In a clear indication of a change in strategy, in late March of 2017 “Trump Declares Somalia a War Zone.” This post addresses two questions. First, what is behind the administration of Donald Trump’s decision to target Al Shabaab? And second, how and in what ways is the administration’s strategies different from the two previous administrations?
Background
Al Shabaab is a splinter group of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The membership of Al Shabaab is estimated between 7,000-9,000 fighters. There are three events linked to the evolution of Al Shabaab, a terrorist which operated in East Africa. The initial event is the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December of 2006. Rapidly advancing Ethiopian forces, backed up with American military support, overwhelmed the poorly trained and led ICU forces. The invasion “provided Al Shabaab with the opportunity to draw on deep-seated Somali hostility towards Ethiopia to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers.”[1]
The second event followed threats to the survival of Al Shabaab. After being forced to the outskirts of Southern Somalia, Al Shabaab adopted new tactics to survive the constant attacks by occupying Ethiopian forces. It is under this intense pressure that Al Shabaab adopted and implemented “an effective guerrilla-style operational strategy as a means of resisting”[2] Ethiopian forces.
The third event is associated with the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2009. With no military force controlling a swath of land in much of southern Somalia, Al Shabaab filled a power vacuum that resulted in them controlling territory as large as Denmark. In short order, Al Shabaab announced their allegiance to Al Qaeda.[3]
In response to the threat three US presidential administrations implemented counterterrorism strategies which “targeted” Al Shabaab. Each of these administrations considered the terrorist group one of the major threats during the war on terrorism.
George W. Bush and Barack Obama and Al Shabaab
During the administration of George W. Bush did not confront terrorism in Somalia until the spring of 2002. At that time, following the defeat of Taliban forces and Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda minions during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, US intelligence “calculated that Al Qaeda would seek a base of operations in Somalia.”[4]
The Bush administration confronted a host of terrorist groups in Somalia that proceeded Al Shabaab. The earlier groups include the Islamic Courts Union and “Al Itihaad al Islamiya”(AIAI)—a Wahhabi Islamist terrorist organization which arose in Somalia in the 1980s.”[5]
As part of Bush’s expansive strategy, the president created The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as the central regional coalition with responsibility of confronting Al Shabaab and other East African terrorist groups.
In the aftermath of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December of 2006, Beginning in January if 2007, President Bush formally “targeted Al Shabaab.”[6] As part of President Bush’s strategy of “detecting, disrupting, and defeating”[7] Al Shabaab, the US military relied on manned and unmanned strikes and Special Operation Forces (SOF) raids against the terrorist group. The administration strategy resulted in the death of hundreds of members of the group and “the death of Aden Hashi Farah, the leader and a founding member of Al Shabaab.”[8]
Barack Obama And Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab evolved into a far more menacing challenge to regional security during the administration of Barack Obama. The threat was characterized this way by Lauren Ploch: “The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and US interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.”[9]
In addition to the above, US counterterrorism emphasis on Al Shabaab occurred because of the terrorist groups increased terrorist attacks. The following excerpt provides a sense of some of the major attacks conducted by the terrorist group: “In September 2009, Al Shabaab bombed the African Union peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu, killing more than 20 people and damaging the offices of a US firm that was purportedly providing support to peacekeepers. In July 11, 2010, Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for suicide bombing of two groups of fans watching the World Cup in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, which killed more than 70 people, including one American citizen. The Ugandan attacks, according to Al Shabaab, were launched to punish the country for its role in assisting AMISOM forces in Somalia, in the same way that the … Westgate attack was launched to punish Kenya for its military operations in Somalia since August 2011.”[10]
Al Shabaab launched numerous attacks against in Kenya. Al Shabaab has long conducted military operations inside Kenya and they conducted several “cross-border raids.” For example, “In 2013, [Al] Shabaab … perpetrated the Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi” and they are “responsible [for the] … deadly terrorist attack on Garissa University in early 2015. The jihadists stormed the university and killed 148 people and wounded many more.[11]
The Obama administration relied upon three disparate counterterrorism responses to the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. Those measures include the use of drone strikes, direct actions missions (US Special Forces raids), and the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping forces to confront the terrorist group in cities and towns in southern Somalia.
