This post explores the consequences of American withdrawal from Afghanistan. To place the issue of withdrawal in context, this post opens with an examination of President Barack Obama’s withdrawal decisions in Iraq and Afghanistan and how those decisions impacted U.S. counterterrorism. Second, the post explores President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in the wake of the peace deal with the Taliban. Third, the post explores President Joe Biden’s decision to implement the final phases of the U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan. The post concludes with an examination of the consequences of the failure of American presidential “commitment in Afghanistan” and its impact on U.S. leadership and counterterrorism.[1] This portion of the post includes an analysis of the consequences of the withdrawal decisions by four U.S. presidents, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden.
President Barack Obama: Withdrawal Decisions In Iraq and Afghanistan
During the 2008 Presidential Election then Senator Barack Obama made his intension about the Iraq War known: He promised “We will end this war in Iraq” and “restore our moral standing in the world.”[2]
Once in office President Obama executed the status of forces agreement (SOFA) negotiated by his predecessor President George W. Bush which called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.[3] Later in a critical statement on the end of the combat mission, Obama asserted, “I can report that, as promised, the rest of our troops in Iraq will come home by the end of the year. After nearly nine years, America’s war in Iraq will be over.”[4]
The withdrawal decision commenced despite internal and external pressure to leave a residual force in place to contain Iran’s increasing influence in the country. In addition, senior military and intelligence officials warned such a force was needed to maintain a credible counterterrorism precedence which could provide critical intelligence on evolving transnational terrorist threats and if necessary, confront the threat.
In late 2014 an iteration of Al Qaeda in Iraq which later morphed into the Islamic State quickly filled the vacuum created in the absence of American troops in Iraq. There are additional variables that set the stage for rise of the Islamic State. To begin with, one must include the role of Nouri Al Maliki, the prime minister of Iraq. Maliki removed Sunni officials from the government. He removed Sunni officers from the military, he authorized the Shia reprisals against in Sunni’s across the country and killed an unknown number of Sunni civilians in Iraq. These actions not being enough, Malaki increased Iran’s influence in the country and dramatically increased the size and authority of the Iranian-backed Shia militia.[5]
In response to the criticism, domestic and foreign, the American president made two unfortunate errors that would forever impact the U.S. response. The first error in judgement is Obama repeatedly undervalued the threat posed by the Islamic State, stating they were not Al Qaeda and represented “the J.V. Team.” The characterization created another firestorm. Critics charged the president simply did not take the threat seriously.
Within a short period, the Islamic State controlled massive areas of territory in Iraq and Syria. As a result of the territorial expansion and the establishment of Raqqa as the center of gravity of the burgeoning transnational empire, in Syria, the leader of the terror entity, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, announced the creation of a caliphate from a Mosque in Mosul, Iraq.
Obama faced an extraordinary amount of criticism both during and in the wake of the Islamic States’ blitzkrieg in Iraq and Syria. The central point in nearly all of the statements in opposition to the president’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq as that decision is the catalyst to rise of the Islamic State. In addition, critics were equally outraged by the president’s failure to respond to the threat posed by the Islamic State during its infancy. That is, the U.S. intelligence community provided ample warnings about the threat, but the alerts were ignored.
The second error unfolded in the wake of the president’s September 2014 anti-ISIS address. In the address Obama outlined the U.S. strategy to defeat the Islamic State. Some of the significant components of the strategy include the return the of U.S. forces to Iraq in a “training capacity”, the establishment of human rights mission to protect Iraqi civilians from the Islamic States’ killing squads, and the creation of an international force to roll-back the territorial gains made by the terrorist entity.[6]
Critics lambasted strategy noting the approach is underwhelming and the president failed “to meet the moment.” Additionally, because the president announced U.S. forces would not be engaged in a combat role, the small size of the force, and the absence of a U.S. presence in Syria, critics of the plan argued the Islamic State would retain its caliphate and its ability to threaten security in the region and American interests.
President Obama’s anti-ISIS strategy underwent several iterations. For example, the president authorized the dispatch of U.S. special forces to partner with Syrian Kurdish fighters that would begin to confront ISIS fighters in Eastern Syria.
