President Obama’s Controversial Legacy as Counterterrorism-in-Chief is the subject of this post. There are a host of questions that are addressed herein. For example, what were some of the critical counterterrorism objectives that were introduced and subsequently implemented by the president? Then a second significant question is addressed: what ultimately is the president’s counterterrorism legacy?
The Obama Counterterrorism Approach
Early in the administration of Barack Obama, the new American President moved swiftly to shift away from some aspects of President George W. Bush’s multi-dimensional counterterrorism approach. As mentioned in a previous work, “President Barack Obama signaled early on that the war on terrorism would undergo a transformation. On January 22, 2009, President Obama signed two executive orders. The first concerned the closure of the detention facility in Guantanamo, Cuba, and the second ended torture and called upon interrogators to refer to the U.S. Army Field Manual for all future interrogations.”[1] In an instant, it appeared two of the core Bush administration counterterrorism instruments existed no more.[2]
The Obama administration had a major dilemma: critics charged the president had to produce a sound counterterrorism strategy. Put another way, statements in opposition to Bush’s approach would not suffice.
The release of the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism clarified the Obama administration’s objectives. Those objectives include: (1) “Reducing U.S. vulnerabilities and updating defenses; (2) Disrupting, degrading and dismantling Al Qaeda wherever it takes root; (3) Preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction; (4) Eliminating Al Qaeda safe havens; (5) Degrading links between Al Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents; Countering Al Qaeda’s ideology; and (7) Depriving Al Qaeda of illicit financing, logistical support, and online communications.”[3] Inside the Obama White House, administration officials were confident they had quieted the critics of the president’s approach to counterterrorism.
There were however those analysts that asserted President Obama had yet to clearly articulate a coherent counterterrorism approach. In an attempt to address criticism of the administration’s counterterrorism plan, Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser, made this statement about administration strategy: “We have a variety of different tools that we use that range from a drone strike to an airstrike to a training exercise to law enforcement cooperation to try to deal with that terrorist threat.”[4]
In the end, President Obama settled on three central counterterrorism instruments to confront the proliferation of terrorism. The instruments include the use of drones, the use of air strikes and the intermittent use of Special Operation Forces (SOFs). It is these three components that ultimately defined the Obama approach to counterterrorism.
Obama and Drone Strikes
The use of drones proved significant in that a host of terrorists (particularly “high value” terrorists) were eliminated from the battlefield. There are several dilemmas associated with the use of Drones. The available evidence suggests the targeted killing of a major terrorist leader did not end the threat of terrorism that was attributive to that organization. This is true in the case of Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Shabab and a host of other terrorist groups. There is another issue associated with Obama’s drone strategy: while terrorists have been removed from the battlefield, there are numerous examples where the sanctuaries the terrorist operated in still remain. Thus in the final analysis there is minimal gain associated with use of drones as an instrument of counterterrorism.
In the end, President Obama embraced and subsequently expanded “drone strikes against militants and terrorists will be an enduring foreign policy legacy. Whereas President George W. Bush authorized approximately 50 drone strikes that killed 296 terrorists and 195 civilians in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, Obama has authorized 506 strikes that have killed 3,040 terrorists and 391 civilians.”[5]
Obama and Air Strikes
Consistent with President Bill Clinton and President Bush, President Obama made extensive use of air strikes as a counterterrorism tool to confront terrorism around the world. At issue, how effective were the counterterrorism strikes?
Given the dominance of the skies, the United States is able to use a wealth of aircraft to target terrorist groups around the world. The dilemma with the Obama administration’s use of air power is that all too often the air strikes did not always alter the terrorist landscape. There is another issue, the strikes were not always connected to a larger strategic purpose that would, in the final analysis, lead to the defeat of a terrorist group(s).
This is not to say that the strikes did not “kill terrorists.” Yet in the aftermath of the air strikes, terrorists have often regrouped because the administration operated under the problematic “light footprint” strategy. This strategy “relies on precision strikes from U.S. aircraft”[6] and the intermittent use of special operation forces. The strategy had one central objective: reduce American military interventions around the world. Critics charged the strategy exposed something else: President Obama’s aversion to the deployment of U.S. combat forces.
This strategy was used in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, in particular. The view within the Obama White House is that so long as terrorists were being killed that would be the headline in the media. The media rarely investigated if the terrorist organization had reconstituted itself or if they had later expanded their sanctuary. In the cases of the AQAP in Yemen, AQIM in Algeria, and Ansar Al Sharia in Libya, one can make the point that after U.S. air strikes, each of the aforementioned terrorist groups remain threats.
In another example, the light footprint strategy (in this case the extended NATO air campaign) succeeded in the removal of Libya’s brutal dictator Muammar Qaddafi. The dilemma is that the U.S. and their NATO partners failed to deal with the next step—national building. The result, Libya quickly descended into a failed state. There is another consequence: a vacuum was created which permitted Al Qaeda and The Islamic State and other terrorist groups to establish sanctuaries across the country.
