U.S. counterterrorism in Somalia that is intended to confront a host of terrorist groups to include Al -Attihad al-Islamiya, Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, ISIS (aka Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) expands two-plus decades and encompasses multiple American presidential administrations, Democrats and Republicans. This post addresses several significant issues. How did previous U.S. presidents confront the terrorist threat in Somalia? Second, what are the components of President Joe Biden’s counterterrorism policy in Somalia and how is it different from his predecessors? Finally, this post concludes with an assessment of the Biden administration’s policy in Somalia.
George W. Bush And U.S. Counterterrorism In Somalia
President George W. Bush did not deal with Al Shabab. That said, the Bush administration counterterrorism approach in Somalia is recognized for creating the infrastructure that subsequent American presidents would employ to confront future terrorist threats across East Africa and beyond.
Before detailing the evolution of Bush’s infrastructure and its impact on terrorist threats in Somalia, it is important to note other aspects of the administration’s counterterrorism response in that country.
For starters, while Al Shabab did not exist, the Bush administration’s focus involved the suspected linkage between Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya and Al Qaeda. In response to the suspected threat, the administration froze the funds of Al-Ittihad, and the United States placed this entity on the list of terrorist organizations.
In addition, the United States, later to be joined by several of its European allies, conducted surveillance flights over Somalia seeking to not only establish or confirm a link between Al Ittihad and Al Qaeda but to monitor the movement and training activities of suspected foot soldiers loyal to Osama Bin Laden.[1]
As a result of the surveillance activities administration officials in the form of Secretary of State Colin Powell and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers made public statements articulating that Al Ittihad is assisting in establishing bases and training facilities in Somalia ostensibly for Al Qaeda.[2]
The Bush administration was involved in the initial counterterrorism operation in Somalia, which was launched on March 19, 2003, and produced the “detainment and interrogation” of Suleiman Abdallah Salim. Abdallah was subsequently rendered and tortured at a suspected CIA Black Site.[3] The use of extrajudicial activities that were later connected to the Bush administrations establishment of rendition and U.S. torture policies during the war on terrorism.
In a response to the local threats within Somalia and the Al Qaeda’s increasing presence in the country and in subsequent regional countries, the Bush administration established a host of entities that would be used to confront the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and later Al Shabaab. Those entities include the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the use of Special Operation Forces designed to track and later detain or kill terrorists which included Al Qaeda and Al Shabab forces.[4] Taken collectively, these organizations played a critical role in the evolution of subsequent presidential counterterrorism activities against Al Shabab and later ISIS.
Barack Obama And U.S. Counterterrorism In Somalia
There are those that argue Bush pioneered “the direct action” strategy in Somalia following the capture of Suleiman Abdallah. Additionally, Bush ordered the direct action mission that resulted in “the death of Aden Hashi Farah, the leader and a founding member of Al Shabab”[5] in 2008.That said, there is another reality, the administration of Barack Obama accelerated this counterterrorism tool.[6]
This leads to a very significant question: What is Obama’s contribution to U.S. counterterrorism in Somalia? President Obama ushered in the modern and expansive version of “the light-footprint strategy.” Obama’s counterterrorism strategy in Somalia and beyond (to include Yemen and Pakistan) “on precision strikes from U.S. aircraft, clandestine ground units and local allies.”[7]
In an illustration of this strategy following the intelligence that indicated “Somali militants were communicating frequently with militants in Yemen” on June 23, 2011 President Obama “approved the first military drone strike on two Al Qaeda-linked operatives in Somalia.”[8]
In analysis of the three components of the strategy (there actually is fourth component, conventional air strikes that increased at a high rate in Somalia), Obama increased drone strikes against Somali Islamic militants, the president approved the highest number of special operation direct action missions in Somalia, and the administration engaged in two distinct cooperative arrangements that confronted Al Shabaab in Somalia.