In the final analysis, though significant gains were made to reduce the ISIS imprint in Iraq and Syria, President Obama had to deal with the humiliation that his predecessor, Donald Trump, who authorized a far more robust strategy, who end the ISIS caliphate. Vice President Joe Biden, a candidate for president at the time, did not credit Trump with a victory over ISIS. Instead, Biden attempted to emphasize his involvement in the development of the anti-ISIS strategy. In the words of Biden: “I was part of the coalition that put together 68 countries to deal with stateless terror as well as failed states.…That’s how we were able to defeat and end the caliphate for ISIS.”[7]
President Donald Trump And The Withdrawal Phenomenon: Syria And Afghanistan
President Donald Trump incessantly made statements about the need to bring U.S. forces home from the Middle East and Afghanistan. In the Middle East Trump was specifically referencing Syria and ultimately Iraq.
Trump spoke about the necessity to withdraw U.S. forces from missions of long duration, most notably Afghanistan. There are other areas of significance to include Syria and in parts of Africa where U.S. forces were engaged in a litany of counterterrorism missions against a host of transnational terrorist groups.
In Syria, a year-plus into his presidency, and not long after he not only increased U.S. forces in that country and privately ordered the execution of the administration’s strategy to end the Islamic States’ caliphate, President Trump, sensing the imminent collapse of Raqqa, privately informed senior officials that in time U.S. forces would be coming home.
In time the private conversations appeared to be administration policy. During a press conference in Ohio in April 2018, President Trump issued a statement that caught senior military officials, State department personnel, and allies off guard. Trump asserted, “We’ll be coming out of Syria …. Let the other people take care of it now.”[8] Additionally, Trump argued, “We were very successful against ISIS.”[9] The president then articulated that even during a period of military success “sometimes it is time to come back home.”[10]
Within the administration, at the White House, the Pentagon, State, the CIA, and elsewhere in the bureaucracy, senior officials moved swiftly to discount and even undermine the president’s statement. Some officials even insisted privately to allies there is no change in U.S. policy in Syria.
In December 2018 President Trump called for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria. From the perspective of the president, the abrupt decision proved appropriate because Trump believed ISIS was facing an imminent defeat.
In a subsequent decision in October 2019 Trump withdrew U.S. forces from positions in Northeastern Syria. The actual reason had much to do with removing U.S. forces from the area ahead of the anticipated Turkish invasion to remove U.S.-backed Kurdish forces from the Syrian-Turkish border region.[11]
There were several commonalities associated with the twin withdrawal decisions. Each presidential decision occurred without the consultation with senior military leaders and NATO allies. Second, Trump political allies in the Beltway quickly admonished the president for the appearance that a critical ally, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), were abandoned and could be annihilated if the decisions were not reversed or the withdrawal of “all” U.S. forces from Syria is substantially changed. Third, around the world there was substantially coverage of the twin decisions with the international media questioning Trump’s resolve and the failure of the United States to support a key ally in the war on terrorism.
In Afghanistan, Trump spoke of ending a war of long duration. The Afghan War, according to Trump, proved costly financially and in terms of loss of American treasure—the loss of 2400 service men and women for a war the president believed could not be won.
Following a year-plus period of negotiations with the Taliban, President Trump announced an agreement was reached with the terrorist entity on February 29, 2020. The agreement called for “two interconnected” guarantees: “the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies.”[12]
President Joe Biden: Withdrawal and Counterterrorism Decisions in Afghanistan
President Joseph Biden inherited the saga known as the Afghan War, a conflict that engulfed four U.S. presidencies. In the opening months of his tenure in office Biden faced two critical questions. The first question is whether the incoming president would adopt President Trump’s timeline for withdrawal or enter into new negotiations with the Taliban to amend the May 1, 2021 deadline for the end of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan?
The second question actually involved two issues. Would Biden give into ongoing requests by the intelligence community and the Pentagon to provide a residual force to ensure an enduring counterterrorism ground presence in the country and one that would be large enough to prevent a Taliban counteroffensive that could threaten the survival of the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani.
In April 2021 President Biden spoke about the way forward in Afghanistan. In his remarks, President Biden “concluded that it’s time to end America’s longest war. Additionally, the president argued, “It’s time for American troops to come home.”[13] In a war that has encompassed three of his predecessors, Biden sternly asserted, “It’s time to end the forever war.”[14]
The president confidently stated after consultation with senior American military leaders, NATO and regional allies, and the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, that “We cannot continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence in Afghanistan, hoping to create ideal conditions for the withdrawal and expecting a different result.”[15]
Biden then opined the United States long ago accomplished its central objective—assuring that “Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack our homeland again.”[16] Still, Biden offered a statement that identified something most previous presidents may have stated privately but would not say publicly: “Afghanistan is a not a winnable war.”
