The Arab Spring displaced several illegitimate regimes in Middle East and North Africa or MENA. In the mist of the shifting political current Islamic extremist organizations quickly seized control of vacant power vacuums. This post explores the Islamic States expansion into Libya. Then the post explores the counterterrorism strategies of the administration of Barack Obama and the administration of Donald Trump to confront one of the most lethal terrorist groups in history.
Background
In an explanation of what President Barack Obama admitted is his worst foreign policy mistake, the leader of the United States observed in Fox News interview that “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.”[1] This represented President Obama’s initial statement of failure in Libya. There is another statement of contrition. In a subsequent statement, the president noted: “[W]e [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this.”[2] Thus, lawless and statelessness existed across the Libya and set the stage for the entry of the Islamic State.
This is but one of the many factors that set-in motion the Islamic States quest to create a sanctuary in Libya. What are the other factors? Some of the other factors include the absence of the government authority in several critical areas (Sirte, Sebratha, Derna, Hirawah, Nawfaliya and parts of Tripoli) in what is a failed state which allowed the Islamic State to take advantage of a host ungoverned and undergovered areas in Libya. Second, in the wake of a leader to unite the country both as a result of the Arab Spring and the collapse of the regime of Moammar Gadhafi, a significant power vacuum existed in Libya. In time several rival governments existed in the country. Third, the presence of multiple Sunni extremist groups, each with viable militias meant that the Islamic State had numerous opportunities upon which to recruit new members. Fourth, much like in Iraq, Libya is a country rich in oil. Leaders in the Islamic State recognized that if they could control aspects of the oil revenue, they could fund their operations and assist in recruitment. Given the failure to control Libya’s oil, the Islamic State returned to the successful “territorial model of control depended upon loot, taxes, smuggling, corruption, and coerced donations.”[3] These and other factors are critical to understanding how the Islamic State created safe havens in Libya.[4]
President Obama And Counterterrorism In Libya
Two years into the Obama administrations counter-ISIL strategy, the legislative branch expressed concern about the increasing presence and establishment of the Islamic State sanctuaries in several states around the world. The region that took on significance is North Africa. Most specifically, within the Obama administration and among scholars, increasing concern had been expressed about the size of the Islamic States’ expansion into Libya and Egypt.
Congress, like various elements of the U.S. intelligence community, argued the Obama strategy understandably focused on the central nodes of the Islamic State—Iraq and Syria. However, due to “strategic neglect” many areas outside these territories, most notably in Libya, ISIS expansion went unchecked.
Several rudimentary congressional questions that concerned the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy in Libya assumed center stage: “Secretary [Defense Ashton Carter], what is the current status of any efforts by the U.S. and coalition nations to confront ISIS in Libya? Does that plan call for airstrikes only?”[5] Secretary of Defense Carter offered this response:
“Let me start with that last part first, because that’s the key, which is try to get a government in Tripoli that can win the support of all of the many factions in Libya, so that Libya isn’t a kind of disordered state that provides fertile ground for ISIL to spread…. In the meantime, to get to the other part of your question, we’re going to protect ourselves against ISIL in Libya, as everywhere else, and as you probably know, we have taken some strikes there and will continue to do that. But the important objective here is to put Libya back on the path to having a government that can give the people decent governance and hold the country together.”[6]
Secretary Carter’s response saliently indicated that the Obama administration did not have “workable and implementable corollary plan” to deal with the presence of ISIS in North Africa, and most evident in Libya.
As indicated by Secretary Carter, the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy initially consisted of intermittent air strikes that targeted Islamic State forces and facilities in Libya. Within the administration, and from those on the left in the United States, there was concern the administration considered a second intervention in Libya. In a briefing on February 19, 2016, Department of State spokesperson Mark Toner, observed, “No one’s talking about a second intervention in Libya.”[7] The reality at the administration was seeking a limited military option.
In time, Africa Command, the American military command with responsibility for African threats to region and American security, received what the Obama administration had been clamoring for: a formal request for assistance from the governing authority in Libya.
Following the request from the Government of National Accord (GNA) for American assistance to confront the Islamic State in Sirte and other areas in Libya, the Africa Command created a genuine counterterrorism strategy. Central to the strategy are manned and unmanned airstrikes designed to assist local Libyan government forces to end the Islamic States enclave in Libya.
There are additional components of the administration’s approach. The administration increased intelligence in and around Libya. They dispatched Special Operation Forces to guide and train local forces in preparation for assaults on Islamic State-held Sirte. The most essential counterterrorism component came in the form of a major military campaign—Operation Odyssey Lightning.
