Covering four American President’s, the US military represented the principal instrument in dealing with transnational terrorist threats. In short, the role of the US military during the war on terrorism has been significant. This post addresses several questions. Those questions include the following. What strategies were used by US presidents to confront the threat of terrorism? What aspects of US military power were used to confront the threat of terrorism? How do you measure the role of the US military in dealing with terrorism?
Background
It is important to note the US military has not always been a major contributor in counterterrorism operations in the disparate wars on terrorism. To illustrate the point, during the administration of Bill Clinton, the president had an aversion to the use of force in response to Al Qaeda’s threat to US interests.
Each US presidential administration thereafter, the role of the US military represented the “tip of the spear” in US counterterrorism during the administration of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and President Donald Trump.
This point was clarified in a statement made by retired Army General Barry R. McCaffrey. In the words of General McCaffrey, “US armed forces and our allies can play a role in neutralizing, disrupting, and destroying terrorist base areas…. The armed forces will play a central role in keeping the terrorist leadership and bases focused on their own survival; preventing them from having the time and the intellectual energy to regain control of their worldwide network and plan further terrorist assaults.”[1]
No matter the president, during the post-9/11 world US leaders were committed in one form or another to the use of force in dealing with Al Qaeda and their affiliates[2], the Islamic State, and other terrorist organizations.
Bush and the Role of US Military and the War on Terrorism
Force remains the central counterterrorism instrument in the war on terrorism. US presidents have articulated that there are other aspects that are critical to confronting the threat of terrorism. In one example, President Bush’s strategy relied on a “four pronged” approach—the use of force, diplomatic cooperation, increased role for the US intelligence community, and global law enforcement cooperation.[3]
Though Bush repeatedly harped on the significance of the use of force, the president recognized that a sustained multilateral approach in the long term could best serve American security interests. Thus, in “this struggle [it is important] … to build multinational cooperation. Multinational cooperation should be an easy thing to achieve, even though many States are under different internal constraints in their behavior.”[4]
There are a host of examples of multinational cooperation during the war on terrorism. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which the United Nations authorized in 2001 to empower 42 states around the role to contribute to the stability of that country. Additionally, President Bush created the Combined Joint Task Horn of Africa and the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to deal with Al Qaeda in East Africa, West Africa and the Sahel.
Under President Bush, the US military utilized another important tool of counterterrorism—Drones. There military relied heavily on The Global Hawk and like-mined platforms for surveillance of terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism.[5] The intelligence obtained from this intelligence platform is used by the Air Force, the Navy, and even CIA-controlled drones to target terrorist sanctuaries.[6] During the second term of his presidency, Bush made great use of armed drones, particularly launching strikes in Pakistan and Yemen.
In another important use of the military, President Bush relied heavily on US Special Operation Forces (SOFs). The SOFs were tasked with several vital missions: Partner Capacity and Foreign Internal Defense and Direct Action and Unconventional Warfare.[7]
On partner capacity and foreign internal defense, this is a reference to “Special operations forces are trained to work “by, with, and through” partner forces, which generally makes them the provider of choice for building partner capacity.”[8] With respect to counterterrorism, “building partner capacity can involve deploying US Army Special Forces and other units to train, advise, and assist local security forces and build the capacity of local governments to provide services, secure their populations, and deal with the causes of terrorism in their countries.”[9]
Under Bush, the president called upon US SOF-led to employ “direct action and unconventional warfare precision targeting of terrorist groups and their financial, logistical, and political support networks. They can orchestrate covert raids to capture or otherwise target terrorists, seize their supplies, and undermine their finances; conduct air strikes from drones, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters; oversee psychological operations to undermine terrorist support; collect and analyze intelligence about terrorist groups (their networks, locations, capabilities, and intentions); and engage with tribal and other local actors.”[10]
As a corollary strategy, the Bush administration dispatched US Special Operation Forces (SOFs) to confront the threat of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world. The SOFs that were deployed in Africa are part of two distinct counterterrorism alliances—the Combined Joint Task Horn of Africa and the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The SOFs were designed to produce a “light footprint” to reduce the presence of US combat troops while carryout training and creating US bases in the region, and ensuring cooperation between US and African partner states and the sharing of vital anti-terrorism information among member states.