The Pentagon publicly promised a robust over-the-horizon counterterrorism approach to protect U.S. interests in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American combat forces.
At present no formal announcement of the plan has been announced. There have been several statements to indicate the direct of the counterterrorism initiative. Acting Air Force Secretary John Roth stated the administration would seek a regional forward base to launch operations, most of which would be air operations to protect the Afghan government.[17] Experts predict Uzbekistan will soon emerge as the potential central hub of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Whether in Uzbekistan, or other countries, the administration is finalizing the likelihood of stationing U.S. forces in a country near the theatre of potential operations—Afghanistan.
At another level, air operations could commence from bases in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The U.S. military still would have the option of relying on long-range bombers and launching carrier-based operations against the Taliban, ISIS-Khorasan, or Al Qaeda forces if need-be.[18] Currently, the U.S. is relying on drones for surveillance to monitor Taliban advances and for targeted strikes.
A number of problems surfaced as a result of the change in pace of the exit of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Inside the intelligence community and obvious issue surfaced, the massive and multilayered intelligence assets will collapse once all U.S. combat forces exit the country. The intelligence community is working diligently to establish spy networks in the country.[19]
The most conspicuous problem is that Taliban forces have moved rapidly to fill the vacuum left by the absence of the U.S. presence in the country. Second, in recognition of the exit of U.S. forces, the Taliban launched a massive counteroffensive seizing territory formally held by U.S.-backed Afghan government security forces. Third, with the rapid loss of territory and the surrender of numerous government forces to advancing Taliban fighters, the Ghani government is confronting a crisis of confidence.
Another critical dilemma confronting the Biden administration is the potential cost of the still undefined over-the-horizon plan. Roth explained, Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Operations (AOR) will be “budgeted about $10 billion there. We have a series of air bases. They will stay for the time being. That’s where your over-the-horizon capability will come from.”[20]
In short order, the Biden administration quickened the pace of the withdrawal. The pace angered critics because the rapid of the withdrawal U.S. forces meant they would be out of Afghanistan before the previously announced September 11, 2021deadline.
Criticism of the pace of withdrawal of U.S. forces was unceasing. In Washington, the president faced bipartisan backlash not only about the tempo of the withdrawal, its impact on the U.S.-backed government, but also about how the exit of American forces would reshape the terrorist landscape in the country and perhaps the region.
Critics asserted the pace accelerated the already declining security environment in the country. Biden’s defensive “status report” did little to reduce the criticism. The universal dilemma, say critics, is the foundation of another Iraq has been unleashed.
John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor, argued, “U.S. leaders must … redefine their country’s strategic interests and how to protect them.”[21] The failure to do so represented a “recipe for disaster and an abdication of leadership. Bolton, argues that Obama, Trump, and now Biden have each been “unwilling or unable to do their job.”[22]
The consequences of the failure of leadership, said Bolton, is “If the Taliban return to power in all or most of the country, the almost universal view in Washington today is the near certainty that Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others will resume using Afghanistan as a base of operations.”[23]
In the wake of the criticism, Biden clarified the withdrawal of the timeline without addressing a series of conspicuous issues, namely, that Al Qaeda could reestablish their footprint which could lead to the potential for “spectacular 9/11-style terrorist attacks” against the U.S. homeland.
During the July 2021 address Biden argued the Taliban takeover of the country is not inevitable and that he believes that Afghan government security forces would be able to respond to advancing enemy forces. In addition, the president stated the U.S. government is working on a plan to rapidly “exfil” all Afghan translators, contractors, and their families out of the country.[24]
The president declared that a force of 600 to 1000 U.S. troops would remain to protect the American embassy in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, the Hamid Karzai International Airport, and other strategic installations in the country. Most significantly, the president stated that “all combat U.S. forces” would be out of the country by August 31, 2021. Biden has thus far maintained his policy of the removal of U.S. forces.
Analysis
The withdrawal of U.S. forces in major counterterrorism missions, most notably in Iraq, Syria, and now in Afghanistan, has had disastrous consequences for US security interests and regional security. To place this statement in context the author will utilize a critical component of leadership and counterterrorism[25] to assess President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. At the conclusion of this section, it will be clear why the mission failed in Afghanistan and why the U.S. may have to revisit redeploying U.S. forces to that country.