Operation Odyssey Lightning commenced in the August of 2016 and concluded on December 19, 2016. The purpose of the mission is to pound the Islamic State positions with air strikes which would enhance the opportunity of local forces to remove ISIS fighters from their most significant safe haven in the country.[8]
The Obama administration quickly recognized that “Solving the conflict will not be easy. The U.S.-led campaign against ISIS in Libya greatly reduced, but did not end the presence of the terrorist army there, so keeping up the pressure on both ISIS and al Qaeda in Libya is important for U.S. national security interests.”[9]
In the wake of what marked President Obama’s final counterterrorism air strike against an Islamic State training facility in Libya, senior officials reaffirmed that they are prepared to continue operations against the threat. Follow the long-range Air Force B-2 bomber attack that destroyed two major training facilities and killed 80 members of the Islamic State, Secretary of Defense Carter offered this hawkish statement: “We need to strike ISIL everywhere they show up.”[10]
The ISIS enclave in Sirte existed no more. Following a reported 495 air and drone strikes that were conducted against ISIS in Sirte, the administration celebrated what it believed is a successful campaign they believed eliminated the ISIS threat in an enclave in Libya.
President Trump And Counterterrorism In Libya
At first glance, President Donald Trump’s counterterrorism approach to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Libya resembles that of President Obama. Both presidents worked with Libyan government forces and militias to deal with the Islamic States’ presence in Southern Libya. Both American leaders relied heavily on intelligence, special forces and air power, manned and unmanned.
If one were to peer by the curtain there are some noticeable differences between the counterterrorism approaches. The Obama administration confronted an entrenched and established terrorist entity that was at the zenith of its power while operating in Sirte. At another level, the critical implementation of the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy is linked to a six-month long air campaign in support of local Libyan forces that removed the Islamic State from their enclave in Sirte.
The Trump administration is dealing with an entity that is metastasizing. That is, from the final months of the Obama administration through roughly a year-plus into the Trump presidency, the Islamic State engaged in a violent insurgency. Over the past six-eight months, the Islamic States’ membership increased to 800-1200 fighters. Recruitment, training, violent attacks, and territorial acquisition continues unchecked. In short, a resurrection is in full-swing.
Geoff Porter, a North Africa specialist at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, acknowledged, “We’re seeing a restoration of the group under new conditions. They’ve restored their capabilities and are intent to use them.”[11] This statement indicates that the Trump administration will have to increase the U.S. presence in Libya to deal with the rapid reemergence of the Islamic State.
The Trump administration quietly introduced other corollary components to augment a strategy that mirrors many aspects of his predecessor. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, the head of the Africa Command, in congressional testimony observed “we are heavily involved in the counterterrorism piece”[12] in Libya. Many observers were dumbfounded, unsure of the message that General Waldhauser was conveying.
At issue, what are the additional counterterrorism components? A major component is that “authorities granted under the Trump administration that allow the military to conduct lethal strikes outside a designated war zone and without explicit White House approval in advance.”[13]
General Waldhauser articulates four additional “objectives for its approach to Libya: degrading terrorist groups; averting civil war; supporting political reconciliation with the goal of achieving a unified central government; and, helping to curb the flow of illegal migrants into Europe via Libya.”[14] Additionally, in April 2018, U.S. officials announced Libya would join the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program and signed a series of agreements and memoranda of intent for border and airport security programs. AFRICOM has engaged with European partners in planning for security assistance to the GNA.”[15]
Thus far, the Trump administration has launched less than ten air strikes. Of note, many of these attacks have been launched without presidential authorization. In short, while there are a host of similar and dissimilar counterterrorism approaches between the Obama and Trump administrations, one of the most salient differences is the authority granted to the regional commander to launch airstrikes.
Some of the outcomes of the previous strikes include the following: “In February 2017, Noureddine Chouchane” was targeted “in a U.S. airstrike in the vicinity of Sabratha. In September 2017, the United States launched airstrikes against an Islamic State desert camp 150 miles southeast of Sirte. These operations appear to have pushed Islamic State operatives deeper into Libya’s southern interior.”[16]
Analysis
As successful as the administrations counterterrorism strategy was in the closing months of the Obama presidency, there are many that expressed warning signs, a signal that the Islamic State was not yet defeated and could return. In a notable example, “Jonathan Winer, the Obama administration’s special envoy to Libya, told Congress in November [2016] that the Islamic State, as it suffered defeats in Sirte, was most likely forming cells elsewhere in the country. He called on Libyans to unite behind the country’s fledgling Government of National Accord to combat the terrorists.”[17]
The Obama administration had another major dilemma: coping with confusion. That is, including the United States, three additional entities—United Arab Emirates, Egypt and France—conducted air strikes and other military operations against the Islamic State in Libya.[18]
A rather rudimentary issue was overlooked by the Obama administration, but is now an issue that is undermining the Trump administrations counterterrorism efforts. That is issue is the requirement to arm coalition forces fighting what is presently an Islamic State insurgency in the country.
