The emergence of the Islamic State represented a major challenge for the Barack Obama administration. Having incessantly stated that Al Qaeda had been decimated, President Obama overlooked, and in eyes of many in the U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism communities, refused to come to grips with the threat posed by the Islamic State. As a result, American counterterrorism efforts were placed in the unenviable position of playing catch up. Indeed, a major counterterrorism figure, David Kilcullen articulated that Obama’s policies, to include the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, the failure to contain the sectarian tendencies of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, and the inability of the president to create a robust strategy that takes “into account the rise and expansion of ISIS across strategic states as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria has had disastrous consequences that have been felt most recently through the realization of attacks in the heart of Europe.”[1] These and a host other counterterrorism dilemmas created what Kilcullen describes as Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that well into the U.S.-led coalition response to the Islamic State there have been a plethora of counterterrorism failures that have hampered the struggle against ISIS.
A significant question needs to be addressed: what is the Islamic State, and why does it matter? In the words of Audrey Cronin, “ISIS represents the post–Al Qaeda jihadist threat.”[2] Furthermore, the Islamic State represents a “proto-state,” an entity that controls territory and performs some of the functions of state.[3] Put another way, the Islamic State achieved Osama Bin Laden’s what could not. Namely, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created an Islamic Caliphate that consisted of territory seized from areas within Syria and Iraq. As a semi-state, the Islamic State is equipped with their own army, and during their battles with weak and fractured Iraq Security Forces (ISF) they were able to capture valuable military equipment to include M1 Abrams battle tanks that were subsequently taken to Syria.
One of the salient issues that hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts involved President Obama’s false and mistaken identification of the threat posed by ISIS. The foolish and arrogant rhetoric that referred to the Islamic State as nothing more than a “J-V team” represented a statement that had a tremendous impact on U.S. counterterrorism measures.
Most notably, the Obama administration’s perception that the Islamic State is no different than previous Salafists terrorist groups hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the ability to evaluate the threat posed by the latest violent radical extremist iteration. It is also important to note that Obama’s misperception illustrated the American President did not have a clear understanding of the threat, or he simply refused to accept the evidence contained in the all-too-numerous intelligence briefings that endeavored to inform him that ISIS represented a “clear and present danger” to US and international security.
The second counterterrorism failure came to light in the aftermath of President Obama’s authorization to use force against ISIS on August 7, 2014. Under the guise of counterterrorism (President Obama stated, “The United States will work with … other countries in the region to provide increased support to deal with this humanitarian crisis and counterterrorism challenge.”), the initial target of the U.S. “preemptive air strikes” were Islamic State convoys that were marching towards the city of Erbil. This city represented the location of the U.S. Consulate in Iraq where American diplomats worked. Additionally, this is an area where U.S. military personnel, which were training ISF members, could have been impacted by advancing ISIS forces. The second authorization essentially created a humanitarian mission that ended the persecution of displaced Iraqis on Mount Sinjar.
In reality the air strikes were provisional, designed as short term operations to placate increasing pressure on President Obama to act. Additionally, the strikes had nothing to do with demonstrating to the world the administration was prepared to formally confront the Islamic State. To validate the aforementioned statement, in his address on the twin authorizations, President Obama clarified his position on what his administration was not going to do. According to President Obama, “As Commander-in-Chief, I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq. And so even as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq, because there’s no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq.”[4] In short, the twin air strikes should not be dismissed as Insignificant. However, during this period it should be pointed out the Obama administration had no intention of confronting ISIS.
By far one of the greatest counterterrorism failure is associated with President Obama’s anti-ISIS strategy. Following the September 10, 2014 unveiling of President Obama’s strategy, which represented the framework for the administration’s counterterrorism approach to formally confront ISIS, the plan was flawed. The critical part of the strategy called for an air campaign that in the words of the president was designed “to degrade” and eventually “to destroy” the Islamic State. This strategy would have impacted a smaller, run-of-the-mill terrorist group.
In reality, at the zenith of their power in late 2014, “ISIS hardly fits that description, and indeed, although it uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not really a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. ISIS, on the other hand, boasts some 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. If ISIS is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. And that is why the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from Al Qaeda will not work against ISIS.”[5]
To further delineate other flaws with the administration’s strategy, consider that it took ten days after the unveiling of the plan before the air war against ISIS finally commenced. Beginning on September 23, 2014, in the midst of implementation of the air war, a subsequent flaw surfaced. Consider that in launching air strikes against ISIS in Syria, the administration also launched cruise missile strikes which targeted the Khorasan Group. The Khorasan Group consists of veteran Al Qaeda leaders which the administration alleged were preparing to launch imminent attacks against the West.
