Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow with the Foundation of the Defense of Democracies, remarked, “One of the biggest counterterrorism concerns for the United States and its allies since the attacks of September 11, 2001, has been managing the dangers posed by ungoverned spaces.”[1] Unfortunately, the U.S. counterterrorism strategies have yet to rise to the challenge posed by ungoverned spaces. This post provides the evidence of one of the most conspicuous failures associated with U.S. counterterrorism.
The Threat: Ungoverned Spaces[2]
What are ungoverned spaces? In a statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February of 2004, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, defined the concept of ungoverned spaces this way, “[they represent] geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control…. Terrorist groups and narco-traffickers use these areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, relatively free from interference.”[3]
Ungoverned spaces in the region of Africa proved to be a major challenge for U.S. counterterrorism officials. The region is the location for the largest number of weak and failed states and the largest number of ungoverned spaces in the world.
In an alarming reality, covering the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, terrorist groups, local (Al Shabab and Boko Haram) and transnational (Al Qaeda and the Islamic State for example) have made extensive use of “local spaces” across Africa which have caused significant instability in the region. At issue, what instruments did the three U.S. presidents employ to confront the terrorist groups which exploited the ungoverned spaces? Second, did these counterterrorism efforts succeed or fail?
Clinton, Al Qaeda and Ungoverned Spaces
In an address before the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, May 22, 1998, President Clinton remarked the U.S. would “intensify the fight against all forms of terrorism [and] … to work with other nations to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries overseas….”[4] Clinton’s speech was not specifically directed towards Africa. That said, Africa is the region where the threat of terrorism significantly impacted U.S. interests and caused instability. Specifically, Osama Bin Laden used Sudan as operational base to direct Al Qaeda’s terrorist conspiracies. To illustrate Bin Laden’s ability to attack U.S. interests, and cause instability, in August of 1998, Al Qaeda launched twin terrorist attacks that destroyed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Often overlooked, numerous innocent civilians in those countries were killed or wounded.
Beginning in 1996, President Clinton implemented an expansive sanctions regime whose purpose is to end the sanctuary in Sudan. In a subsequent counterterrorism strategy, and in retaliation for the embassy bombings, Clinton issued orders that launched Operation Infinite Reach on August 20, 1998—a twin cruise missile strike which targeted a suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan and Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.
Clinton’s counterterrorism strategy failed to meet most of its objectives. The draconian sanctions did play an important role in ending Bin Laden’s operational base in Sudan. Additionally, the sanctions regime forced the government of Sudan to end the annual “terrorism conference.”
There were however several conspicuous failures. The Al-Shifa plant did not make chemical weapons, but rather it was a pharmaceuticals factory. This reality proved to be embarrassing for Clinton and the U.S. intelligence community. Significantly, while Al Qaeda’s operational base was terminated, Bin Laden dispatched many terrorist cells to settled in ungoverned, under-governed, and misgoverned areas in East and parts of North Africa.
During a press conference that outlined the objectives of the cruise missile strikes, Defense Secretary William Cohen remarked, “We recognize that these strikes will not eliminate the problem, but our message is clear. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists, and no limit to our resolve to defend American citizens and our interests.”[5] The reality is new sanctuaries developed before and in the wake of the cruise missile strikes.
Bush, Al Qaeda, and Ungoverned Spaces
Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in Afghanistan in October of 2001. Within days of the mission, the U.S. intelligence community warned that elements of Al Qaeda were fleeing Afghanistan, and established sanctuaries in East Africa. In an illustration of the Bush administrations counterterrorism strategy, U.S. forces, to include Special Operation Forces, Naval vessels, and other assets were dispatched to confront the threat.
In the immediate period in the wake of September 11, 2001, there was no formal statement by the administration of George W. Bush to confront the threat posed by terrorist utilization of ungoverned spaces around the world. In time that would change.
In a statement before the United Nations on September 2008, President Bush called upon the international community to confront ungoverned spaces. In the words of President Bush, “The terrorists believe time is on their side, so they have made waiting out civilized nations part of their strategy. We must not allow them to succeed. The nations of this body must stand united in the fight against terror. We must continue working to deny the terrorists refuge anywhere in the world, including ungoverned spaces?”[6]
In response, the Pentagon established the “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Project.” The report noted, “Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas.”[7] To deal with the threat, the report called upon “Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens.”[8]
Most troubling for U.S. counterterrorism officials is that Africa’s terrorist groups continue to exploit the ungoverned spaces in the region. Even more troubling for the Bush administration is the fact that transnational groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah continued to exploit the ungoverned spaces in the region. How did the Bush administration respond?
To address the above query, it is important to return to the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. Specifically, the U.S. intelligence community picked up significant chatter that while many Al Qaeda forces sought refuge in Yemen and in other areas in the Middle East, intelligence officials warned the majority were seeking refuge in the ungoverned spaces in East and North Africa.
The U.S. introduced two approaches to deal with the threat. One approach called for the dispatch of American and allied Naval forces to East Africa and U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOFs) were dispatched to deal with the burgeoning Al Qaeda presence Somalia.