The issue of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan occurred during a critical period in the implementation of the counterterrorism strategy in that country. In the wake of the Al Qaeda attacks on the homeland on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush initiated the opening phase of the war on terrorism. The target was Afghanistan. Through Operation Enduring Freedom the Bush administration invaded Afghanistan and subsequently toppled the Taliban government.
In less than a year the Taliban government was routed and Al Qaeda terrorist camps were destroyed, and an untold number of fighters were killed or captured. Al Qaeda would no longer be able to launch spectacular attacks and the potential for a democracy in the country appeared in reach.
Inside the Bush administration, there were those, such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and others scattered throughout the bureaucracy that privately worked to secure the president’s ear on what would become the second phase of the war on terrorism—Iraq.
There was a major problem, the Afghan phase of the war on terrorism was not complete. Still, in 2003 President Bush indicated a commitment to that country and the mission. Privately, to validate the absence of commitment in Afghanistan, and to set the military plan in motion for the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president authorized the dramatic reduction of U.S. conventional and special operation forces in that country.[26] Once the “go orders were given” those forces and critical intelligence assets were redeployed to Iraq.
Twin realities surfaced. The momentum to defeat the Taliban was lost and worse within months a resurrection of the terrorist entity ensured as its forces, many of which had relocated to enclaves in Pakistan and in the mountains of Afghanistan, launched a major counteroffensive and regained territory in the southern and eastern areas of the country. Predictably, U.S. troop levels increased, and a host of successful military operations reversed many of the Taliban gains, but the momentum that existed during the period December 2001-early 2003 collapsed.
During the 2008 presidential election then Senator Obama provided a sustainable narrative where he viewed Afghanistan as “the good war.” Iraq, the war of choice as was called, was perceived as “the bad war.” He campaigned on ending the Iraq War. It appeared that after the presidential election Obama was prepared for a serious commitment to Afghanistan, one where nation building may have taken a backseat but a new strategy to defeat the Taliban appeared possible.
That narrative received a boost after President Obama recommitted to Afghanistan and announced the first of two U.S. military troops increases. However, Obama’s Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asserted the problem with the mission in Afghanistan is that it was too broad, and he argued the focus should be on “establishing limited goals such as preventing and limiting terrorist safe havens.”[27] The latter is a reference to the Bush administration failure to end the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan which was used as a central hub of operations that was used to accelerate the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Following an extensive assessment, General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, delivered a classified report to the president. The report called for a new strategy and a dramatic increase in U.S. military forces to confront and eventually end the Taliban offensive in the country.
After several months of deliberation, President Obama unveiled his new approach to the situation in Afghanistan to a graduating class at West Point Military Academy in New York in December of 2009.[28]
In the address, Obama informed the world that a “surge” of an additional thirty thousand U.S. troops (NATO agreed to increase its troop contingent) would be deployed to the war zone, he linked the success of Afghanistan with partnership with Pakistan, and increased the pressure on the Taliban and accelerated attacks on Al Qaeda cells in the country.[29]
Though the address had a host of indicators that the president appeared to commit to Afghanistan, there are a series of statements that raised concern in the U.S. military, in the Congress, within the government in Afghanistan, and among allies around the world.
For example, though Obama committed to an increase in U.S. troops in the country, he also announced those forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan within eighteen-months. Second, the announcement of timeline for the departure of U.S. forces, said critics, meant the Taliban simply would lay low until the withdrawal of American military forces before launching another offensive. Inside the Pentagon many senior military officials understood a pending reality—many of the gains on the battlefield would disappear after the surge ended.
The above not being enough, in May of 2012 Obama announced a change in the U.S. relationship with Afghanistan. In an agreement reached with the government of Afghanistan, Obama stated “Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation, and we build an equal partnership between two sovereign states; a future in which war ends, and a new chapter begins.”[30]
The president asserted his new strategy “broke the Taliban’s” momentum. In reality, once it was clear there was an “end date” for the surge, the Taliban retreated to the mountains and over the border into Pakistan. In another area of the address Obama mentioned another 23, 000 U.S. forces would depart the country and “by the end of 2014 the Afghans will be fully responsible for the security of their country.”[31] The once good war would now be the responsibility of the government of Afghanistan. The American commitment under Obama was ending.
