Rule of Law,” Ethics & International Affairs, 28, No. 1 (2014), pp. 83-103.
[13] Statement by the President on ISIL. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. September 10, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1.