Despite the presence of U.S. military forces, Al Qaeda continued to expand their networks in the ungoverned spaces in the region. A second approach proved necessary. This approach called for the training and arming of local forces in the region. To carry out this mission, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This new military partnership endeavored to create cooperation designed to link states in the region with the mission of ending not only the threat of terrorism but the ungoverned spaces that permitted them to thrive.
Al Qaeda in East Africa continue to thrive. More troubling, not only did they continue to foment instability, Al Qaeda began to coopt local terrorist groups. In an instructive example, Al Qaeda had an allegiance with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia. With assistance from the U.S., ICU forces were routed by Ethiopian forces. In time a far more dangerous iteration emerged—Al Shabab. In short order that organization became an affiliate of Al Qaeda.
In North Africa, many terrorist groups proliferated in the region. In time, many local terrorists participated in the jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq. After receiving training by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), many of these terrorists returned home to conduct attacks designed to destroy governments in North Africa.
Much like in East Africa, Bin Laden coopted local terrorist groups. In one example, after discussions [groups] merged with Al Qaeda. In time, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was established. AQIM threatened the governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Additionally, the organization boasted that they had the capability of conducting attacks in Europe.
In response to this threat, the U.S. government created the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). This partnership failed. Not enough troops were trained, and the partnership was not large enough to deal with the threat in neighboring states. In short order, the Bush administration created the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).
Initially, TSCTI had several successes. One of the initial achievements (at least in the short term) is the belief that AQIM had been defeated. Second, there was a noticeable decline in attacks and terrorist-related violence in much of North Africa. However, because of the ongoing presence of weak states within the partnership, a host of terrorist groups emerged and used the ungoverned spaces to cause instability. In another problem within the TSCTI, Boko Haram emerged and dominated many areas in Northern Nigeria and in neighboring states. In Algeria, AQIM retuned to once again threatened the region.
In recognition of the ever-evolving threat of terrorism in East and North Africa, the Pentagon created Africa Command (AFRICOM). The new combatant military command is designed to increase coordination to confront the threat. But debates over which states(s) would be home of AFRICOM often overshadowed its mission. As Bush’s tenure closed, and with the administration’s focus shifting to dealing with the reemergence of the Taliban threat in Afghanistan, critics charged that not enough attention had been given to threats in East and North Africa.
Obama, Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and Ungoverned Spaces
In 2007 Senator Barack Obama made this statement: “They [Al Qaeda] operate freely in the disaffected communities and disconnected corners of our interconnected world—the impoverished, weak and ungoverned states that have become the most fertile breeding grounds for transnational threats like terror.”[9] Once in office, Obama’s focus shifted to issues that had a greater priority than ungoverned spaces.
During the first year, the threat of terrorism in Africa received scant attention in the administration. Covering the period 2009-2010, Obama focused on U.S. policy in Afghanistan and ending the Iraq War. In another priority, during the period 2009-2012, the Obama administration dramatically increased U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen.
In 2014 the Obama White House released information that offered a window into administration efforts to deal with terrorism in Africa. The Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa Factsheet outlined administration counterterrorism efforts in Africa. In a major point, the document acknowledges, “The United States and our African partners are committed to countering terrorism in Africa through counterterrorism partnerships that draw on all of our tools: military, diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, law enforcement, and development alike.”[10] Nothing was said about ungoverned spaces.
Other highlights include the following. The document noted that in 2011 the Obama administration “co-founded the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).” In time, many states in Africa would joined the GCTF. Additionally, the administration boasts that it provided funds and training for the Somali National Army and the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers battling Al Shabab.
These initiatives represent the “Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism” which is designed to defeat Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, and other groups in the region. Elsewhere, the administration provided $10 million in counterterrorism assistance to the government of France to assist our ally in their mission to defeat violent extremists in Chad, Mali, and Niger.[11]
In 2015 President Obama committed the U.S. to the intensification of the struggle against terrorism in East Africa. Specifically, the administration committed to expansion of counterterrorism operations in Kenya and Somalia and increased financial support to the government of Kenya.[12] Finally, the Obama ordered the Pentagon to increase the training of Kenyan military forces to curb the threat posed Al Shabab.[13]
On the Islamic State, President Obama made this statement: “ISIS is a virulent, nasty organization that has gained a foothold in ungoverned spaces effectively in Syria and parts of Western Iraq. We have to take it seriously.”[14] Even as Iraqi forces are poised to retake Mosul, the second largest city in the country, ISIS has settled in ungoverned spaces in over 20 states around the world. To date, Obama has not announced a strategy to deal with this threat.
Ungoverned Spaces: The Counterterrorism Verdict
Covering the Clinton, Bush, and the Obama, each administration’s counterterrorism strategies never rose to challenge of ungoverned spaces. Under Clinton, ungoverned spaces increased in Africa. What proved problematic for Clinton is that Al Qaeda and their allies occupied multiple ungoverned spaces both before and after attacks on U.S. interests in the region.