In an address at Fort Myers on August 21, 2017, Trump unveiled his administration’s strategy in Afghanistan. The American president refused to provide support for an open-ended commitment in the country. The U.S. approach would be conditions-based. Though the president agreed to increase the U.S. troop contingent to train Afghan government forces, Trump spoke about the need for a political solution.[32]
Trump promised he would inform the government in Pakistan that it was time to end sanctuaries in the country. On the removal of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said the president, “My original instinct was to pull out.… But all my life, I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.”[33] There was another significant reason for keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The president feared “a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda.”[34]
Trump’s renewed commitment to an American presence in Afghanistan contradicted many of his earlier pronouncements on the need for the U.S. to leave country. In an illustration of Trump’s numerous statements on the need to withdraw U.S. forces from the country, on January 14, 2013, he stated, “I agree with President Obama on Afghanistan. We should have a speedy withdrawal. Why should we keep wasting or money—rebuild the U.S.!— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump).”[35]
February 2019 signaled a dramatic shift in Trump’s commitment to Afghanistan. With peace talks between the United States and Taliban underway in Doha, Qatar, through his negotiator, U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, Trump agreed to the withdrawal of up to 7,000 U.S. military forces if they Taliban agreed [to an] intra-Afghan dialogue on the country’s political structure, as well as a cease-fire.”[36]
One year later, the Trump administration announced an agreement with the Taliban. The agreement consisted of four components to include the reduction of violence across the country, the withdrawal of foreign troops (U.S. and NATO forces), commencement of intra-Afghan negotiations, and the Taliban commitment that Afghanistan would not become a haven for terrorists.[37]
As the Trump era drew to a close, the U.S. troop presence stood at around 2500 and 7,000 NATO forces still remained in Afghanistan. The American commitment to Afghanistan was all but over.
The era of Biden is well underway. For all of the new president’s efforts to shift away from his predecessors’ policies, Biden, however, “in similar fashion to Trump … has said it is time to “end the forever wars,” a catchall for 19 years of military operations launched in response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks …. But Biden has indicated that ending the wars does not mean shutting down all counterterrorism operations abroad.”[38]
In Afghanistan, however, he is determined to end the U.S. commitment in that country, but at what cost? Oddly, Biden his now on path that in many ways is consistent with what occurred in Iraq under President Obama.
That is, a former terror entity is predicted to potentially seize substantial control of the country. In Iraq, and now in Afghanistan, the U.S. government invested billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to train the security forces in each country. In Iraq, initially those forces essentially collapsed and paved the wave for the Islamic States’ dominance of much of Sunni-dominated regions of the country.
Thus far in Afghanistan, several significant negative guideposts have been reached. Like in Iraq, significant American military equipment is in the hands of the military. Second, like Iraq, an untold number of Afghan security forces surrendered to the enemy and were slaughtered. Third, like Iraq, a terror entity is swiftly obtaining territory across the country. Fourth, like Iraq, fear and instability exists across the country.
As we reexamine U.S. strategy in Afghanistan there are several significant problems which have produced what history will judge as a failed counterterrorism mission. The conspicuous dilemma is the absence of continuity. That is, from Bush through Biden U.S. president’s executed distinct strategies. There is an attendant issue, each U.S. president (Bush, Obama, and Trump) increased U.S. troops in that country and subsequently withdrew substantial numbers of American military personnel. During the period of withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the Taliban consistently regained territory.
Despite the egregious mistakes the U.S. military incessantly regained territory lost to the Taliban. Unfortunately, a problematic cycle developed which favored the Taliban. The dispatch of new contingent of U.S. forces to Afghanistan, followed by the seizure of territory after the reintroduction of more U.S. troops, then a subsequent political decision by U.S. presidents resulted in the withdrawal of U.S forces from the country. The cycle always ended with the Taliban forces regaining territory.
In the final analysis, in the absence of real a presidential commitment another salient reality ultimately undermined counterterrorism in the country—no American president defined victory and was willing to pay the political price to see the mission through to the end.
What remains unknown is the outcome of the pending civil war in Afghanistan. With Afghan security forces on their heels, the Ghani government has reached out to warlords to stem the tide and restore order. If a coalition of Afghan security forces and warlord-led armies fails, and with the Taliban likely to seize control of the country, what role will the Biden administration play? Will Biden redeploy a residual U.S. force to restore order? Or will he order the removal of the remaining U.S. forces that are currently guarding the U.S. embassy, the national airport, and other significant areas in the capital? A defining moment will soon require answers that could define the Biden presidency.