During the Bush presidency, the US deployed thousands of combat forces to Afghanistan and Iraq to deal with disparate terrorist threats. The large-scale introduction of US combat forces is essential for regime change, stability, and attacking terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There were however problems associated with the missions. Both missions were long in duration and critics questioned whether the military ever achieved the mission objective—the defeat of terrorism. In Iraq, critics questioned the war of choice and the failure to prevent the emergence of the multiple insurgencies (Sunni, Shia, and Al Qaeda in Iraq) that developed in Iraq. After acknowledging the existence of the above insurgencies, President Bush introduced the surge strategy that along with the Sunni Awakening helped to defeat two of the three insurgencies (The Shia insurgency was contained but not defeated).[11]
Obama And The Role Of The US Military Role In The War On Terrorism
During the presidency of Barack Obama, the role of US military in confronting transnational terrorism lead to the reduction of the use of force and ended the US mission in Iraq. President Obama also worked to redefine the US effort against terrorism. For example, President Obama no longer used the words “war on terrorism” and instead instructed administration officials to use “overseas contingency operations.”
President Obama also attempted to redefine American strategy in the war on terrorism. The Obama administrations 2010 National Security Strategy represented one of several attempts to redefine US strategy. A passage in the document is instructive: “We are fighting a war against a far-reaching network of hatred and violence. We will disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates through a comprehensive strategy that denies them safe haven, strengthens front-line partners, secures our homeland, pursues justice through durable legal approaches, and counters a bankrupt agenda of extremism and murder with an agenda of hope and opportunity.”[12] Additionally, the document states, “the United States is focused on implementing a responsible transition as we end the war in Iraq, succeeding in Afghanistan, and defeating al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates.”[13]
The National Security Strategy contained this additional significant statement: “Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security. But they must be complimented.”[14] This statement indicated that President Obama anticipated an increase in a multilateral approach to reduce the American military burden in dealing with the threat posed by a plethora of transnational terrorist groups.
The above identifies some of the Obama administrations attempts to reduce the role of the US military. By the end of 2011, President Obama fulfilled a campaign promise an ended the US military commitment in Iraq. This decision is one of several factors that set the stage for the reconstitution of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an entity that would later morph into the Islamic State.
In Afghanistan, President Obama expanded the US military presence with the mission objective “to defeat and destroy” the Taliban.[15] As part of this expansion, SOF operations, particularly raids, against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, increased. This represented one of several examples whereby the administration employed their version of the “light footprint” strategy. Other examples where this strategy was utilized include Pakistan (the raid the killed Osama Bin Laden), Somalia, Yemen, to name a few.
The war against the Islamic State further augmented the role of the US military. In the words of James Warren, “To a degree unprecedented in American military history, the war against ISIS is a conflict spearheaded and orchestrated by the commandos, trainers, and advisers of the elite US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) …. Propelled by sharp spikes in demand worldwide for its unique expertise in irregular warfare and counterterrorism, SOCOM appears to be well on its way to establishing what former SOCOM commander Admiral William McRaven calls its own “global network of likeminded interagency allies and partners.” As of early 2016, almost half of the 7,500 Special Forces warriors overseas were posted outside the Middle East and Afghanistan, operating as both liaison and training teams inside more than 80 nations.”[16]
The Obama administration improved upon a Bush-era creation: the use of armed drones to conduct targeted strikes against high value terrorists. Micah Zenko, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, asserts that drones emerged as the Obama administration’s “weapon of choice in dealing with terrorists.”[17] Why? As stated by Zenko, “The reason is simple. The unmanned aircraft provided the administration an accurate way of striking enemies while minimizing risks for US personnel. They can control the weapons from American bases thousands of miles from the mountains of Pakistan or deserts of Yemen.”[18]
Trump And The US Military Role And The War On Terrorism
President Donald Trump moved expeditiously to orient his administration to the ways of the war on terrorism. There is a notable issue: President Trump is operating in the absence of a formal strategy. Instead, the new administration is employing an ad hoc approach in dealing with terrorism.
Nonetheless, the Trump administration has used force against Yemen where the president approved a controversial raid that targeted members of Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in February 2017.[19] The controversial raid included the participation of members of SEAL Team 6. The mission killed several terrorists, but it also resulted in the death of a US serviceman and civilian casualties.[20]
In March 2017, President Trump ordered the execution of 30 successful airstrikes against AQAP.[21] The airstrikes signaled “The willingness to expand counterterrorism operations inside war-torn Yemen … that Trump is more willing to defer to military commanders on national security policy than President Obama, who was criticized publicly by three of his four Defense secretaries and privately by uniformed officers for micromanaging the military.”[22]
In terms of dealing with the Islamic State, Trump approved of the deployment of Army Rangers and Marines to Manbij, Syria to preclude inter-allied fighting between Turkish and Syrian Kurdish Forces (YPG).[23] The deployment had another objective: to increase the pace of the operation to retake Raqqa, the operational hub of the Islamic State.