The Obama administration officially deployed drones that targeted Al Shabaab in 2011.[12] It is estimated that over 20 strikes were launched from the base in Djibouti. In addition, drones were used as an instrument of surveillance against Al Shabaab in Somalia and those forces that operated in Kenya. Not to overlooked, the Obama administration conducted numerous manned air strikes against the terrorist group as well.
President Obama ordered numerous direct-action missions in Somalia. In an instructive example, “The Obama administration began to target mid- and low-level operatives, starting with an airstrike on March 5, 2016, that killed approximately 150 fighters at an al Shabaab training camp 120 miles north of Mogadishu. Pentagon officials stated the Al Shabaab forces posed an imminent threat to US forces in the area, where they were working directly with local partners.”[13]
In addition, it should be noted the administration increased the training of “Somalia’s elite special forces units, known as Gashaan (“lightning”) …. These units accompany US forces on direct action missions, respond to hostage crises, and most recently have been tasked with protecting President Farmajo.”[14]
Trump And Al Shabaab
There are several reasons behind President Trump’s decision to target Al Shabaab. In late 2016, the terrorist group commenced its resurgence.[15] During this period, they incessantly targeted Kenyan and AMISOM forces. Second, in the wake of the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces which were attached to AMISOM, “Al Shabaab militants immediately reentered the towns of Burduhule, Rabdhure, Garasweyne, and Tiyeglow in the Bakool region; Eli Ali, Halgan, and Moqokori in the Hiraan region; Bud and Gal’ad in the Galgudud region; and Adan Yabal in the Middle Shabelle region.” Third, intelligence indicated the terrorist group “developed the ability to conduct complex raids against hard AMISOM targets, causing significant casualties.”[16] Given the resurgence of the terrorist group and the establishment of new sanctuaries, the Trump administration moved to respond to these strategic realities.
Upon receiving intelligence that the Al Shabaab threat not only returned, but because the terrorist group adapted to US and AMISOM tactics and consolidated control over territory previously captured, President Trump made several decisions that increased the activity and authority of Africa Command.
The initial presidential decision ordered the deployment of “several dozen troops from the 101st Airborne Division [which] would train and equip Somali forces to more effectively combat militant Islamist group Al Shabab.”[17] In the second decision, President Trump signed an executive order that “designated part of Somalia as an “area of active hostilities.”[18] This meant that much of southern Somalia would be designated warzone that allowed Africa Command to increase and sustain tempo of operations against Al Shabaab.
In the third decision, President Trump “approved a Pentagon request to allow more aggressive airstrikes against suspected militants in Somalia…. Trump’s decision … allows US special operations forces to accompany Somali troops and other African allies as they move closer to the fight against Al Shabaab militants, enabling them to call in offensive airstrikes quicker.”[19] Navy Captain Jeff Davis, a spokesman for the Pentagon, offered this description of the significance of the president’s decision: It will assist in increasing “pressure on Al Shabaab and reduce the risk to our partner forces when they conduct operations.”[20]
With the expanded authority Africa Command dramatically increased US airstrikes against Al Shabaab covering the period June-August of 2017. In a demonstration of the impact of the airstrikes, on July 31, 2017, a US drone strike resulted in the death of Al Shabaab senior commander Ali Muhammed Hussein (aka Ali Jabal), an individual responsible for multiple attacks in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.[21]
There are those that have expressed concern about what is viewed as a turning point in US counterterrorism strategy in the region. The concern is expressed through this question: “Trump is militarizing US-Africa policy?”[22]
A subsequent problem is found in the following excerpt: “The US is waging a massive shadow war in Africa … The war you’ve never heard of,’ the online journal VICE News recently announced. ‘Today, according to US military documents obtained by VICE News, special operators are carrying out nearly 100 missions at any given time—in Africa alone.’ It was the latest sign of the military’s ‘quiet but ever-expanding presence on the continent’, one that represented the ‘most dramatic growth in the deployment of America’s elite troops to any region of the globe’, it said. Donald Bolduc, the US Army general who runs Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), says Africa’s challenges ‘could create a threat that surpasses the threat that the United States currently faces from conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria’, according to VICE News.”[23]
At this point, while there is focus both on Al Shabaab and other terrorist threats across the continent, a critical question remains unanswered: will President Trump’s counterterrorism changes in Somalia lead to the defeat of a terrorist group which has thus far survived the policies of three American presidents?