To place the point in context, it should be noted the Islamic State regrouped in the desert region south of Sirte. Local forces can conduct reconnaissance operations but are unable to engage the ISIS forces. Major General Mohammed al-Ghossri, who commands Libyan forces affiliated with the UN-backed GNA, provides information on the dilemma that confronts his forces: “Unfortunately, the Libyan desert is still full of IS [Islamic State] forces.”[19]
Another senior leader, Colonel Ali Faida, the commanding officer of the Libyan forces charged with securing Sirte, articulates that his forces are unable to confront the increasing number of Islamic State fighters.[20] Faida made this alarming statement: “We are short of suitable vehicles to navigate … [the terrain], so it is very difficult for us to take control of this area.”[21] Additionally, basic military equipment is lacking. For example, “basic supplies [such as] spare parts and tires for military vehicles and night vision equipment.”[22]
The Trump administration must confront another reality: to adjust the current counterterrorism strategy or create a new one? The Trump administration is more likely to adjust their strategy. What is in play? The Africa Command military organization, with consultation with the Pentagon (most specifically with Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC)) and the White House will set the stage for the modification of the current strategy. The administration could arm the government forces South of Sirte and perhaps those forces in and around Derna. Second, the administration is likely to dispatch a continent of Special Operation Forces to train and to support the Libyan forces that will confront Islamic State fighters in the desert. Third, anticipate an increase in American intelligence in the area and then air strikes in the form of unmanned drones.
There are two additional dilemmas—governance and ungoverned spaces across Libya. These issues require a dramatic increase in American foreign aid to the country. That is, money is needed to assist the GNA to expand its presence in the outer regions of the country. Additional funds are required to rebuild the Libyan military. Similarly, both the Obama and Trump administration incessantly spoke of the “whole of government approach” in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Why one should ask has the Trump administration not implemented this approach in Libya?
The failure to confront and defeat in the Islamic State in Libya could set the stage of for further expansion elsewhere in MENA. To prevent this scenario the Trump administration will be forced to consider increasing the American troop presence and combining that with a civilian surge to resolve a host of governance issues. On the civilian surge, the administration must create an environment of stability in Tripoli and in other major cities across the country. In the absence of this stability the Islamic State revival in Libya will continue.
[1] Dominic Tierney, “The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake,’” The Atlantic, April 14, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] For a detailed examination of other factors that contributed to the arrival of the Islamic State in Libya, please see, Jason Pack, Rhiannon Smith, and Karim Mezran, “The Origins and Evolution of ISIS in Libya,” The Atlantic Council, June 2017. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/Atlantic_Council-The_Origins_and_Evolution_of_ISIS_in_Libya_ web_0619.pdf.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Carter and General Dunford in the Pentagon Briefing Room. News Transcript. Defense.gov. Press Operations Secretary of Defense Ash Carter; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford. February 29, 2016/. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article /682341/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-carter-and-gen-dunford-in-the.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Odyssey Lightning Inherent Resolve-Libya,” https://www.globalsecurity.org /military y/ops/ inherent-resolve-libya.htm.
[8] Pack, Smith, and Mezran, “The Origins and Evolution of ISIS in Libya.
[9] Peter Bergen and Alyssa Sims, “Seven Years After Obama’s “Worst Mistake,’ Libya Killing is Rampant,” CNN, June 20, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/20/opinions/libya-chaos-civilian-deaths-bergen-sims/index.html.
[10] Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Bombs ISIS Camps in Libya,” New York Times, January 19, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/united-states-bombs-isis-camps-in-libya.html.
[11] Borzou Daragahi, “ISIS Resurrection: Libya Attacks Foreshadow Terror to Come,” The Daily Beast, May 29, 2018. https://www.thedailybeast.com/isis-resurrection-libya-attacks-foreshadow-terror-to-come.
[12] Eric Schmitt, “Under Trump, U.S. Launched 8 Airstrikes Against ISIS in Libya. It Disclosed 4.” New York Times, March 8, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/ world/africa/us-airstrikes-isis-libya.html.
[13] Paul D. Shinkman, “In Libya Strike, Military Shows New Lethal Powers Under Trump,” US News, September 29, 2017. https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles /2017-09-29/in-libya-strike-military-shows-new-lethal-powers-under-trump.
[14] Christopher Blanchard, “Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service, May 2, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Johannes Saal, “The Islamic State’s Libyan External Operations Hub: The Picture So Far,” Counterterrorism Center United States Military Academy, December 2017. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-states-libyan-external-operations-hub-the-picture-so-far/.
[17] Schmitt and Gordon, “U.S. Bombs ISIS Camps in Libya.”
[18] Bergen and Sims, “Seven Years After Obama’s “Worst Mistake,’ Libya Killing is Rampant.”
[19] Tom Westcott, “Islamic State in Libya: Fighters Are Regrouping in the Lawless Desert,” Middle East Eye, August 2, 2018. https//www.middleeasteye.net/news/Islamic-state-libya-regroup-lawless-desert-GNA-oil-battle-sirte-1812019376.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