A critical cooperative arrangement in the war on terror in Africa is the Obama administrations support for African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the U.S. expansion of its counterterrorism operations. In separate battles with Al Shabaab, “United States forces also conducted strikes in defense of U.S. forces, and in defense of partnered Somali and AMISOM forces, on June 21, July 20, July 31, August 31, September 25, and September 28, 2016.”[9]
In the second illustration of the Obama administrations cooperative arrangements, the United States trained Somalia’s special forces for operations against Al Shabaab. The U.S. trained a small, but highly effective Gaashan Brigade that launched a high number of direct action missions against the Al Shabaab.[10] Though significant, the Obama administration did little or certainly not enough to improve the rest of the Somali National Army (SNA). The following statements provide information on the unit’s combat effectiveness. The SNA “remains undermanned, poorly equipped, and ineffective.”[11]
Paul Williams offered this commentary on the state of the SNA: Williams observed “The assessment confirmed the army was in a dire state: There were fewer frontline personnel than previously estimated (on average battalions had only 63 percent of their authorized strength).”[12]
Additionally, Tommy Ross provided this critical assessment: “The dozen countries and organizations that have tried to build the SNA since 2008 failed to coordinate their efforts and ignored the political problems of elite disagreements, clan politics, and corruption.[13]”
As the Obama presidency entered its final year, many scholars began to use negative verbiage in their assessment of U.S. counterterrorism in Somalia. While the Obama administration endeavored to use the phrase “light foot strategy” to characterize its counterterrorism approach in Somalia, many scholars used language such as “targeted killing program” as a description of administration policy. Despite criticism the administration approach to Al Shabab yielded a total of 11 strikes in 2015 and 14 strikes in 2016 during the final year of the Obama presidency.[14]
In the final analysis, Obama’s approach to terrorism in Somalia called for extensive use of SOF raids, drone strikes, manned strikes, private contractors, local Somali forces, and the use of AMISOM forces that collectively reduced the territory formally under the control of Al Shabaab.
Donald Trump And U.S. Counterterrorism In Somalia
President Donald Trump made several critical decisions that formally set the stage for dramatic increase in the American response to the threat posed by Al Shabab in Somalia. The signature decision called for ending “Obama-era restrictions” that impacted U.S.-led airstrikes on suspected Al Shabab strong-holds in Somalia. In March 2017 Trump authorized a proposal to end Obama-era restrictions on where American manned or unmanned aircraft could target Al Shabab.
Once the restrictions were lifted the second decision called for a dramatic increase in U.S. airstrikes against the Somali terrorist group. In an examination Trump’s counterterrorism strategy in Somalia an analysis of administration air strikes the new American president quickly surpassed the counterterrorism activity of his predecessors. As noted in the study conducted by the New America Foundation, by the close of 2019 Trump “… surpassed the number of strikes by drones and Special Operations raids of any previous year and had also conducted double the number of strikes that it had through August 2018.”[15]
The data is illuminating. Over the course of his presidency Trump order the Pentagon to conduct 207 air strikes against Al Shabab. To illustrate the significance of the increase in air activity within Somalia under Trump, the Bush administration conducted 12 air strikes and Obama launched 48 air strikes that targeted Al Shabab forces.[16]
Of equal importance, Obama dramatically accelerated U.S. SOF ground raids in Somalia. In an illustration of the point, “the Pentagon … announced 13 ground raids and airstrikes thus far in 2016—including three operations in September—up from five in 2015.”[17]
Trump’s desire to end U.S. involvement in forever wars produced a controversial decision in the final months of his presidency. The president called for the withdrawal of most of the 700 American forces in Somalia. In an attempt to reduce the domestic and international fallout from Trump’s decision to “reposition the majority of personnel and assets out of Somalia by early 2021”[18] the Pentagon asserted the decision did not impact overall American policy in Somalia.
In fact, said the Pentagon, “We will continue to degrade violent extremist organizations that could threaten our homeland while ensuring we maintain our strategic advantage in great power competition.”[19]
President Joe Biden And U.S. Counterterrorism In Somalia
In the early period of his presidency, Joe Biden did not provide a comprehensive U.S. counterterrorism approach to deal with the threat posed by the Al Qaeda-linked Islamic terrorist organization Al Shabaab. In reality this is not surprising. Why? Candidate Biden did not campaign on counterterrorism threats in East Africa or more specifically in Somalia.
