On December 11, 2016, the Islamic State recaptured the historic Syria city of Palmyra. The offensive occurred during the final phase of Syrian-Russian offensive to drive the remaining anti-government rebels from Aleppo. This post addresses issues not captured in the wake of the Islamic State offensive in Palmyra.
The Resurrection of the Islamic State?
The Islamic State originally captured Palmyra in May of 2015 and held the historic territory for ten months. Following a Syrian government offensive (aided by Russian airstrikes), the Islamic States forces were expelled from the city in March of 2016.
After a stealthy nearly week-long offensive, the Islamic State recaptured Palmyra. In a dramatic illustration that the Islamic State is far from defeated, the terrorist organization is alleged to have “made use of “significant forces” from its strongholds in nearby Raqqa and Deir Az-zor, with more than 4,000 fighters, backed by tanks, attacking the city.”[1] Despite the fact “Russia, Syria’s ally, [which]… launched a flurry of air strikes overnight that reportedly killed 300 ISIL fighters and forced the group to retreat,” the Islamic State succeed when it was widely believed the terrorist group was crumbling an unable to move beyond its established strongholds in Syria.
In the wake of the conquest of the historic city, the Islamic States propaganda arm, the Amaq News Agency, “… produced an infographic supposedly documenting the jihadists’ spoils during the four-day battle in Homs province. Amaq claims that all of the following were seized: 44 tanks, 7 BMPs, 7 130mm cannons, 14 23mm cannons, several anti-armor rocket launchers, dozens of anti-armor rockets, various automatic weapons, military vehicles, weapons and ammunition.”[2]
The is another significant point one which concerned the U.S. and Russian governments: the fact that as part of their spoils, the Islamic State is believed to have captured Russian anti-aircraft equipment. This information is based on media clips released by Amaq that are purportedly “… from May of the Russian base [which] showed a truck-mounted surface-to-air missile system, known as the Pantsir S-1. It is unclear whether the system was left behind or was only there for a short time when the base was under construction.”[3]
In the aftermath of the ISIS victory, a question begs, did the Islamic State’s retaking of Palmyra signal the terrorist organization is undergoing a measured resurrection? There is sufficient evidence to validate that yes there is a measure of revival that developed in the wake of ISIS’s reclamation of Palmyra. More on the resurrection of ISIS to come.
Obama and Palmyra
In a speech before members of the armed forces of Central Command and the Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, in Tampa, Florida, President Obama confidently remarked, “ISIL has lost control of major population centers. Its morale is plummeting…. Syria, ISIL’s self-declared capital in Raqqa is being squeezed. The bottom line is we are breaking the back of ISIL. We’re taking away its safe havens.”[4] The ISIL recapture of Palmyra represents a salient illustration that President Obama’s ruminations of the Islamic State’s defeat have been exaggerated.
There is however a series of far more damning points not discussed elsewhere. First, the recapture of Palmyra ensures that ISIS will receive well-needed fuel, revenue and wheat for Raqqa. That is, the seizure of the oil fields in Palmyra will be used to fund terrorism and assist in governing the population that remains under the control of the terrorist group. This is important because President Obama boasted that “ISIL’s self-declared capital in Raqqa is being squeezed. We have attacked ISIL’s financial lifeline….”[5]
Second, there are some alarming intelligence issues that have surfaced in the wake of the ISIS victory in Palmyra. Consider the following. We continue to hear about the Russo-Syrian excuse that because their forces were engaged in Aleppo, they missed the Islamic States’ clandestine offensive in Palmyra.
But what explains U.S. and coalition intelligence failures? Several additional questions exemplify the point of failed intelligence. We know that for over a year U.S. drones (and other aircraft and satellites) have patrolled over the skies of Raqqa gathering intelligence. What explains the failure of intelligence to recognize and subsequently destroy Islamic State forces that made their way to Palmyra presumably from Raqqa? Put another way, how did U.S. and coalition intelligence miss the numerous military and supporting vehicles that likely made use of roads that eventually drove to Palmyra to participate in the offensive?
There is another issue: does the coalition maintain an intelligence apparatus that surveilled Deir Ezzor, the location of a wealth of ISIS fighters? If not, what accounts for the failure not to have an intelligence presence over this Islamic State territory? An additional question surrounds the extent to which President Obama’s restrictive rules of engagement. That is, did the president’s restrictive rules of engagement prevent a combined U.S. forces from potentially intervening to prevent ISIS forces from recapturing Palmyra?