Three American presidents have endeavored to confront the threat posed by Al Shabaab. To place this point in context, consider the same number of presidents have failed to end the Taliban threat in Afghanistan. Thus far, the US government has been unable to end that threat. Based on what information do we conclude that President Trump will be successful in dealing with Al Shabaab?
The author will be watching and assessing President Trump’s attention to the implementation of the still unfolding counterterrorism changes directed at Al Shabaab. A question begs, if there is a need for another course correction will President Trump authorize such change(s), or will he instead implement restrictions? The answer to this query will provide a window into the seriousness of purpose of the president.
[1] Daniel E. Agbiboa, “Terrorism Without Borders: Somalia’s Al Shabaab and the Global Jihad Network,” Journal of Terrorism Research, Volume 5, Issue 1 (Special Issue) February 2014, pp. 27-28.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Stig Jarle Hansen, “Al Shabaab in Somalia,” Chatham House, June 12, 2013. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/120613 summary.pdf.
[4] John Davis, Africa and the War on Terrorism (ed.) (London: Ashgate, 2007), p. 149.
[5] Agbiboa, “Terrorism Without Borders: Somalia’s Al Shabaab and the Global Jihad Network.”
[6] Several terrorist attacks validate the Bush administration’s decision to target the transnational terrorist group. For example, “In 2007, Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for at least five successful suicide bombings. In 2008, Somalia ranked fourth globally, behind Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, in the number of fatalities incurred by terrorist attack. Among the attacks attributed to Al Shabaab was the coordinated suicide bombing of five targets, including the UN Development Program (UNDP), in Somaliland and Puntland in 2008.” See Lauren Ploch, “Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response,” Congressional Research Service (CRS Report), November 3, 2010. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf.
[7] Dr. Malinda Smith, Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.189.
[8] Katherine Zimmerman, Jacqulyn Meyer Kantack, Colin Lahiff and Jordan Indermuehle, “US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?” Critical Threats, March 1, 2017. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/us-counterterro rism-objectives-in-somalia-is-missi on-failure-likely.
[9] Ploch, “Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response.”
[10] Agbiboa, “Terrorism Without Borders: Somalia’s Al Shabaab and the Global Jihad Network.”
[11] Caleb Weiss, “Shabaab Steps Up Attacks in Kenya,” Threat Matrix, A Blog of the Long War Journal, June 6, 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/shabaab-steps-up-attacks-in-kenya.php.
[12] Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, January 17, 2017. https://www .thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush.
[13] Zimmerman, Kantack, Lahiff and Indermuehle, “US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?”
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Allison Fedirka, “Why the US Cares About Somalia,” Geopolitical Futures, May 10, 2017. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/us-cares-somalia/?format=pdf.
[18] “Somalia: Ex Somali President ‘Urges Trump to Collaborate’ to Fight Al-Shabaab,” AllAfrica .com, April 8, 2017. http://allafrica.com/stories/201704100221.html.
[19] Corey Dickstein, “Trump Authorizes More Aggressive Airstrikes Against Al Shabab in Somalia,” Stars and Stripes, March 30, 2017. https://www.stripes.com/news/us/trump-authorizes-more-aggressive-airstrikes-against-al-shabab-in-somalia-1.461295#.Wc0J2YW c HIU.
[20] “Trump Approves More ‘Aggressive Airstrikes’ in Somalia,” Middle East Observer, March 31, 2017. https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/03/31/trump-approves-more-aggressive-airstrik es-in-somalia/.
[21] Abdi Guled, “Al-Shabab Commander Likely Killed in Somalia Airstrike: Africom,” Military.com, July 31, 2017. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/07/31/al-shabab-commander-likely-killed-somalia-airstrike-africom.html.
[22] Peter Fabricius, “Is Trump Militarizing US-Africa Policy?” Smallwarsjournal.com /blog, The Institute for Security Studies, August 11, 2017. http://smallwars journal. com /blog/is-trump-militarizing-us-africa-policy.
[23] Ibid.