Endnotes
[1] There are four components associated with leadership and counterterrorism. This post explores the role of commitment and then illustrates the consequences of the failure of U.S. presidents to commit to their strategy and the mission in Afghanistan. The other three components include diplomacy, action (the use of the military), and vision.
[2] “Barack Obama’s New Hampshire Primary Speech, New York Times, January 8, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/politics/08text-obama.html?_r=0.
[3] It should be noted that Obama did attempt to renegotiate the SOFA, but the diplomacy failed. The Obama administration offered to keep a residual force in Iraq but would do so only if U.S. military personnel would be granted immunity from Iraqi prosecution. The government of Iraq refused to accept the administrations offer.
[4] Barack Obama Announces Total Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Iraq,” The Guardian, October 21, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2011/oct/21/obama-us-troops-withdrawal-iraq.
[5] Ryan N. Mannina, “How the 2011 U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq Led to the Rise of ISIS,” Small Wars Journal, December 23, 2018. https://small warsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-2011-us-troop-withdrawal-iraq-led-rise-isis.
[7] Carlos Christian, “Biden Blasts Trump’s Foreign Policy, Then Takes Credit for Beating ISIS,” The Union Journal, January 16, 2020. https://theunionjournal.com/biden-blasts-trumps-foreign-policy-then-takes-credit-for-beating-isis/.
[6] Statement by the President on ISIL. whitehouse.gov, September 10, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statemen t-president-Isil-1
[8] Tim Harris, “Trump: ‘It is Time’ to Get Out of Syria, ‘I Want to Bring Our Troops Home,’” RealClearPolitics, April 3, 2018. https://www.realclear politcs.com/video/2018/4/3/trump_it_is_time_to_get_out_of_syria_I_want_ to_ bring_our_troops_home.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Bassem Mroue, “American Troops Start Pullout from Along Turkey’s Border in Syria,” The Associated Press, October 2019. https://www.military times.com/news/your-military/2019 /10/08/trump-on-pulling-us-troops-out-of-syria-were-not-a-police-force/.
[12] “Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief,” Congressional Research Service, Updated June 11, 2021. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R451 22.pdf.
[13] Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, The White House, April 21, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-presidentbiden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Tara Copp, “For Now, ‘Over the Horizon’ Protection for Afghanistan Will Fly from Existing Hubs, Acting Air Force Secretary Says,” Defense One, June 8, 2021. https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/06/now-over-horizon-protection-afghanistan-will-fly-existing-hubs-acting-air-force -secretary-says/174595/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Zachary Cohen, Natasha Bertrand and Katie Bo Williams, “Biden Administration Still Weighing CIA Drone Strike Policy Amid Afghanistan Withdrawal,” CNN, July 5, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/05 /politics/cia-drone-strike-afghanistan-suspected-terrorists/index.html.
[20] Ibid.
[21] John Bolton, “Bring the Troops Home’ Is a Dream, Not a Strategy,” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/biden-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-taliban-al-qaeda-war-on-terror-pakistan-iran -nato/.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Lyse Doucet, “Biden Defends Decision to End Afghan Military Operation,” BBC News, July 8, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57770436.
[25] See John Davis, “Leadership and Counterterrorism,” March 2020. https://www.editor-in-chieftheglobalwaronterrorism.com/leadership-and-counterterrorism/.
[26] Zachary Laub, “The U.S. War in Afghanistan-1991-2021,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 15, 1999. https://www. cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Jesse Lee, “The New Way Forward—The President’s Address.” whitehouse.gov, Blog. December 1, 2009. https://obamawhitehous e.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan, The White House, May 1, 2012. https://obamawhite house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-obama-address-nation-afghanistan.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Mark Landler, “Trump Outlines New Afghanistan War Strategy with Few Details,” New York Times, August 21, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troops-trump.html.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Leo Shane III, “Trump Tweets: Every Time the Commander in Chief Mentioned ‘Afghanistan’ Since 2011,” Military Times, August 21, 2017. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2017/08/21/trump-on-afghanistan-on-twitter/.
[36] “The U.S. War in Afghanistan-1991-2021.”
[37] Lindsay Maizland, “U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war.
[38] Dan Lamothe, “Biden has Promised to End the ‘Forever Wars,’ But Landscape Remains Complicated,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/biden-wars-terrorism-iraq-afhganistan-syria/.
