The US government has created a host of counterterrorism programs to deal with variety of terrorist threats. Overtime, multiple American presidential administrations have used several these programs and initiatives to assist governments in Africa in confronting local and transnational terrorism. Unknown to most, many of these programs are directed through the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism Programs and Countering Violent Extremism. This post exams the mission of this unique bureau and examines some of the significant counterterrorism programs that have been created and implemented by the US government.
Background
The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism is responsible for leading “the whole-of-government effort to counter terrorism abroad and to secure the United States against foreign terrorist threats.”[1] The bureau supplanted the outdated Office for Combating Terrorism which was created by President Richard Nixon in 1972.
The Bureau of Counterterrorism is tasked with the implementation of programs and initiatives that are designed to assist states around the world in confronting terrorist threats. The bureau’s mission consists of the following: (1) “works to strengthen partnerships, civilian capacity, and information sharing around the world to counter evolving terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism; (2) “designs, manages, and oversees foreign assistance to build the civilian capabilities of foreign government partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism in an effective and sustainable fashion”; (3) “seeks to build law enforcement and judicial capabilities to mitigate attacks, disrupt terrorist transit, and arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists in accordance with the rule of law.”[2]
In addition, “To bolster these efforts, (1) “seeks to promote the leadership of other countries to build capacity in third countries in their regions” and (2) “also seeks to strengthen partnerships and initiatives involving government and non-governmental actors to counter sources of violent extremist messaging, narratives, and recruitment.”[3]
In the wake of the events on September 11, 2001, Africa emerged as a focal point in the war on terrorism for several reasons. With the recognition the operational base in Afghanistan was being routed by American forces, Al Qaeda made the strategic decision to dispatch many mid-level terrorists to East and North Africa and elsewhere around the world. As a counter to this move, US policy makers recognized that a new counterterrorism strategy replete with programs to enhance the ability of African states to confront Al Qaeda had to be devised. In short, Africa had to come the fore as strategic front in the war on terrorism.
In 2002 the Bush administration created the Combined Joint Task Force Horn Of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to assist East African states in their efforts to confront the threat posed by Al Qaeda. Within two years, the administration created the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). PSI was designed to assist four North African states (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) to “enhance border capabilities throughout the region against arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the movement of transnational terrorists.”[4]
After a short duration, and in recognition of major shortcomings of the PSI, the Bush administration in 2005 created the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). TSCTI formally targeted the Obama bin Laden-linked organization, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Four years later, TSCTI morphed into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
For the most part, the administration of President Barack Obama continued many of the same counterterrorism initiatives that existed during the Bush administration. This is particularly the case when it comes to “military enhancements.” As stated by Alex Vines, head of the Africa Program at U.K.-based Chatham House, “The U.S. has deepened its military engagement with Africa. Under [former President] George W. Bush there was the launching of the U.S.-Africa Command, a dedicated command focusing on Africa, and so the Obama administration has just really continued that trend.”[5]
From another perspective, President Obama pushed for counterterrorism cooperation with US Africa partners via several instruments. Those instruments include “military, diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, law enforcement, and development alike. Our partnerships are building African partner capacities in the security and justice sectors to counter terrorism in a way that is consistent with the rule of law, and building the capacity of African governments and civil society in countering violent extremism (CVE) to neutralize violent ideologies before they spread.”[6]
The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Initiatives in Africa
The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism is the principal State Department entity tasked with implementing several counterterrorism programs in Africa. In addition to that which described above, the bureau’s “mission is to promote U.S. national security by taking a leading role in developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat terrorism abroad and securing the counterterrorism cooperation of international partners.”[7]
The bureau implements several counterterrorism initiatives. Some of the initiatives include the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Countering the Financing of Terrorism Finance (CFT), Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), International Security Events Group (ISEG), Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Programs (TSI), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT).[8] Some of these initiatives and the cooperative ventures with states in strategic regions in Africa are discussed herein.
The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which commenced through legislation enacted by Congress in 1983, represents one of the oldest counterterrorism programs in the US arsenal. The ATA continues to be “highly successful antiterrorism training and equipment-support mechanism, a world-class training operation for law enforcement organizations of foreign countries willing to stand side by side with the United States in fighting terrorism.”[9] In total, “more than 90,000 law enforcement personnel from 154 countries”[10] have participated in ATA-led programs.