From the beginning, despite the Bush administration’s rhetoric and after the creation of several counterterrorism strategies to deal with ungoverned spaces, there was a modest increase in sanctuaries in Africa. Indeed, the administration’s task proved to be monumental.
Even after the creation of the CJTF-HOA and the TSCTI which provided funds that permitted local military forces to receive new military hardware. Some of these local forces in select partner states trained with the U.S. military, and others engaged in sharing intelligence. Still, there were problems within the partnerships. Most notable, there were not enough local forces that were trained to meet to the threat posed by terrorists which operated in multiple ungoverned spaces, and it should be noted much of the ungoverned spaces therefore continued to exist and others were occupied in other areas across Africa.
Interestingly, Obama and officials in the administration spoke of Al Qaeda and ungoverned spaces at a higher level than that of previous presidents. However, despite administration rhetoric not much was accomplished in dealing with the challenge posed by ungoverned spaces. The reality is the security threat increased. That is, we have witnessed a proliferation of Islamic terrorist groups across the region. Second, not only have local terrorist groups expanded, the same is true for those groups that support Al Qaeda and those that are now pledging loyalty to the Islamic State. Third, and equally troubling, these combined terrorist entities have used an untold number of ungoverned spaces to sustain their terrorist activities.
There are two critical periods that illustrate that Obama’s efforts to confront ungoverned spaces proved problematic. In the initial period (2009-2012), President Obama boasted that drone strikes killed numerous terrorist leaders in the territories of Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. During this same period, Obama incessantly boasted that Al Qaeda had been “degraded” and even “decimated.” In Africa, the truth is revealing: Al Qaeda stealthy expanded its affiliates and they continued to foment discord across the region. Some viewed this expansion as “The Arc of Instability.”
In the second period, which encompassed the Arab Spring, in those areas where state failure ensued, Libya and Egypt for example, a host of terrorist groups filled multiple power vacuums. In Libya, Ansar Al Sharia, and several other jihadist groups, emerged. In Egypt, Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis (ABM), used the ungoverned spaces in the Sinai region to launch multiple terrorist attacks.
The fact that ABM subsequently pledged their loyalty to ISIS further demonstrates the threat that this group poses. There is also this issue: within a short period, Al Qaeda and radical Islamist groups seized power vacuums across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In short, the evidence indicates that during the period of the Arab Spring, and what the author refers to as the Arab Thaw[15], President Obama often appeared disconnected and a plethora of terrorist groups developed and occupied several ungoverned spaces.
After examining three U.S. presidents and their counterterrorism strategies, the verdict is the rhetoric and the implementation of policies never rose to the threats posed by a burgeoning list of terrorist groups that continued to operate in a plethora of ungoverned and under-governed spaces. Worse, terrorist groups continue to occupy a record number of ungoverned spaces in the region.
[1] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Losing War Against Ungoverned Spaces,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 28, 2015. http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/gartenstein-ross-daveed-the-losing-war-against-ungoverned-spaces/.
[2] The Department of Defense (DoD) as early as 2004 has often used “ungoverned territory” instead of ungoverned spaces. The reason ungoverned territory is often used is because it represents an area absent sustainable government troops. The definition of ungoverned territory is “rugged remote, maritime or littoral areas not effectively governed by a sovereign state.” See J. Boone Bartholomees, The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: National Security Policy and Strategy (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), p.156.
[3] Phil Walter, “Ungoverned Spaces: What Threat Do They Pose?” BlogsofWar.com, February 16, 2016. http://blogsofwar.com/ungoverned-spaces-what-threat-do-they-pose/.
[4] President Bill Clinton Speaks to the Naval Academy at Annapolis. May 22, 1998. Annapolis, Maryland. http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/05/22/clinton.academy/ transcript.html.
[5] Statements by Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “There Can Be No Safe Haven for Terrorists.” Federal Document Clearing House, Washington Post, August 21, 1998, p. A18.
[6] United States Participation in the United Nations—2008. Address by President George W. Bush, September 23, 2008. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/document s/organization/13478 7.pdf.
[7] Robert Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens,” The Final Report of Ungoverned Areas Project Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Washington, DC 2008. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Barack Obama, April 23, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/elections/remarks-senator-barack-obama-chicago-council-global-affairs/p13172.
[10] Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa Factsheet. The White House, August 6, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa.
[11] Justin Sink, “Obama Directs $10M to Fight Terrorists in Africa,” The Hill, August 11, 2014. http://thehill.com/policy/international/214818-obama-sends-aid-to-fight-terror-groups-in-africa.
[12] Juliet Eilperin and Kevin Sieff, “Obama Commits U.S. to Intensified Fight Against Terrorists in East Africa,” Washington Post, July 25, 2015. https://www.washington post.com/politics/us-to-expand-support-in-kenya-somalia-for-counterterrorism-operation s/2015/07/25/b6f386f0-3210-11e5-97ae-30a30cca95d7_story.html?0p19G=c.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “President Obama’s Full Interview with Steve Inskeep.” December 21, 2015. https://grabien. com/story.php?id=44158.
[15] See John Davis, The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).