The mixture of combat forces combined with the increase of airstrikes against the AQAP in Yemen, along with the use of drones, indicates that President Trump is likely to employ US military power at level consistent with that of President Bush.
Analysis:
Covering four American Presidents, the role of the US military has been the critical instrument in counterterrorism efforts to confront a host of terrorist groups. Operating under disparate presidential strategies, beginning with Al Qaeda, the affiliates of the former-bin Laden led transnational terrorist group, through the current conflict with the Islamic State, the US military has confronted terrorists in their sanctuaries, killed and captured numerous high value leaders through airstrikes and SOF raids.
A question begs, how does one evaluate the role of the US military in the age of transnationalism terrorism? There are multiple measures necessary for a prudent evaluation. The measures include: evaluating air strikes, SOF raids, drones, and deployment and mission success of major US combat forces whether in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is another important measure that should be considered: presidential political will.
Put another way, there is no doubt the military maintains the skillsets and leadership to confront terrorism, but are the civilian leaders prepared to support them until the mission objective is completed? Unfortunately, there have been several US president’s that have undercut the mission, either through inadequate strategies and the premature withdrawal of US forces.
Critics change there are several additional problems associated with the role of military and the war on terrorism. For example, drone strikes and US SOF raids are invaluable in killing mid-level and senior leaders of several terrorist groups. That said, on too many occasions after drone strikes and raids numerous terrorist sanctuaries still exists. Thus, many terrorist groups reconstitute themselves and often begin a new wave of terrorist-related violence.
Another problem is that critics have questioned the cost of the war. With missions to confront terrorist threats still ongoing, and threats to US security continuing to mount, there is little doubt that Congress will likely scrutinize future military appropriations and strategies to defeat the enemy.
One of the signature criticism about the role of the military in conducting the war on terrorism is the absence of victories. That is, the US has deployed conventional forces to Afghanistan and Iraq but the Bush and Obama administrations cannot claim the defeat of the terrorist groups that operated in those countries.
On this point, James Fallows makes the following argument: “William S. Lind is a military historian who in the 1990s helped develop the concept of “Fourth Generation War,” or struggles against the insurgents, terrorists, or other “non-state” groups that refuse to form ranks and fight like conventional armies. He wrote recently: ‘The most curious thing about our four defeats in Fourth Generation War—Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—is the utter silence in the American officer corps. Defeat in Vietnam bred a generation of military reformers … Today, the landscape is barren. Not a military voice is heard calling for thoughtful, substantive change.’”[24]
In the final analysis, the war on terrorism will be decided on the following: the improvement of presidential strategies and political will, allowing the military to achieve the objectives of the mission, and providing appropriate funding to rebuild our armed forces represent the critical variables that will determine the role of US military in the war on terrorism in the future.
[1] As quoted in Transcript, “Military Role in the “War” on Terrorism, Council on Foreign Relations,” October 10, 2001, http://www.cfr.org/world/military-role-war-terrorism/p4196.
[2] See, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
[3] John Davis, ed., The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004), pp. 186-187.
[4] Transcript, “Military Role in the “War” on Terrorism, Council on Foreign Relations.”
[5] Joseph Trevithick, “How the US Air Force’s Biggest Drones Help Set Up Attacks on ISIS,” January 23, 2017. Motherboard.vice.com. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-the-us-air-forces-biggest-drones-help-set-up-attacks-on-isis-islamic-state.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Seth Jones, “Counterterrorism and the Role of Special Operations Forces,” Testimony Presented Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade on April 8, 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT408/ RAND_CT408.pdf.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 41-42.
[12] National Security Strategy 2010. http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/8/.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] “President Obama Delivers Remarks to Soldiers During Surprise Afghanistan Trip,” CNN, March 28, 2010. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1003/28/bn.01.html.
[16] James A. Warren, “Special Ops Rule in War on Terror,” The Daily Beast, May 28, 2016. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/28/special-ops-rule-in-war-on-terror.html.
[17] Jim Michaels, “Drones: The Face of the War on Terror,” USAToday, March 19, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/19/drones-pakistan-iraq/25033955/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, “Raid in Yemen: Risky from the Start and Costly in the End,” New York Times, February 1, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast /donald-trump-yemen-commando-raid-questions.html?_r=0.
[20] Ibid.
[21] W.J. Hennigan, “Trump steps up airstrikes against Al Qaeda in Yemen; more ground raids could follow,” LA Times, March 4, 2017. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-trump-yemen-20170304-story.html.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Michael Gordon, “US is Sending 400 More Troops to Syria,” New York Times, March 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria.html.
[24] James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” The Atlantic, January/February 2015. Issue. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.