The light footprint strategy exposed the Obama administration’s aversion to casualties. In a larger point, “in employing the light footprint, however, the Obama administration has failed to present a clear strategy detailing how those military tools will accomplish the United States’ ultimate foreign policy goals.”[7]
Obama and Special Operation Forces
From the outset of the administration special operation forces were destined to play a major role in Obama’s counterterrorism strategy. Consistent with the light footprint strategy, Obama deployed SOFs to counter the threat posed by the ever-expanding transnational terrorists around the world. U.S. SOFs incessantly engaged Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Of great import, the tempo of their missions assisted in the retaking of territory or slowed Taliban offensives.
Unknown to most is that nearly 10,000 U.S. SOFs operate in over 135 countries around the world.[8] Currently. the SOF operations in Iraq, Syria and Libya are deemed mission critical.[9] Additionally, there are those that assert the deployment of these elite warriors is critical to saving Obama’s battered legacy in the struggle against The Islamic State.[10]
In the missions in Somalia, Cameroon, Nigeria, and to a degree those in Libya, and elsewhere, the SOF missions have not been all that successful. There are a number of reasons associated with the absence of success. In Somalia and Libya, for example, the missions lack tempo and duration. That is, a mission may be launched one month and then there are no SOF actions for months. Once again there is evidence that these and other terrorist groups within those the countries were reconstituted. Taken collectively, in these and in other cases U.S. Special Ops Missions in Africa Fail to Stem Rising Tide of Terror Groups.
The above not being enough, in the battle with The Islamic State, particularly in regards to their Caliphate, critics charge that Obama is misusing our most elite forces. That is, there are not enough SOF deployed in theatre to formally go after the enemy and worse President Obama has authorized “restrictive rules of engagement” that have nullified many missions and hampered others.
The misuse of U.S. SOFs is best described in the following quote. In the words of David S. Maxwell, a former member of the elite warrior community, “Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognizes that the troops on the ground do not have the latitude necessary to accomplish the mission. If you want the troops on the ground to be affective then you have to let them do their jobs. The more constraints we place on them in the misguided belief that by doing so and by micromanaging them from inside the beltway that this will somehow prevent things from going wrong, the more we hinder mission accomplishment …the more we put the troops at risk.”[11]
Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates
Regarding Al Qaeda and their affiliates, there is a reality the media does not address. It is true that Obama increased the use of drones against Al Qaeda and their loyal affiliates. That said, the drones strikes, and the increase in bases used to launch those operations, have not reduced terrorist sanctuaries around the world.
With respect to Al Qaeda’s affiliates, while many inside the AQAP leadership have been targeted and killed in Yemen, many of same those leaders have been replaced and worse the terrorist network has increased in size and they have expanded their territorial control inside the country. In Algeria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to undergo a quiet revival, and more importantly, this terrorist organization continues their quest to overthrow the ruling government.
In Syria, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formally Jabhat al-Nusra) has survived intermittent US air strikes and have expanded their territory in the country. In Libya, few talk about the continued existence of Ansar al-Sharia, the terrorist organization that was behind the 2012 Benghazi attack that resulted in the death of four brave Americans (one of which was the Ambassador) still exists. These are just a few examples that illustrate the fallacy associated with the success of President Obama’s counterterrorism strategy.
Taken collectively, Al Qaeda and their affiliates continue to exist. Most alarming, the terrorist sanctuaries continue to expand around the world. This may be the best evidence of the failed counterterrorism polices of the Obama administration.
Obama and The Islamic State
In referring to The Islamic State as “the JV team” President Obama set in motion a process whereby his administration envisaged criticism that it lacked leadership and a strategy to deal with the existential threat. Often overlooked, what if Obama acted on the earlier actionable intelligence, and then implemented a genuine military response? Long after receiving updated intelligence on the threat posed by ISIS, President Obama still refused to act. When the president did unveil his plan during the September 2014 televised address that disclosed the administration’s anti-ISIS plan, critics charged that Obama had no strategy.
There is considerable evidence to support the contention of many of the president’s critics. In particular, one need only evaluate the numerous shifts in administration strategy to recognize that it stood little chance of success. For example, consider the continued increase in U.S. conventional forces to the region, as an illustration of the ever-changing plan. Second, note the ever-expanding deployment of SOFs (American and allied) to Iraq and Syria. Third, the president has returned to the Pentagon and held multiple meetings with senior Pentagon officials. In the wake of those meetings, the president subsequently unveiled another iteration of his strategy. These examples demonstrate the incrementalism associated with Obama’s strategy.
President Obama is still dealing with the fallout that U.S. air power is assisting in the expansion of power for Iraqi Shia militias and Iranian Quds forces which continue to operate in Iraq. The following quote best illustrates the president’s dilemma. In the words of Andreas Krieg, “When it became obvious in 2014 that the US Air Force was providing indirect air support for Shi’ite militias and Iranian advisers in Iraq in the fight against the group known as [the] Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the world was stunned. The United States, it seemed, had come to terms with the fact that, given the rising jihadist threat, Iran and its protégés in Iraq had become potential partners with whom the operational burden could be shared.”[12]
Finally, there is a far more salient dilemma associated with the president’s strategy. That is, even as Iraq, with support of U.S. SOFs and airpower, is poised to engage ISIS in the battle to retake Mosul, the Islamic State has created sanctuaries in over 30 additional states. So much for the president’s often used verbiage that he will “defeat” and “destroy” the ISIS.