Within Africa critics were lining up to question the direction of administration counterterrorism policy in Somalia and across the continent. Writing for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) scholar Akinolo Olojo made this sweeping statement: “There is no clarity about the character or direction of Biden’s Africa policy on terrorism—something that should keep African countries focused on their own proactive approaches …. The activities of terror groups on the continent have increased. This raises doubts about the relevance of a continued U.S. military presence for counterterrorism in Africa.”[20]
In May of 2022 President Joe Biden authorized three decisions that recommitted the United States to an open-ended mission in Somalia. The president authorized the redeployment of hundreds of U.S. forces back to Somalia (550 in total). This decision reversed Trump’s withdrawal of U.S. forces decision in the final year of his presidency.[21]
Second, as part of the redeployment U.S. forces will again train local Somali military forces and assist AMISOM forces in their anti-Al Shabaab counterterrorism initiatives. The third component of the decision is equally significant. Biden authorized the Pentagon to target senior Al Shabaab leaders.
In an effort to explain the significance of Biden’s decisions, Adrienne Watson, the presidents National Security Council spokeswoman, note the approach will “enable our partners to conduct a more effective fight against Al Shabaab, which is Al Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest affiliate and poses a heightened threat to Americans in East Africa.”[22]
There was immediate fallout with regards to Biden’s approach. Many Republicans asserted Biden’s May 2022 decisions ensured “a forever war in Somalia.” Second, there are those that argue the “administration policy appears to be nothing but more of the same ineffective and counterproductive involvement that has brought Somalia to its present state.”[23]
Critics also argued Biden’s approach will only “intensify conflict in Somalia.” In one example, Costs of War Project report by Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ Ṣóyẹmí, argued, “The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia.”[24]
Third, in a major critique of the Biden administration’s approach in Somalia is the absence of details. For example, counterterrorism expert Luke Hartig, asserts, “We currently have only piecemeal knowledge of the deployment. Initially it was anonymous administration officials who fed information to leading newspapers, and there was no significant public rollout that would answer hard questions.”[25]
Hartig makes this additional point: “In terms of the larger strategic framework, the administration has yet to release its National Strategy for Counterterrorism,”[26] and the president or senior foreign policy officials have failed to speak about administration policy or counterterrorism in general. The point is the Biden administration has not demonstrated that counterterrorism is a high priority.
One of the more interesting realities is the administration has spent more time exploiting a U.S.-led military operation that killed an ISIS leader rather than a focused effort to clarify the president’s approach to confronting Al Shabaab.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin provided this statement on the success of the military operation: “The U.S. military conducted an assault operation in northern Somalia that resulted in the death of a number of ISIS members, including Bilal-al-Sudani, an ISIS leader in Somalia and a key facilitator for ISIS’s global network.”[27]
Austin made this additional point that clarified the importance of Bilal to ISIS and in the terrorist threat to Somalia and beyond. Austin asserted “Al-Sudani was responsible for fostering the growing presence of ISIS in Africa and for funding the group’s operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan.”[28]
To clarify the point, in spite of the return of U.S. forces to Somalia, the Biden administration has yet to provide clarification of the impact the approach has had on Al Shabaab. One of the administration’s most significant successes against the Somali terror organization occurred during twin operations in August of 2023.
The initial operation in early August resulted in the death of four Al Shabaab members following an attack on SNA forces on August 9, 2023. In the second operation which occurred later in August, seventeen Al Shabaab members were killed.[29]
Assessment: Pros And Cons of Biden’s Evolving Counterterrorism Approach in Somalia
Many in the foreign policy and counterterrorism communities have championed Biden’s approach to confronting terrorism in Somalia while others question if the president’s strategy will meet the threat. At issue, what are the pros and cons of the president’s approach to dealing with terrorism in Somalia? The final section of this post addresses this question.