As a case study, the government of Nigeria represents is a major beneficiary of ATA programs. To confront a glaring weakness, Nigerian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams participated in “numerous training sessions [sponsored by ATA] … in FY 2016 that focused on bolstering skill sets at both the operational and command levels. Equipment caches were provided, and a training exercise was conducted to ensure that all participants were thoroughly immersed in the process of building a sustainable response capability.”[11]
Previously, in 2015 “ATA personnel delivered a training module called Explosive Incident Countermeasures, which focused on honing the EOD teams’ tactical response procedures and post-blast investigation skills. ATA also provided first responder medical stabilization training to medical emergency responders. Upon the conclusion of this training, an exercise was held that integrated these medical first responders into a series of multifaceted mass-casualty, post-blast investigation and tactical EOD response scenarios.”[12] Taken collectively, the teams were equip with the means to prevent and to respond to aftermath of Boko Haram detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
ATA programs have proven beneficial to participating states in many ways. However, there are problems with the programs. Not enough civilian and military officials in host African states participate in programs and courses. Second, there are serious questions concerning oversight and management of the programs.[13] Third, the methodology of evaluating the benefits of the programs of individual states is also in question. Fourth, and of great significance, states in region complain that programs offered to one country is not always available to another state.
The Counterterrorist Finance (CTF) program “coordinates the delivery of technical assistance and training to governments around the world that seek to improve their ability to investigate, identify, and interdict the flow of money to terrorist groups.”[14] In addition, CTF programs “strengthen the investigative skills of law enforcement entities, bolster prosecutorial and judicial development, and sustain designated training and technical assistance programs to build anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing capacity.”[15]
The many courses and enlisted of US personnel have assisted many states in the region to enhance their individual capabilities to confront terrorist financing and money laundering. Over time, regionally many Africa states have worked to develop their own institutions to deal with anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing capacity. For example, “The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) was established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government in the year 2000. GIABA is a specialized institution of ECOWAS that is responsible for strengthening the capacity of member states towards the prevention and control of money laundering terrorist financing in the region.”[16]
In another example, “The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC)) is a body of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. It was established in 2000 with the mandate to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, assess the compliance of its members against the FATF Standards, provide technical assistance to its member states and facilitate international cooperation.”[17]
The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) “is designed to build a network of partnerships from South Asia to the Sahel to develop more effective partnerships in countries and regions where terrorist networks seek to establish a foothold.”[18] Critically, “in coordination with the Department of Defense’s CTPF efforts … seeks to use State’s funding to build the capacity of criminal justice sector actors who can respond to, arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorist suspects, recruiters, and financiers in accordance with due process and the rule of law”, and finally, “CTPF funding [is used] to expand partnerships with non-security and non-governmental actors to counter radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism, especially in regions threatened by ISIS.”[19]
Recently, in an illustration of the expansion of CTPF, President Donald Trump has requested increased funding to meet several threats in the Sahel. The Department of Defense “proposes allocating CTPF funds in the Sahel Maghreb to counter al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other regionally-based terrorist groups, and to promote stability in the region. Key partner nations in the region include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. Funding will support …[counterterrorism] CT partners in a region where civil war in Libya and other regional pressures challenge the security interests of the U.S., its allies, and partners.”[20]
According to the Department of Defense, the “CTPF funds will be used to assist countries in: (1) securing their respective borders; (2) denying access to Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs); (3) conducting effective counter-incursion operations to disrupt VEOs; and (4) enabling African partners to interdict illicit flows of arms, drugs, money, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), natural resources, and persons that enable VEOs to grow and threaten U.S. and partner nation interests. The CTPF will also enable U.S.-partner interoperability and collaboration…. In addition to providing partners with operational training, equipment, and services, CTPF will support the development of partners’ institutional capacity to absorb and apply new capabilities in their security forces. The CTPF-funded activities will also support partners’ institutional capacity to sustain critical capabilities. In many cases, the CTPF will fund U.S. engagements with partners to enhance U.S. understanding of partner capability gaps and increase interoperability and collaboration.”[21]
The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) is the East African equivalent of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.[22] Participating member countries of PREACT include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan.
Established in 2009, PREACT is a multi-year program designed “to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats, counter violent extremism, and address longer-term vulnerabilities. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, expanding border security, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security organizations, improving democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology.”[23]
A program designed to improve counterterrorism cooperation, there is little doubt that in the areas described above there has been significant improvement. However, participant members, particularly the states with small local security forces, have not received sufficient funding. As a result, there are gaps in border security, insufficient cooperation in bilateral training among member states, and within the United States government the management of funds is a major problem. For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) discovered that PREACT funds were dispersed to Mauritius “which is not a PREACT partner.”[24] In addition, the GAO discovered “State does not routinely collect PREACT activity and financial information from implementing partners to enable it to have complete information needed to inform program management and accurately report on PREACT.”[25]
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), formally the Trans-Sahar Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), remains one of the most successful initiatives in the region. The TSCTP supplanted the TSCTI in 2005. Participating members of TSCTP include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.
