For nearly seventeen years, discourse on the war on terrorism has focused almost exclusively on the military dimensions of the conflict. The problem is that the military dimensions have overshadowed the diplomatic initiatives that have been implemented both prior to and in the wake of Al Qaeda’s September 11, 2011 attacks. This post details several of the critical diplomatic activities that were designed to confront the scourge of terrorism. The post closes with an analysis of the success of the diplomatic actions and an examination of the flaws associated with soft power.
Background
It is often overlooked that there are sixteen international conventions that have been approved to deal with the issue of terrorism. Some of the conventions on modern terrorism include the following: the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.
At another level, The General Assembly (GA) adopted several declarations that addressed the threat of terrorism. In December of 1994, the General Assembly approved the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/49/60). This resolution explicitly called for the “adoption of the declaration on measures to eliminate international terrorism should contribute to the enhancement of the struggle against international terrorism.”[1] In addition, the resolution urged that all member states “take all appropriate measures at the national and international levels to eliminate terrorism.”[2]
A supplement to the declaration was approved in 1994 which “established an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate [on] an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism.”[3]
Prior to the heinous attack on September 11, 2001, due to the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s transnational terrorist organization, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 1267 in 1999 which targeted the Taliban government and required the regime to end the terrorist training camps inside the country.[4] The resolution also created the 1267 sanctions committee. With respect to the Taliban and subsequently Al Qaeda and a host of other terrorist organizations, sanctions committee noted that member states were required “to freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of designated individuals and entities.”[5]
Post-9/11 Diplomacy And The War On Terrorism
In a salient statement, Marshal Brement argued “The United States lacks the power and resources to win this war by itself.”[6] Brement and others understood that diplomacy therefore is needed to ensure sustained international involvement in the war on terrorism.
There was another issue that confronted the administration of President George W. Bush: the U.S. government was not yet prepared for another ideological struggle. Inside the administration there were individuals that argued the government needed to be prepared for a struggle for the “hearts and minds” in the Muslim World and beyond.
Ariel Cohen asserted, “For the first time since the Cold War, the United States finds itself in an intense struggle for hearts and minds. This time, the U.S. government is competing against radical fundamentalists for the support of the Arab and Muslim world. This is a struggle against those who seek to destroy the United States and its allies and its core values. The battle is not a short-term campaign, but one that will be protracted without a clear end.”[7]
In addition, in the words of Cohen, “to win this battle, the nation must formulate an integrated strategy of public diplomacy and political actions. This campaign must be fought against extremist organizations and governments that support political violence. The focus should be on the information and media battlefield (Information Operations), which are as important as the kinetic/conventional military aspects of war. In cooperation with moderate Muslims, the United States can encourage the strengthening of Islam as a tolerant faith and counter the militant ideology that destroys lives and hinders economic development. Military force alone will not achieve this goal, for the challenge is philosophical, cultural and political.”[8]
Ambassador J. Cofer Black, the former Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in a testimony before the Congress provided details on the Bush administration’s effort to implement a policy that relied principally on diplomacy. In the words of Ambassador Black, “Diplomacy is the instrument of power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation. Through diplomatic exchanges we promote counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations that serves our mutual interests. We build capacity that bolsters the capabilities of our allies. Diplomacy helps us take the war to the terrorists, to cut off the resources they need and depend upon to survive. I want to make clear … that the State Department and our embassies and consulates abroad certainly are not alone in carrying out this important mission. The Departments of Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, CIA and many other federal agencies have critical missions in this regard. However, as the lead foreign affairs agency, the Department of State … serves as the … coordinator and overall clearinghouse for the wide span of counterterrorism activities conducted overseas by the United States Government. As you might imagine, the job of coordinating such a large interagency—and international—effort is a great challenge.”[9]
US-Led UN Effort to Confront Al Qaeda
Diplomacy represented one of several critical components in President Bush’s four-pronged anti-Al Qaeda strategy. As described in the White House National Security Strategy in 2002, the Bush administration implemented several diplomatic initiatives to confront Al Qaeda and their affiliates.