The introduction of the strikes against the Khorasan Group induced a “message problem.” Messaging is a critical component of counterterrorism. In the wake of the initial “so called counter-ISIL strikes,” officials within the Obama administration struggled to identify if the strikes (those against ISIS and the Khorasan Group) were a success. Keep in mind, the essence of the presidential address focused on ISIS, but only a short section of speech was designated for the Khorasan Group. However, in the wake of the initial round of air strikes the administration spent an extended period fielding questions not about the success of the campaign against the Islamic State, but about why the administration elected to target ISIS. Critics questioned the administration’s focus and mixed message. Perhaps worse, a year-plus after subsequent strikes against the Khorasan Group, individuals within and outside the administration the author spoke with questioned if the strikes were necessary, and some wondered if the Al Qaeda-linked group existed at all.
Other flaws in counterterrorism involved the failure to identify a “Syrian component of the Obama strategy.” That is the administration initially failed to train forces within Syria that could retake ISIS-held territory in that country. That part of the strategy proved so ineffectual that the administration decided to scrap that portion of the plan altogether. In time, the administration made the decision to rely instead on a U.S.-led Special Operation Forces that would “advise and assist” Kurdish and Arab allies in Syria to directly engage Islamic State forces. The strategy adjustment cost the coalition effort nearly 14 months of confusion and inaction on the ground against ISIS in Syria.
There were a host of additional counterterrorism flaws connected to the strategy. Covering the first year-plus period after the introduction of the anti-ISIS strategy, hundreds perhaps thousands of air strikes were cancelled. Air power is by far the dominant counterterrorism component of President Obama’s strategy. The cancellation of numerous whether as a result of the faulty intelligence, the concern for civilian casualties, or the weather had dramatic impact on the campaign against ISIS. Critics charged that if there were “spotters on the ground,” the administration’s air campaign would have been far more successful.
Additionally, there are currently investigations surrounding allegations the Obama administration forced intelligence analysts within Central Command (CENTCOM) to rewrite reports to ensure that they were more favorable, namely that the war was succeeding according to plan. When there are perceptions that administration officials are attempting to rewrite reports to produce a “positive spin on the war effort” such interference will likely result in skepticism of other counterterrorism operations and pronouncements against the Islamic State.
Long after the modest success, to include the retaking of territory in Iraq and Syria, and well into the U.S.-led coalition air campaign which destroyed a wealth of ISIS military vehicles, artillery, and command and control capabilities, there are very few individuals that will argue the administration’s strategy will reach its ultimate objective of destroying the Islamic State.
At issue, why is the strategy likely to fail? There are several reasons to indicate that ISIS will survive. Consider much of the Obama administration’s strategy relies heavily on U.S.-led air power against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Air power by itself will not defeat the Islamic State. Another counterterrorism flaw surfaces during coalition efforts to retake territory, whether by the ISF, Peshmerga or other forces. Keep in mind, during these ground operations there are nominal increases in U.S.-led air strikes. But the capture of territory is accompanied by a dramatic decline in the coalition air campaign. This, say analysts, permits ISIS to regroup and time to assess the battlespace. If there were U.S. ground forces hunting ISIS fighters, whether in Iraq or Syria, their forces would face far more pressure. Put another way, “The longer America leaves IS [The Islamic State] to embed itself in the cities it has captured, the greater the harm it does and the more lethal the force that will eventually be required to remove it.”[6]
In a continuation of the flaws associated with the strategy, and its impact on counterterrorism, if and when this administration is able to marshal the requisite “local forces” (or more likely another administration) to retake Mosul in Iraq or Raqqa in Syria, the Islamic State will still survive. As the map below illustrates, the problematic Obama administration strategy and the utilization of uneven counterterrorism tactics have failed to prevent the Islamic State from extending their pro-state into sanctuaries in a host of other states. As a result of the failure to introduce US ground forces during the nascent period of the development of ISIS, this ensures that it will take a far more robust strategy (and covering a period of three to five years) to finally end the threat posed by the transnational entity. Thus, the strategy, as previously stated, will fail to achieve its objective of destroying ISIS.