The Obama Counterterrorism Legacy
To say that Obama’s counterterrorism policies did not have any successes is inaccurate. According to Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, the president had several significant counterterrorism achievements. In the words of Jenkins, “Obama can claim credit for ordering the military raid that killed Osama Bin Laden and for pursuing an aggressive policy of drone strikes and special operations aimed at taking out terrorist commanders.”[13]
Another major achievement is that the drone strikes did significantly impact the leadership of Al Qaeda, AQAP, Al Shabab, and other terrorist groups around the world. Additionally, the air strikes that targeted Islamic State forces and military equipment in Iraq and Syria are critical to the reduction of the size of their caliphate.
In the final analysis, there are a host of variables that validate that Obama’s counterterrorism strategy had a minimal impact against terrorism around the world. For example, during the 2010-2012 period, the Obama administration expanded the drone program which targeted senior leaders of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Al Shabab in Somalia, and AQAP in Yemen.
As stated previously, many of the leadership in these organizations have been killed. However, most of the leaders have been replaced. Second, the organizations and the threat they pose still exists. Third, the sanctuaries that house the terrorists remains. Fourth, the Obama administration’s delay in implementing an effective counterterrorism strategy for an extended period after the ISIS blitzkrieg across Iraq, proved to be problematic. Worse, even after the liberation of a host of Sunni areas in Iraq, and the success in retaking of territory in Syria, The Islamic State has created sanctuaries in over thirty additional states around the world. Thus President Obama is not close to meeting his pledge to “destroy” the Islamic State.
In one of the major illustrations of the failure associated with the president’s counterterrorism legacy, consider that Obama Has Touted Al Qaeda’s Demise 32 Times since Benghazi Attack. To ensure accuracy, “President Barack Obama has described al Qaeda as having been “decimated,” “on the path to defeat” or some other variation at least 32 times since the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya.”[14] Despite the verbiage, Al Qaeda like many of their affiliates continues to operate in sanctuaries in over sixty countries around the world.
In the end, the Obama counterterrorism legacy is replete with examples of failures. Another lasting illustration of the failed legacy is this: “Obama’s innovations in counterterrorism have never reconciled the gap between the reality of what the US does in hunting terrorists around the globe and its wider foreign policy agenda.”[15] Finally, the strategies employed by the counterterrorism-in-chief in time will be supplemented. Great legacies exist for an extend period, but problematic legacies have a short shelf life. Which one do you think explains Obama’s counterterrorism legacy?
Endnotes
[1] See John Davis (Editor), The Barack Obama Presidency: A Two Year Assessment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 165-66.
[2] Despite the executive order, GITMO as it came to be known remains open.
[3] Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. June 29, 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism.
[4] Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,” New York Times, January 12, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy.
[5] Zenko, “Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,” New York Times, January 12, 2016.
[6] Seth G. Jones, “Another Example of Obama’s Light-Footprint Strategy,” RAND, September 17, 2014. http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/09/another-example-of-obamas-light-footprint-strategy.html .
[7] Brad Stapelton, “The Problem with the Light Footprint: Shifting Tactics in Lieu of Strategy,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis Number 792, June 7, 2016. http://www.cato.org/publications/ policy-analysis/problem-light-footprint-shifting-tactics-lieu-strategy.
[8] Nick Turse, “U.S. Special Operations Forces: A Secret War in 135 Countries,” September 25, 2015. Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-special-operations-forces-a-secret-war-in-135-countries/5478132.
[9] Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats,” New York Times, December 27, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/ 2015/12/28/world/middleeast/more-and-more-special-forces-become-obamas-military-answer.html?_r=0.
[10] For more on this point, see Kimberly Dozier, “Obama Turns to Special Ops to Salvage His Legacy,” The Daily Beast, January 15, 2016. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/15/ obama-turns-to-special-ops-to-salvage-his-legacy.html.
[11] David S. Maxwell, “The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy,” Small Wars Journal,” June 17, 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-only-thing-worse-than-misusing-sof-is-policy-makers-misusing-sof-operational-methods-as.
[12] Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 92: 1 (2016): p. 97.
[13] Brian Michael Jenkins, “President Obama’s Controversial Legacy as Counterterrorism-in-Chief,” The RAND Blog, August 22, 2016. http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/08/president-obamas-controversial-legacy-as-counterterrorism.html.
[14] Fred Lucas, “Obama Has Touted Al Qaeda’s Demise 32 Times since Benghazi Attack,” CNSNews, November 1, 2012, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-al-qaeda-s-demise-32-times-benghazi-attack-0.
[15] Michael Boyle, “President Obama’s Disastrous Counterterrorism Legacy,” The Guardian, August 5, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/05/obama-legacy-shadow-wars.