The Bush administration worked to create a global coalition to thwart Al Qaeda’s attempts to expand their transnational network around the world. Through diplomacy the administration had hoped to deny “further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.”[10]
In a second illustration, the administration strategy called for “using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose.”[11] And third, “using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.”[12]
During the tenure of President Bush, the United Nations implemented several Security Council Resolutions that were designed to curb the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. In 2001, the UN Security Council approved resolution S/RES/1373 which created the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC). In 2004, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) S/RES/1566 established “the working group to consider measures against individuals, groups and entities other than Al-Qaeda/Taliban.”[13] To ensure that regional organizations continued their efforts to confront terrorism, the Security Council approved S/RES/1631 which called “upon relevant regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance the effectiveness of their counterterrorism efforts.”[14]
Diplomatic Actions Against The Islamic State
Through the work of Secretary of State John Kerry, the administration of President Barack Obama assembled a sixty-plus state international coalition to confront the Islamic State. To lay the foundation for the international coalition, as quoted in a State Department publication, the document referenced U.N. Security Council Resolution 2170 which stated, “terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States … which is why our first priority is to encourage others to join in this important endeavor.”[15]
The U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition relied on five-lines of effort to defeat the Islamic State. Those efforts include: “(1) Providing military support to our partners; (2) Impeding the flow of foreign fighters; (3) Stopping financing and funding; (4) Addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and (5) Exposing true nature.”[16]
To implement the five-line diplomatic plan, the Stated Department acknowledged, “that there is a role for every country to play in degrading and defeating ISIS. Some partners are contributing to the military effort, by providing arms, equipment, training, or advice. These partners include countries in Europe and in the Middle East region that are contributing to the air campaign against ISIS targets. International contributions, however, are not solely or even primarily military contributions.”[17]
Much like the Bush administration, President Obama made use of several UN Security Council Resolutions to enhance diplomatic activities against the Islamic State. In one example of those activities, the Security Council adopted S/RES/2178 on September 24, 2014 to address the increasing threat of foreign fighters. The resolution called upon member states to enhance “the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge”[18] of ISIS. In addition, the resolution noted that “Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counterterrorism comply with all their obligations under international law….”[19]
On another level, to curb the financial resources of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, the council approved S/RES/2199 which called upon member states “to freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaeda, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf.”[20]
On December 17, 2015, the UN adopted S/RES/2253 whereby “the Security Council imposes individual targeted sanctions (an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo) upon individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaeda Sanctions List.”[21]
Analysis
The diplomatic efforts against terrorism are extensive. At issue, how effective have those measures been against transnational terrorism? The multilateral initiatives against transnational terrorism are vast. In terms of measuring success, in dealing with the funding sources of terrorist organizations, whether in the form of Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, the diplomatic efforts at the regional and global level have proven successful.
The constant communications between states because of the diplomatic efforts have produced several “regimes” that have proven critical in providing states with a global institution in the form of the U.N. counterterrorism committee. The creation of this committee serves as a useful instrument in dealing with current and future terrorist threats.
The U.N. counterterrorism committee deals with several focus areas to include but not limited to terrorist financing, border management, law enforcement, information sharing, and cooperation at the international, regional, and subregional levels.[22] The success of this body is best exemplified in the ongoing cooperation of member states in carryout the objectives of the UN counterterrorism committee.
There are however several flaws with the diplomatic response to terrorism. For example, the United Nations, through the Security Council, approved several resolutions to implement a host of counterterrorism measures. However, because of “international political realities and institutional problems, [they] have hindered the U.N. from successfully implementing and monitoring counterterrorism measures.”[23]
Another flaw concerns the absence of direct action by the Security Council. Specifically, other than in the unique cases involving Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, “the Security Council has failed to threaten or take action against any country for failing to comply with international counterterrorism norms.”[24]
A major flaw concerns the instrument of soft power. That is, soft power in the form of diplomacy has its limitations. Diplomacy does not end sanctuaries which permit terrorist organizations to establish operational headquarters from which they plan and implement their terrorist conspiracies.