Strengths of Biden’s Approach in Somalia
There are those that argue the enduring presence of U.S. forces “will help to increase the security and freedom of movement of other personnel, such as State Department and [U.S. Agency for International Development] colleagues as they conduct critical diplomatic and development missions.”[30] This points to Biden’s effort to work to increase the capacity of the Somali government to meet “citizen needs.”
The administration argues the return of U.S. forces, even if the total deployment is less than what existed prior to Trump’s withdrawal decision (500 deployed under Biden and 750 under Trump), will also permit greater focus on governance issues. That is, there is a strong desire within the Biden administration to attack corruption within the government and to work with Somali leaders to establish long-term transparency.
A major strength is the little-known civilian components associated with the return of U.S. forces is that these forces will also provide cover for the “larger integrated civil-military strategy designed to help the Somali government, support Somalia’s economic development, and undermine the root causes of …[terrorism].”[31] Proponents of this component of the strategy wonder why the Biden administration does not publicly speak about how this aspect of the approach is being implemented.
There is the view that with the increasing growth of Al Shabab as an organization and with the terrorist group’s ability to obtain more territory within Somalia after the withdrawal of U.S. forces under Trump, “Biden’s order to resend U.S. service members [back to the East African country] … was the right move.”[32]
Many in the counterterrorism community assert the absence of a military presence in Somalia induced a dramatic decline in American intelligence collection on the movements of Al Shabab and on the local governments ability to respond to the threat posed by the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group. With the return of the U.S. forces and the attendant increased intelligence capabilities, the Biden administration is better positioned to react to future threats from the Al Qaeda linked terrorist group.
Criticism of Biden’s Approach
There are a host of deficiencies associated with Biden’s approach in dealing with terrorism in Somalia. Given the issue of space, I have provided some of the most important dilemmas connected to Biden’s approach.
The administration agreed to permit U.S. forces to return to train local Somali SNA forces. Historically, U.S. trained Somali special forces have excelled in missions that targeted Al Shabaab. There are those that argue that more money and time should be spent on creating and training more local special forces units in order to expand missions to thwart Al Shabaab’s recent aggressive attitude.
Instead, more money and time will be spent on training the less effective SNA forces. As mentioned earlier many of the units are ill-equipped, they lack mobility, and there are persistent leadership issues throughout the ranks of these forces. There is no available information that has been provided by the Biden administration to indicate that things will change.
In spite of the policy, a major issue surfaced to indicate the Biden approach will be worse than that of Trump’s. That is, “in spite of evidence of new policy, in reality the U.S. use of drone attacks and traditional airstrikes in Somalia has declined significantly from its peak under Trump, but it has not ceased.”[33]
One of the most enduring evaluations of Biden’s approach is a statement made by the former head of AFRICOM Army General Stephen Townsend in a testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in March of 2023. Townsend noted “I believe my assessment is that it [the strategy] is not effective .… We are marching in place at best. We may be backsliding.”[34]
Finally, one of the lasting issues that encompasses all U.S. presidents [and not just a critique of Biden] that authored an approach or strategy to confront terrorism in Somalia since September 11, 2001 is “what constitutes victory”? This issue, consistent with American strategies in Afghanistan, is that Biden, like previous U.S. presidents has not provided any credible answer to the question. Perhaps worse is that no administration official to include Secretary of Defense Austin, or Secretary of State Antony Blinken have defined victory in Somalia. What is currently in place is an open-ended mission in Somalia
[1] John Davis, Editor, The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), 103-104.
[2] Ibid, 104.
[3] Katherine Zimmerman, Jacqulyn Meyer Kantack, Colin Lahiff, and Jordan Indermuehle, “U.S. Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?”, CriticalThreats.org, March 1, 2017. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/us-counterterrorism-objectives-in-somalia-is-mission-failure-likely.
[4] The following quote provides a window into the significance of Bush’s use of SOFs in Somalia. “In 2002 or 2003, President George W. Bush sent Special Forces and CIA officers to Somalia to capture or kill members of al-Qaeda believed to be responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In January 2007, the Bush administration carried out its first airstrike against suspected members of al-Qaeda in Somalia using an AC-130 gunship.” David Chrisinger, “The Surge Nobody’s Talking About: The U.S. War in Somalia,” TheWarHorse.org, June 25, 2020. https://thewarhorse.org/the-surge-nobodys-talking-about-the-u-s-war-in-somalia/.