Days after the ISIS’s retaking of Palmyra, “over a dozen U.S. and coalition warplanes destroyed 14 Syrian tanks, three heavy artillery systems and one anti-aircraft artillery emplacement.”[6] In a statement that provided details on why the air strike was launched, Air Force Colonel John Dorrian, the top U.S. spokesman in Iraq argued, “We will not allow [the Islamic State] to maintain capabilities that threaten Coalition or partner forces.”[7] There is a problem with the statement: “American and coalition fighters did not target the Russian-made Syrian SA-3 anti-aircraft missile system taken as part of the weapons cache seized in Palmyra after Islamic State.”[8]
The destruction of anti-aircraft missile systems, which is now in the hands of Islamic State fighters, is still on the table. On this point, Lt. General Stephen Townsend, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, stated, “I expect that the Russians and the regime will address it … in short order. We’re watching that, [but] as soon as we have an opportunity, if the Russians [don’t], we will.”[9]
Finally, the successful offensive in Palmyra is a morale booster for Islamic State fighters. During an extensive period of U.S. and coalition air strikes, and given that there had been a declining number of recruits to supplement their forces, to succeed in an intensive firefighter against Syria forces (and with standing Russian air strikes) in Palmyra, there is no doubt that ISIS and their fighters have regained a measure of confidence.
Analysis
A major indication of the embarrassment posed by the Islamic States’ conquest of Palmyra is illustrated in the silence that has permeated throughout the Obama White House. In other words, there has been no official statement on events in Palmyra. In an interview on Foxnews, State Department Spokesman John Kirby made a passing reference to the Islamic States’ victory.[10] In the end, Kirby placed emphasis on the administration’s belief that ISIS has been significantly degraded.
Overlooked in the wake of the recapture of the ancient city is that on December 10 the Obama administration dispatched 200 additional American troops[11] to increase the preparation for the eventual offensive to destroy the Islamic State’s operational headquarters in Raqqa. The ISIS offensive in Palmyra not only caught them off guard but represents a salient setback.
There is little doubt the conquest of Palmyra does indeed demonstrate the Islamic State is far from defeated. Indeed, the offensive in Palmyra represents an example of resurrection, and there are other illustrations of this reality. In a further illustration of the renewed confidence of the Islamic fighters, it should be noted that ISIS has “moved on to seize the Tiyas air base and advanced toward Homs and Qaryatayn” areas all in Syria.”[12] The extent of this measured resurrection is unknown. Indeed, one would be hard pressed at this point to discern how the above movements fits into the Islamic States’ strategy.
In the final analysis, these movements reflect that ISIS can mount an offensive to capture territory. Once again President Obama’s rhetoric (“The bottom line is we are breaking the back of ISIL”[13]) must be called into question. Thus, analysts will continue to assess if the recent offensive is a short term resurrection of the Islamic State or whether it is simply a shrewd strategic move.
[1] [No Author] “ISIL ‘Recaptures’ Palmyra from Syrian forces,” Al Jazeera, December 11, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/isil-recaptures-palmyra-syrian-forces-161211133342 925.html.
[2] Thomas Joscelyn, “Jihadis Celebrate Capture of Russian Base in Palmyra, Syria,” Threat Matrix A Blog of the Long War Journal, December 2016. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016 /12/jihadis-celebrate-capture-of-russian-base-in-palmyra-syria.php.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism. MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. White House, December 6, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approach-counterterrorism.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Carlo Munoz, “Multiple U.S. Airstrikes Destroy ISIS Weapons Cache in Palmyra,” Washington Times, December 16, 2016. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/16/us-airstrikes-destroy-isis-weapons-cache-palmyra/.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “State Department Spokesman John Kirby Defends ‘Progress’ Against ISIS, Refugee Vetting.” Foxnews.com. December 20, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMZGto0GO3g.
[11] Eric Schmitt, “U.S. to Send 200 More Troops to Syria in ISIS Fight,” New York Times, December 10, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/us/politics/us-adds-200-troops-syria-isis.html.
[12] Anton Mardasov, “Kremlin Dilemma: Regain Palmyra Or Advance on Idlib?” Al Monitor, December 16, 2016. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/russia-syria-dilemma-palmyra-isis-idlib.html?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=20161 219&bt_ee=xUSlxlAH6F6kNws+EfqlIWrlj7vNLdMViAoC9TQKHpx0oMxlMYDpm3l95Ov3X4VJ&bt_ts=1482173294221.
[13] See Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism.