There is another equally important problem. The U.N. has yet to devise a mechanism that imposes costs on a state that supports terrorism or harbors terrorist leaders. For example, it was known that after Al Qaeda was displaced from Afghanistan that many of their members entered and later were given sanctuary in Iran. Yet, the United Nations (and the Bush administration) was powerless to force Iran to turn over the Al Qaeda foot soldiers.
Are there recommendations to improve global efforts to confront terrorism? Victor Comras, Alistair Millar, and Brian Wilson offer this statement: “For future success, the U.N. would be wise to build from former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2005 five-pillar counterterrorism strategy.”[25] The five pillars include the following: “Dissuade groups from resorting to terrorism; Deny terrorists the means to carry out an attack; Deter states from supporting terrorist groups; Develop state capacity to prevent terrorism; and Defend human rights in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism.”[26]
Millar noted that “The U.N. faces notable challenges in its efforts [on]… counterterrorism. One such challenge remains the body’s inability to hold member states accountable for failing to pursue designated terrorist organizations.”[27] The U.N., according to Millar, should move to improve their practices. He offers an example of how to achieve better results. The U.N. should provide “legitimacy for multilateral action, keeping terrorism on the global policy agenda, and sustaining political momentum for counterterrorism initiatives.”[28]
There is another important dilemma that indicates the extent to which the diplomatic efforts have failed to curtail terrorist states and terrorist organizations. For example, the U.N. has done little to curb the actions of state sponsors of terrorism or those states that harbor terrorists. This point is a reminder of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that harbors terrorists. Many member states argue that this issue should be addressed immediately. However, due to politics among the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, this issue will not be resolved in the short term so long Russia, a supporter of Iran, retains the option of executing its veto power.
There is a strange of not perverse irony, in the age when transnational terrorist non-state actors continue to undermine security, it is the politics among states that often hamper measures to end the scourge of terrorism.
In the final analysis, the role of diplomacy in the war on terrorism cannot be overstated. Its role may be best captured in a quote found in the article, “Counterterrorism Pitfalls: What the US fight Against ISIS and Al Qaeda Should Avoid.” The quote is as following: “Fighting terrorists without diplomats … is a fool’s game.”
[1] See United Nations General Assembly Resolution. A/RES/49/60 February 17, 1995. https: //documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/768/19/PDF/N9576819.pdf?OpenElement.
[2] Ibid.
[3] See Security Council Counterterrorism Committee. http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/ laws.html.
[4] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267. October 15, 1999. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/300/44/PDF/N9930044.pdf?OpenElement.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Marshal Brement, “Strategy and Diplomacy in Dealing with Counterterrorism,” [No Date] http://faculty.virginia.edu/mesp/Brement-Strategy-and-Diplomacy.pdf.
[7] Ariel Cohen, “War of Ideas: Combating Militant Islamist Ideology,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): p. 113.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Diplomacy and the War Against Terrorism. Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC. March 18, 2003. https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2003/18795.htm.
[10] National Security Strategy, White House, Washington DC, 2002. http://www.global security .org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on 8 October 2004. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC /GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/N0454282.pdf?OpenElement.
[14] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1631. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5282nd meeting, on 17 October 2005. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC /GEN/N05/ 556/42/PDF/N0555642.pdf?OpenElement.
[15] “The Global Coalition to Counter ISIS,” Department of State. September 10, 2014. https:// www.state.gov/s/seci/.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178. Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting on September 24, 2014. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN /N14/547/98/PDF/N1454798.pdf?OpenElement.
[19] Ibid.
[20] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199. Adopted by the Security Council at its 7379th On February 12, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1504028EN.pdf.
[21] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh) Al Qaeda and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities. United Nations Security Council. Subsidiary Organs [No Date] https://www.un.org /sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list.
[22] For a complete list of the UN Counterterrorism Committees areas of focus, see Security Council UN Counterterrorism Committee. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/.
[23] Victor Comras, Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), front flap.
[24] Ibid, p. 214.
[25] Victor Comras, Alistair Millar, and Brian Wilson, “Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism,” Policy Watch, Washington Institute November 19, 2010. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/flawed-diplomacy-the-united-nations-and-the-war-on-terrorism.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