[5] Zimmerman, Kantack, Lahiff, and Indermuehle, “U.S. Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?” For more information see, June 25, 2020.
[6] Three “limited ground raids” occurred during the period 2003-2004 in Somalia. It should be noted the Bush administration did being to conduct airstrikes in this country as well. This information was obtained from, Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Melissa Salyk-Virk, “America’s Counterterrorism Wars,” NewAmerica.org, June 17, 2021. https://www.newamerica.org /international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/.
[7] Seth Jones, “Another Example of Obama’s Light-Footprint Strategy,” The Rand Blog, September 18, 2014. https://www.rand.org/blog/2014/09/another-example-of-obamas-light-footprint-strategy.html.
[8] Bergen, Sterman, Salyk-Virk, “America’s Counterterrorism Wars,” NewAmerica.org, June 17, 2021. https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars /the-war-in-somalia/.
[9] Letter from the President—Supplemental 6-month War Powers Letter, The White House, December 5, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/05/letter-president-supplemental-6-month-war-powers-letter.
[10] Zimmerman, Kantack, Lahiff, and Indermuehle, “U.S. Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?”
[11] Ibid.
[12] Paul D. Williams, “What Went Wrong with the Somalia National Army?” [Commentary] WarontheRocks, May 20, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/what-went-wrong-with-the-somali-national-army/.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data,” Council of Foreign Relations, January 20, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-final-drone-strike-data.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Mark Mazzetti, Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War, New York Times, October 16, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/world/africa /obama-somalia-secret-war.html.
[18] Mary Harper, “Trump orders withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia,” BBC.com, December 5, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Akinolo Olojo, “Joe Biden and Counterterrorism in Africa: More of the Same? Institute for Security Studies (ISS) January 20, 2021. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/joe-biden-and-counter-terrorism-in-africa-more-of-the-same.
[21] Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Biden Approves Plan to Redeploy Several Hundred Ground Forces into Somalia,” New York Times, May 22, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us /politics/biden-military-somalia.html.
[22] Luis Martinez, “Biden Approves Return of U.S. Troops for Somalia Counterterrorism Fight, Reversing Trump,” ABCNews, May 16, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-approves-return-us-troops-somalia-counterterrorism-fight/story?id=84752064.
[23] Daniel Larison, “Report: U.S. Military Driving and Exacerbating Violence in Somalia,” Responsible Statecraft, May 5, 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/05/05/conflict-in-somalia-has-no-us-military-solution/.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Luke Hartig, “Counterterrorism Policy in Somalia: Cautions and Unknowns,” Justsecurity.org, May 17, 2022. https://www.justsecurity.org/81559/bidens-new-counterterrorism-policy-in-soma lia-cautions-and-unknowns/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Haley Britzky and Sam Fossum, “U.S. Military Operation Kills Senior ISIS Leader in Somalia,” CNN, January 26, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/26/politics/us-isis-leader-killed-somalia /index.html.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Kathleen Bieberly, “U.S. Kills 17 Somali Terrorists After Biden Nixes Withdraw,” New York Post, August 17, 2022. https://nypost.com/2022/08/17/us-kills-17-somali-terrorists-after-biden-nixes-withdraw/.
[30] Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Biden OKs Plan to Send U.S. Troops Back to Somalia,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/16/us-troops-somalia-return/.
[31] Hartig, “Counterterrorism Policy in Somalia: Cautions and Unknowns.”
[32] Thomas S. Warrick and Christopher P. Costa, “Why Biden’s Limited Somalia Deployment is the Right Move,” Atlantic Council, June 3, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-bidens-limited-somalia-deployment-is-the-right-move/.
[33] Larison, “Report: U.S. Military Driving and Exacerbating Violence in Somalia.”
[34] Ibid.