TSCTP endeavors to defeat terrorism in West and North Africa through six areas of support to include: (1) “Enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries and law enforcement to conduct counterterrorism operations”; (2) “Integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and law enforcement, and other supporting partners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts”; (3) “Enhancing border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements”; (4) “Strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity”; (5) “Monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom)”; and (6) “Reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.”[26]
Some specific successes include “Mauritania has demonstrated its ability to “find, fix, and finish” VEOs by employing the counterterrorism capabilities that TSCTP engagement has helped them build, such as intercepting vehicle-borne explosives in Nema and Nouakchott in 2010 and 2011, and using its ISR capability to direct its ground troops to confront AQIM elements. In addition, while many African countries were troop contributors to the African-led international support mission to Mali, Chad’s U.S.-trained special anti-terrorism group was the only African force that took part in offensive operations to clear terrorist-occupied northern Mali in early 2013.”[27]
The highly successful TSCTP program is not without its problems. Areas of failure include reciprocal intelligence sharing concerns among members and the US government, insufficient and uneven training of member forces, many member states claim that local forces need to be equipped with advanced weapons to counter terrorist activities in ungoverned spaces. The latter is a recognition that many member states request their own drones to deal with terrorist threats as opposed to relying CIA or US military drones.
Analysis
This post has endeavored to shed light on the comprehensive US counterterrorism efforts to assist partner allies across Africa. There are several indices of cooperative and productive results from the numerous counterterrorism initiatives.
That is, through programs aimed at civilian, military, diplomatic, and law enforcement personnel in the region, American government efforts at capacity building have proven beneficial to a host of states in the region. Because of these efforts, states in Africa have improved their ability to confront a diverse set of terrorist challenges.
There are, however, a long list of variables that undermine the objectives of the programs. In particular, some of the negative variables include (1) corruption within the host state often leads to failure to implement programs, (2) political instability (often an absence of Democratic governance), (3) the need to train and equip larger forces in the region, (4) porous local armed forces which hampers mission readiness and thus an inability to confront and defeat radical Islamic threats, (5) failure to end terrorist use of sanctuaries in vast ungoverned spaces in the region, and (6) the failed recognition to respond to the reality that counterterrorism programs by themselves will often not succeed unless there are strong US military ground and air components (in some areas of the region) to assist local forces in routing transnational terrorists entities.
US counterterrorism programs and initiatives have dramatically improved the capacity of our African partners to deal with the threat of terrorism. In the final analysis, there is room for improvement of the management of the programs and initiatives greater efforts to ensure that members are meeting standards of Democratic governance.
[1] The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. https://www.state .gov/j/ct/about/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm.
[5] Salem Solomon, “Counterterrorism Efforts Dominated Africa Policy During Obama Years,” Voice of America, January 19, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/counterterr orism-efforts-dominated-africa-policy-during-obama-years/3676860.html.
[6] FACT SHEET: Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. August 6, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/ fact -sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa.
[7] The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Message from the Assistant Secretary Eric J. Boswell, Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance, 2011 Fiscal Year in Review. https://www.state.gov/documents/organ ization/195222.pdf.
[10] Bureau Counterterrorism Programs and Initiatives. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/pro grams/index .htm.
[11] Antiterrorism Assistance Program 2016 (Text Version). United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Partnership with the Bureau of Counterterrorism Antiterrorism Assistance Report 2016. https://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/273872.htm.
[12] Ibid.
[13] For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) multiple years of course data. The GAO’s concluded that “ATA course data are incomplete in that the data do not include all delivered courses. For the 4 fiscal years 2012 through 2015, ATA reported that 1,987 courses were delivered. The course data ATA provided to us included only 1,633 courses, or about 82 percent, of the courses ATA reported to have delivered in those 4 years. Our analysis of ATA participant data similarly indicates that the course data are incomplete, as some courses listed in the participant data were not included in the course data.” For more program dilemmas, see Antiterrorism Assistance, State Department Should Improve Data Collection and Participant Oversight. Report to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. United States General Accounting Office, Washington, DC September 2017. http:/www.gao.gov/assets/690/687483.pdf.
[14] Programs and Initiatives, US Department of State.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa. FATF-GIBA, GABAC, Paris, France. October 2016. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (2017). Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). http://comptroller. defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-Book.pdf.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Programs and Initiatives, US Department of State.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Combatting Terrorism, State Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Washington, DC, June 2014. https://www.gao.gov/ assets/670/664126.pdf.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/ index.htm# TSCTP.
[27] Lesley Warner, “Nine Questions about the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask,” Warontherocks.com, April 8, 2014. https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nine-questions-about-the-trans-sahara-counter-terror ism-partnership-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/.