Source: Jay Akbar, “The Terrifying Rise of ISIS: Map That Shows How Terror Group’s Tentacles Now Reach From Algeria to Afghanistan,” Daily Mail, March 2015. http://www.Dailymail .co.uk/ news/article-2960463/The-terrifying-rise-ISIS-Map-shows-terror-group-s-tentacles-reach-Algeria-Afghanistan.html#ixzz4BPBAbxAF.
In another problematic illustration of the flaws associated with counterterrorism, the architects of the strategy did not comprehend the goals associated with the rise and sustainability of the Islamic State. One of the central intentions of Al-Baghdadi called for the creation of a Caliphate. A second goal called for the establishment of sanctuaries; these sanctuaries represent an extension of the Syrian-Iraq Caliphate. The third, and equally significant objective, called for fomenting instability in the West.[7]
Most recently, with respect to the third component of ISIS’s strategy, with major external terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, Turkey, and even the United States, the Islamic State, through actual and threatened strikes have forced these and other states to always be on guard for future attacks. As former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army lieutenant general Michael Flynn explains, “They have been contemplating external attacks ever since the group moved into Syria in 2012.”[8] Thus Western counterterrorism officials have been placed in a defensive posture, gaming when the next attack may occur. In the final analysis, each of the components of ISIS’s strategy has proven successful.
In order to implement their strategy, ISIS has employed social media to achieve the radicalization of individuals to support their political ideology, to join their ranks, and additionally, to conduct attacks against perceived soft-targets. In Europe, where it is easy to penetrate the borders of nearly all states in the region, the Islamic State has been able to easily attract converts which thereafter have launched attacks in select European states.
Given the porous counterterrorism capabilities of the majority of states in Europe, this issue impairs the abilities of governments to respond to the ever-evolving ISIS threat. While Britain, France, and Germany have the capability and finances to upgrade their counterterrorism capacities, according to Haras Rafiq, an expert from the Quilliam Foundation, a major think tank in London, many other “countries just aren’t mature enough and don’t have the resources”[9] to enhance their capabilities. Additionally, Rafiq argues, “Europe can’t even think about creating a task force before the local infrastructure improves.”[10]
Inside the United States, with all of their resources and capabilities, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) insists they are overwhelmed, even acknowledging that they have opened terrorist investigations in all fifty states. Additionally, the director of the bureau, James Comey, is concerned about the ability of the Islamic State to encrypt their messages. According to Comey, “We are unable to see what (terrorists) say. Our ability to monitor them has not kept pace.”[11] Put succinctly, unable to monitor conversations via social media, ISIS is thus able to plan and implement attacks, and the FBI is unable to prevent them.
In a lasting though less conspicuous illustration of a significant flaw associated with the U.S.-led coalition struggle against the Islamic State, Obama has yet to outline “an end game” in the conflict with ISIS. That is, what constitutes victory? And, are the existing counterterrorism measures sufficient to meet the objective? One would be hard pressed to find an administration official ready to provide answers to the aforesaid queries. Most significantly, these are questions that a comprehensive strategy, and one replete with measurable counterterrorism methods would have addressed.
[1] Samaya Borom, “The Collapse of Counterterrorism,” April 20, 2016. http://rightnow.org.au/ topics/anti-terrorism/the-collapse-of-counter-terrorism/.
[2] Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group.
[3] Brynjar Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” Vol. 9, No 4., 2015. http://www.terrorismana lysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441/html.
[4] Statement by the President. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, August 7, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president.
[5] Audrey Kurth Cronin “Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat.”
[6] [No Author] “The Mistakes That Made Islamic State,” The Economist, March 19, 2016. http:// www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21694981-mistakes-made-islamic-state.
[7] Harleen Ghambir, “ISIS’s Global Strategy: A Wargame,” Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, 2015 p. 3-32.
[8] Rukmini Callimachi, “How ISIS Built the Machinery of Terror Under Europe’s Gaze,” New York Times, March 29, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html?_r=0.
[9] Erin Banco, “ISIS: Europe’s Counterterrorism Approach Struggles As Islamic State Militants Continue To Cross Borders,” Ibtimes, May 8, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-europes-counterterrorism-approach-struggles-islamic-state-militants-continue-2368799.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jason Silverstien, “FBI Director Warns About Encrypted Chats Becoming ‘Default’ for Terrorists,” New York Daily News, December 9, 2015. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ politics /fbi-director-warns-encrypted-terrorism-talk-online-article-1.2460217.
